25 July 1998
On July 21 1998 the Department of Defense published "Department of Defense Review of Allegations Concerning Operation Tailwind," dated July 21, 1998.
The online summary makes frequent reference to tabs of supporting information. The DoD Public Affairs Office said most of the 251-page report was in tabs which would be put on the Internet by DoD at a later date ("in a few weeks"). We requested a hardcopy of the report and are transcribing its attachments listed below. Initial transcriptions are hyperlinked; others will be added as completed.
Thanks to Lt. Col. William Darley, Public Affairs Office, Department of Defense (703-697-1846).
Note: Due to irregular page numbering of the tabs, numbers have been added in italics top left of all pages.
[End Attachments List]
[Tab A]
[B-1]
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
JUL 9 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind"
Allegations have been made that in the early 1970's a military operation in Laos called "Operation Tailwind" was directed toward US military defectors, and that Sarin Nerve gas was used during the operation.
You are directed to review military records, archives, historical writings, other appropnate information sources, and interview individuals with personal knowledge for the purpose of determining if there is any truth in this matter.
Please provide me with the results of your review within 30 days.
[Signature Bill Cohen]
U10018 /98
[End Tab B]
[C-1]
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
This document records remarks made June 23 in a meeting from 2:34 p.m. to 4:14 p.m. June 23 in Room 3E869, The Pentagon. The seven individuals listed below, all former U. S. Army officers, volunteered to share their knowledge of Operation Tailwind, a U.S. military operation conducted in September 1970 in Laos, with members ofthe Defense Department group investigating allegations made in a June 7 NewsStand [Time] CNN TV program concerning Operation Tailwind.
1. MG. John Singlaub, USA, (Ret.), a past commander of Studies and Observations Group (SOG), MACV;
2. COL John "Skip" Sadler, USA, (Ret.), Commander, SOG, Ground Studies Group during Operation Tailwind;
3. COL. Robert Pinkerton, USA, (Ret.), Operations Officer, SOG during Operation Tailwind;
4. LTC. Eugene "Gene" McCarley, USA, (Ret.), who, as a captain, commanded the Operation Tailwind force on the ground;
5. Maj. John Plaster, USAR, (Ret.), SOG member and author ofthe 1997 book, "SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam";
6. CPT. Michael "Gary" Rose, USA, (Ret.), medic on Operation Tailwind;
7. Mr. Rudy Gresham, personal representative of ADM Thomas H. Moore, USN, (Ret), and spokesperson for the Special Forces Association.
The meeting was chaired by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy de Leon.
MEETING
Secretary de Leon addressing the CNN allegations, made these introductory points:
Thanked guests for coming to the Pentagon to share their knowledge of Operation Tailwind and assist DoD in fulfilling the June 9 directive from the Secretary of Defense to inquire into the allegations made by CNN/Time concerning Operation Tailwind.
Invited guests to introduce themselves and indicate their role in Operation Tailwind.
[C-2]
DISCUSSION
SADLER: "The buck should start and stop here [with me]. I was responsible for planning it [Operation Tailwind], getting it approved, and directing it."
At no time was there any mention of defectors or deserters or nerve gas. Tailwind participants did not observe any "whites" or "round eyes" on the ground. Nerve gas was never used. This was a terrible piece ofjournalism by CNN.
Gen. [Creighton] Abrams approved the operation. He was briefed daily during the operation.
The After Action Report (AAR) of the operation should be on fiLe "somewhere in the Pentagon." There is nothing in that AAR that substantiates the CNN story about observing or killing defectors or using nerve gas. After the operation, there was never any report or even mention of any defectors encountered or nerve gas used.
DE LEON: Purpose of operation?
SADLER: There were two primary assignments for Operation Tailwind: 1) "to help relieve enemy pressure coming down from the north - it was a beehive there," and 2) "in the area of Chavane, we knew there was something in there in force." [Given that the enemy had put substantial assets in Chavane], "We had to go see why the area was s important to the enemy."
The operation succeeded in gathering exceptionally good intelligence about the enemy. "The two footlockers of documents we got, [General] Abrams described as 'the best logistics intelligence ever gained in the entire Vietnam war."' [The documents described the support structure for and operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail.]
PLASTER: [Gave a presentation using slides, including slides of photographs taken during the operation. The specific points he made are contained in his briefing slides and supporting paper packet. (The slides, less the slides of photographs, and supporting documents are attached to this MFR.) The presentation covered: dates and mission of the Tailwind operation; SOG organization, command and control relationships, and areas of operation; declassified pages from a U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam [MACV] report of operations; facts, arguments and statements by Tailwind participants that rebut the specific CNN/Time allegations; and attempts made during CNN' s preparation of their story to convince the CNN producers that they "had it wrong."]
SADLER: When [General] Abrams took over from [General] Westmoreland, he took more control of SOG operations. He resented the fact that an Army colonel [Col. Sadler] was commanding Navy and Air Force units.
PLASTER: For reasons of security, SOG was a compartmented organization. One part of the organization often didn't know what the other part was doing.
2
[C-3]
B Company ["Hatchet Forces"] conducted the Tailwind mission. The area of the mission was in Laos, where Highway 165 met Highway 966. That's about 10 kilometers east of Chavane (outside the area of operations) and 25 miles into Laos, not 200 miles as [Tailwind platoon leader llLt. Robert L.] Van Buskirk claims in his book - "that would put you 75 miles into Thailand."
"The idea [of Operation Tailwind] was to create a ruckus in the enemy' s rear so they'd have to pull back forces. The Hmong guerrillas could then seize their objectives, and in fact, they did."
From the time the Tailwind force landed in Laos September 11, 1970, they were fighting. About 12 soldiers from B Company were brought in to a landing zone (LZ) about 20 minutes before the operation began. Then two H-53s helicopters brought in the rest of the unit. Over the course of the mission, there were many US and Montagnard casualties.
On Day 4 of the operation, two dogs came up to Lieutenant Van Buskirk' s patrol. The patrol followed the dogs back to their owners in a Viet Cong [VC] base camp. It was not a village. There were no civilians in the base camp. There were no Caucasians.
The VC at the base camp put up a very poor defense. "The VC never believed we'd attack them from the ground that deep in Laos." As the photos document, the camp had bunkers to protect from air attack but no fighting bunkers to defend against ground attack. "They were bomb shelters, and we just threw in grenades." Further, the VC in the camp were inexperienced logistics soldiers, not trained combat soldiers.
USAF A-1 Skyraiders operating out of Thailand provided close air support (CAS). In some cases, when the CAS encountered heavy anti aircraft defenses, the forward air controller (FAC) called for CBU [Cluster Bomb Unit] 19, a concentrated tear gas, to suppress the anti aircraft.
DE LEON: Was that also referred to as "vomit gas"?
PLASTER: I heard it referred to as "sleeping gas." CBU 30 ordnance was similar to CBU 19. Tear gas was rarely used: "It was very close hold."
Q: Who had authority to employ tear gas in air strikes?
SADLER: I had the authority to call in tear gas. I could use it on my authority. We had tear gas in hand grenades as well. Headquarters 7th Air Force also had the authority to use tear gas on a case-by-case basis.
SINGLAUB: The proper term is "riot control gas." It was and is used by the police in this country. It has a very pronounced effect. "You feel like you're dying." We used it to suppress anti-aircraft fire.
3
[C-4]
CHARLES CRAGIN: Was riot control agent unique to the military or did civilian police use the same agent?
SINGLAUB: It was the same thing.
SADLER: The tear gas used does not require decontamination at all. "If it had been nerve gas, no one would have made it back from the operation alive."
BRIG. GEN. DAVID ARMSTRONG: Did the FAC (Forward Air Controller) lay on the tear gas or did you [McCARLEY] call for it?
McCARLEY: The FAC called it in, not me. We were carrying M17 gas masks. That was my SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) for missions.
PLASTER: The mask carrier was stamped "FOR RIOT CONTROL AGENT ONLY." The masks weren't in good enough shape to handle nerve gas.
I flew 450 missions in 1970 and 1971 in support of SOG operations. We never once used gas on any of those missions.
To use gas, the FAC would have to make the request through 7th Air Force.
McCARLEY: The FAC advised me the gas was coming in. He could see the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] massing. We had fought for four days and were out of water and almost out of ammo. We were exhausted. He could see that once we got to the extraction zone, we would be overrun. The FAC called for the gas. I never requested it.
SADLER: FAC's were our lifeline. We had no artillery that could fire that far [from Vietnam into the area of operations in Laos]. The FAC's provided all of our fire support.
PLASTER: [Showed photos of McCarley and Rose immediately after the mission with no shirts on (just after exiting the extraction helicopters).] (Rhetorically), "Do these men look like they just got hit with nerve gas? Rose was recommended for the Medal of Honor. He received the DSC (Distinguished Service Cross).
"The great accomplishment and byproduct of the operation was the satchels of documents we brought back." [Showed photograph of Montagnard soldier carrying satchels, as well as a slide of a MACV journal extract (attached). The extract notes the importance of the intelligence gained about the NVA 599th Transportation Group's operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail.]
CRAGIN: [CNN producer] April Oliver said she read the MACV journal cover to cover.
4
PLASTER: Yes. [Plaster explained the repeated efforts by himself and others to convince Oliver that her allegations were baseless. Those efforts are documented in the attached slides.]
ROSE: "My wounded were extremely distressed by the gas. We had stripped them down to lessen the weight and tied them to poles for transport. I couldn't do anything for them."
PLASTER: CNN relied on Jim Cathey, who said he was a member of "the Rat Pack Commandos." There was no such unit. Fox News just told us that Cathey is an Air Force supply sergeant who was stationed at Tan Son Nhat Air Base.
"Jay Graves was not a recon[naissance] team leader in Kontum. He was not in Operation Tailwind, but he was [nonetheless] interviewed [by CNN] for 71/2 hours."
I have four statements from people contacted by CNN. They denied the allegations. In each case, the producer, April Oliver, became angry when we wouldn't support her allegations.
McCARLEY: There was no mention whatsoever in briefings before or after Tailwind of "round eyes," POWs, or nerve gas.
(Rhetorically) With all of the photos taken of the base camp [including those just shown by Plaster], why were there no photos of these "round eyes" supposedly encountered? The photographic documentation was extensive and shows that there were no Caucasians encountered.
Rose should have gotten the Medal of Honor.
SADLER: Rose was wounded three times during the operation. He treated all 16 U.S. soldiers on the mission at least once each. He treated all of the wounded Montagnards.
McCARLEY: He shielded a wounded man with his own body. I don't think he ate or slept during the entire [four day] operation. He treated all of the wounded after the operation even though he was wounded himself. We were told the Medal of Honor was downgraded to a DSC because he [Rose] was not in an official combat status -- it was a "black operation."
SADLER: "Another reason the defector story doesn't pass muster is that it was a standing imperative that if you saw POWs, rescuing them became your mission, regardless of what mission you were on." There were incentives to returning with enemy POWs or deserters--$100 for us, and indigenous people would get a Seiko watch.
ARMSTRONG: CNN says they were told Tailwind was a reconnaissance in force What was the specific objective of the mission?
5
[C-6]
McCARLEY: "We were looking for a fight." The mission was to draw the enemy into our area and relieve pressure on our forces to the north--to test the enemy' s strength and to create a diversion. There were no specific recon objectives.
PLASTER: Our enduring goal was to take prisoners [for intelligence purposes], not to kill the enemy. We were an intelligence-gathering unit.
ARMSTRONG: [He read aloud the definition of a reconnaissance in force.] CNN wanted to know the objectives of the recon. They didn't understand that this [Tailwind] was an attack mission, not a recon.
McCARLEY: (Rhetorically) Out of the 200 people CNN interviewed, why did they just use those few individuals who did not deny the CNN allegations?
ROSE: "By Day 4 of the mission, the wounded were stacking up. There were a lot of guys on morphine, lashed to poles. It was hard for them to keep what was happening straight."
It wasn't a village we went into as CNN said, it was a compound. I came up [to the compound] after the fight was over. "I saw only two bodies, both dead from small arms fire, and I've seen enough people dead from small arms fire to know what that looks like."
[ROSE vividly recounted the final hours of the mission as the force moved to the evacuation point.] Describing the encounter with gas, he said: "We got hit with gas. It was CS [tear gas]. I know what CS is from basic training and from a prior incident at Kontum. It's like skunk. Once you smell it, you never forget, even if it's fifty years later. It was definitely tear gas. I was wincing, my eyes watered, my nose and lungs burned. You turn your face into the wind and it clears. My wounded were in distress. I never saw any evidence of nerve gas. It was CS! It's criminal to say our own Air Force would drop nerve gas on us!"
"On the LZ waiting to be extracted, we were running out of ammo. I went through all mine. The third ship [helicopter] coming in got hit and crashed into the water. I remember a Marine pulling us onto another helicopter to get us out."
"It's hard for me to have to explain to my 20-year-old daughter that we did nothing wrong. CNN owes us an apology and they need to say they got it wrong."
LT. COL. TOM BEGINES: We [ROSE and I] were talking before the meeting. He said something very important just in casual conversation but it should be discussed now. He said they carried atropine on the operation. Many of the media from their coverage of Desert Storm know that atropine is the acknowledged antidote for nerve gas. Some will take the fact that the patrol carried atropine as evidence we intended to encounter or use nerve gas.
6
[C-7]
ROSE: All of the medics I knew in A and B [Hatchet Forces] companies routinely carried atropine in syrettes on missions. These weren't the atropine dispensers that are used to treat for nerve gas. It wasn't carried because we thought we'd encounter nerve gas. We carried atropine because we didn't have any snake bit kits or anything to treat poisonous insect bites. I don't know if there are any scientific studies about it but we [the Hatchet company medics] believed that since snake venom and poisonous insect bites act on the nervous system like nerve gas, using atropine would slow down the venom' s action long enough to get a man to the hospital. I only had occasion to use atropine once in my entire time with the SOG, to treat a Vietnamese child bitten by a poisonous insect.
PLASTER: [Showed the group the award narration Lieutenant VAN BUSKIRK submitted soon after the mission for Specialist Five Craig Schmidt. The award narration composed by VAN BUSKIRK soon after the operation states in part "When the company later moved to a landing zone for extraction they were subject to tear gas . . . "] Van Buskirk said at the time that the gas he encountered was tear gas. There is no mention of supposed nerve gas.
PINKERTON: I never heard in the year I was SOG operations officer any reference to defectors.
Soldiers used the term "round eyes" to describe Caucasian women. I never heard those words used otherwise. Our mission was to rescue Americans. Command Sergeant Major Billy WALL [spelling?] was the greatest warrior I ever saw. He was a legend. But he was reduced to tears one time when we were alerted to the possible presence of American prisoners and they were moved before we could get them.
SADLER: We had two guys killed in attempts to rescue Americans.
SINGLAUB: Conceming the CNN statement that they attribute to me. CNN showed my picture and said that I had said.it may have been necessary to kill Americans. They used material from the interview I did with them a year ago. I initially refused the interview because Peter ARNETT was going to be involved: He's dishonest and despicable. CNN tricked me! They said ARNETT was not going to be involved. April OLIVER attached my comments out of context to a completely different story.
CNN did the same thing with Admiral MOORER.
I think CNN took statements from many people completely out of context. I told CNN producer OLIVER many times there was no story. ARNETT just wanted to air his old contention -- first made by him years ago during the war -- that nerve agent was used in Vietnam.
It's sad that we have to spend so much time and energy defending ourselves against allegations of things that never happened.
7
[C-8]
The story that has not been told and should be told to the American people is our efforts to rescue Americans.
GRESHAM: These sensational, untrue allegations are just like those made in the media that U.S. special forces were involved in the assassination of Martin Luther King. I worked for two years as the spokesperson for special forces to dispel those completely false allegations. We prevailed. Colonel John SMITH in Army Public Affairs can tell you all about that.
Colonel SMITH called me two or three days before CNN aired their story. He'd been informed of seven and seven-and-one-half hour interviews of people conducted by CNN for this story. There were repeated attempts by CNN to twist their words.
The CNN story made headlines in London, Paris, all over the world.
I'm also the special forces investigator for these allegations.
"MOORER told the Balfimore Sun that CNN put words in his mouth."
"[After the CNN interview] Admiral MOORER and I had very candid conversations." [Retired Army Chief of Staffl Bruce PALMER and General DAVIS know Admiral MOORER. MOORER called me and asked me to be his spokesperson. The allegation was made after the CNN story aired that the Pentagon pressured him to clarify the record but he told me the Pentagon never pressured him.
[During my service in Vietnam], I also worked as PA [Public Affairs] for WESTMORELAND.
I got a telephone call from Tom JOHNSON, President of CNN. I told him CNN was flat wrong in their story. CNN sent a producer named Jim CONNORS [spelling?] to see me. I rebutted all of their allegations in detail and gave them the true facts. I pointed out that CNN had virtually no documentation to support their allegations. CNN offered Jay GRAVES' [a CNN source for their story] DD Form 214 [Record of Service] showing he was in Vietnam as supposed proofthat he was on Tailwind. That's laughable! CNN's response to me was that I was "naive" about what happened ! CONNORS said he did not have the authority to retract the story.
There are 15,000 members in our special forces association. I asked for any information that might give any credibility to the CNN allegations. I've gotten nothing in response.
The former SOG members present gave an exclusive to Fox Network today. We also talked to ABC.
ARMSTRONG: Tailwind was our deepest operation into Laos. Did you need special permission to do Tailwind?
8
[C-9]
SADLER: I'll give you a qualified "yes." ABRAMS had the authority to order the operation but it required the tacit consent of other organizations. We let people know about the operation and their silence meant acquiescence.
PINKERTON: I sent a message to CINCPAC [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific] before the operation.
Q. [ARMSTRONG?] With regard to the U. S. ambassador to Laos. Did you need to have his permission to use tear gas, especially since that might be portrayed as using a new weapon, an escalation, and the political situation was tense at the time?
SADLER: ABRAMS said to get ambassadorial approval. We went to NKP [Nakhon Phanom, Thailand].
SINGLAUB: I'd go to NKP or Udom [also in Thailand] to coordinate operations in Laos.
CAPTAIN (USN) PETROPAOLI: Wouldn't the SOG know when CS gas was being loaded on Air Force aircraft for use?
SADLER: We coordinated with C-130s for airstrikes. The code words were "hillsborough" during the daytime and "moonbeam" during the nighttime.
PLASTER: There was a brigadier general with the airborne FAC in such cases, I think with his Laotian counterpart.
ARMSTRONG: Yesterday, CNN made the contention that the ambassador would have to approve the use of new weapons [like tear gas].
SADLER: We got clearance from NKP during the initial coordination for the operation. The ambassador did control things in Laos.
ARMSTRONG: I talked with Admiral MOORER. It wasn't clear to me what he actually said to CNN.
GRESHAM: He's 86. He said OLIVER tried to put words in his mouth. He said he never saw documentation but "had heard rumors" of the use of sarin. He said that 24 hours before the CNN program aired CNN tried hard to get him to say he knew sarin had been used. CNN did three sessions with him. They tried to charm an 86-year-old man. He told me he is now clear in his mind that there was no nerve gas, no defectors. Everything that he said that was controversial was said off camera. CNN said he read the transcript before their prograrn aired but he said he only glanced at it.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS KEN BACON: I think CNN is "this close" to retracting the story.
9
[C-10]
UNDER SECRETARY De LEON: We want the true story told.
BACON: Who is Michael HAGEN?
PLASTER: He's one ofthe 16 U.S. participants in the operation. Ted WISEREN [spelling?] believes CNN told HAGEN "his paralysis is the result of the nerve gas used during Tailwind."
BACON: He's quoted by CNN saying, "The government doesn't want you to know, but I know it was nerve gas."
ROSE: My wife talked to him yesterday.
"I'm living proof that toxic gas was not dropped on us that day. Nobody showed any signs of exposure to toxic gas."
BACON: Was there ever any nerve gas [stored] in Laos or Thailand?
PLASTER: I can say conclusively, and I've done a lot of research into SOG operations, that I've never heard of any nerve gas in country.
SINGLAUB: Commanders tell me that nerve gas was not available. Talk with Harry C. "Hinnie" ADERHOLT [spelling?] in Fort Walton Beach, Florida.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHERIDAN: Besides tear gas, what else was unusual about the Tailwind operation?
PINKERTON: It was the largest force [company-size] we had ever committed in Laos up until then. Usually, the SOG missions were just three to five man operations on the ground. We would go after lucrative intelligence targets. It was also a sensitive mission because it was outside the normal AO [area of operations].
SINGLAUB: The story of "Salt and Pepper" [the supposed two U.S. defectors] has existed for a long time. I think it's a disinformation campaign.
CRAGIN: What kind of lead time was there for the FAC to call in tear gas?
McCARLEY: It was normally 2-3 hours from the time of request. Again, I didn't call in the tear gas so I don't know.
PLASTER: "'Sandies [sp?]' was the codeword for fire suppression for SAR [Search and Rescue]. Any SAR people will tell you they had aircraft on strip alert. Some could have been loaded with CBU- 19 [tear gas] . They could have been diverted to the Tailwind operation on an emergency basis when the operation ran into trouble. They knew there were heavy anti-aircraft defenses and the Tailwind force was in serious trouble.
10
[C-11]
ARMSTRONG: They knew they had to do an extraction. The Air Force could have planned to use tear gas.
CRAGIN: Do you know the names of any of the FAC's that day?
McCARLEY: All three SOG "covey riders" with the FACs have died.
PLASTER: Lloyd G. O'DANIELS is an auditor in Springfield, Virginia. He flew as a backup FAC that day.
Air Force General EBERHART [now Vice Chief of Staff] was with the FAC unit but he went home [to the U.S.] before Tailwind.
DAVIDSON: I've talked with some A-l guys but I've not been able to locate the FAC that day the tear gas was used.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHWEITER: Do you know the name or callsign of the pilot who dropped the tear gas?
PLASTER: Newsweek says it was Art Bishop.
One more thing. The SOG deserves a Presidential Unit Citation for Tailwind. It was a black operation, now declassified. They deserve it.
SADLER/PINKERTON/ROSE: [Strongly agreed.]
Other OSD aKendees at the meeting are as follows:
Mr. C. Cragin, Acting ASD(RA); Mr. W. Davidson, AA to SECAF; Mr. J.B. Hudson, AA to SECARMY; Ms. J. Fites, DUSD(PI); CAPT J. Pietropaoli, JCS; BG D. Armstrong, USA, (Ret.), JCS; Mr. R. DestaKe, DPMO;COL E. Winborn, OSD(LA); Mr. J. Schweiter, DASD(M&P); Col T. Bowman, OUSD(P&R); Mr. K. Bacon, ASD(PA); Mr. B. Sheridan, PDAS(SO/LIC); Mr. B. Carson, OUSD(P&R); Cdr D. Newman, OGC.
THOMAS J. BEGINES
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Designated as Recorder
Attachments
11
[C-12]
Suggested Citation Accompanying
Statement of Lt. Robert Van Buskirk
Specialist Five Craig D. Schmidt, 543-60-1312, United States Army, Special
Operations Augmentation, Command and Control Detachment Central, 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Republic of Vietnam, is recommended
for award of the Silver Star Medal for heroism in battle during the period
12 through 14 September 1970 in connection with military operations against
hostile enemy force in the Republic of Vietnam. SP5 Schmidt was serving as
a squad leader with a company-size exploitation force that was on a mission
deep in enemy-controlled territory. On the morning of the 12th, the first
platoon came under fire from an estimated 40 NVA employing automatic weapons,
B-40 rockets, mortars and hand grenades. SP5 Schmidt uas called upon to reinforce
the left flank. He immediately moved his men into position but uas wounded
by an enemy grenade. Some of his SCU [Montagnards] squad members were also
wounded and others refused to advance into the heavy fire. Although wounded,
SP5 Schmidt continued his advance into the fire, disregarding his own safety
and delivering heavy fire on the enemy. Only two of his squad members followed
him. Their accurate fire killed many of the enemy and the others were forced
to withdraw to the right where they were cutoffby another squad. This contact
lasted over an hour. SP5 Schmidt's aggressiveness and excellent conduct under
fire greatly contributed to the annihilation of almost the entire enemy force.
The next day, 13 September, another group of enemy struck the forward element
of the company as they left their RON [rest overrlight] site. SP 5 Schmidt
had been wounded a second time and was in the center of the company with
the other wounded personnel. Two men were attempting to hold off the numerically
superior enemy force. SP5 Schmidt left his safer position with the other
wounded and moved alone to the point of contact and began firing on the enemy.
On the 14th of September the point element was again pinned down by enemy
fire, from the direct front. The squads moved on line and began an assault
on the enemy position. SP5 Schmidt was the leader of one of these squads
and despite his wounds he charged forward towards the enemy location. They
soon discovered that the enemy were trying to protect their base camp, a
battalion-size, well-defended area. SP5 Schmidt led his men into the camp,
through the enemy fire. The assault was a success and 54 enemy were found
dead in the camp. There were more dead on the flanks and in the front. When
the company later moved to a landing zone for extraction thev were subjected
to tear gas that had been dropped bv friendly aircraft but then drifted
to their position. There were three minutes in which to find an LZ.
Although wounded and sick from the gas SP5 Schmidt ran past his point
man and began jumping up and down to flatten the tall elephant grass. It
was largely due to his actions that the landing zone was cleared and the
company was able to be extracted. His courage and valor throughout this operation
reflect great credit upon himself and are well deserving of the Silver Star
Medal.
| 1. Eyewitness Statement
2. Proposed Citation |
Robert L. Van Buskirk 1LT, |
[Signature] |
[C-13]
TRUE FACTS
CONCERNING OPERATION TAILWIND
DATE: 11 - 14 September 1970
LOCATION: Target Area Tango-Two, eighteen kilometers east of Chavane, Laos
UNIT: Company B, Command & Control Central, (Special Operations Augmentation), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Kontum, Republic of Vietnam
COMMANDER: Captain Eugene C. McCarley
MISSION: Conduct a diversionary attack along the Highway 165 road structure, to draw NVA forces away from the Bolovens Plateau, to support an attack there by CIA-supported guerrillas
FORCES INVOLVED: Co. B, CCC, with 16 USSF and 120 Montagnards, support by
USAF A-l Skyraiders; USMC HH-53 and AH-1 Cobra gunship units from Danang,
South Vietnam.
[C-14]
[Figure C-1]
[C-15]
[Figure C-2]
[C-16]
MACV-SOG
SOG was a Joint Service, Unconventional Warfare Task Force, which existed JAN 1964 - APR 1972, with responsibility for:
--Operating (indigenous) agent networks in North Vietnam, Laos & Cambodia;--Reconnaissance and Surveillance along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and enemy base areas in Laos and Cambodia;
--Small-scale (company or less) raiding and road interdiction missions along the Laotian highway system;
--Crafting and Dissemination of "black propaganda ' in support of the U.S war effort;
--POW and MIA tracking, and attempted recover /rescue;
--Working in collaboration with other U. S. agencies (CIA, NSA, etc ), on special efforts uhich relate to the above missions.
[C-17]
CNN/TIME SPECIFIC ALLEGA TIONS
During the September 1970 Operation Tailwind, a raid by SOG personnel behind enemy lines in southern Laos:
Time article: ". . . the reason for the raid: The targeted village as believed to be harboring a large group of American G.I.s uho had defected to the enemy. The Special Forces units job was to kill them."
The article went on to allege that this operation twice employed sarin nerve gas, both as a preparatory attack on the "village" the night before the SOG ground force hit it, and at the very end ofthe operation, to facilitate extraction ofthe SOG men.
Therefore, there are three distinct charges:
1. SOG targeted and killed unarmed, unresisting Arnerican defectors in Laos.
2. That SOG men killed women and children in the Laotian "village."
3. To support this operation, the USAF dropped sarin nerve gas on two occasions.
[C-18]
Van Buskirk's Claim he Killed American "Defectors"
Time article [15 June]:
"Suddenly Van Buskirk spotted two "longshadows," a name for taller Caucasians. One was sliding down a "spider hole" into the underground tunnel system beneath the camp. The other was running toward it. "Early 20s. Blond hair. Looks like he was running off a beach in California," remembers Van Buskirk.... The lieutenant gave chase but just missed the blond man as he slipped into the tunnel. He shouted down the hole, identifying himself and offering to take the man home. "F_ you," came the reply. "No, it's f_ you," answered Van Buskirk as he dropped in a white phosphorous grenade, presumably killing both longshadows."
Van Buskirk was the only Tailwind participant to claim Americans or Caucasians were present. CNN offered "confirrnation" by two men who were not on the ground in Laos, and did not participate in this operation.
[C-19]
CNN/TIME'S STORY OF THE SURVEILLANCE
MISSION DOES NOT STAND UP
It's claimed one team obserVed the "village" from two miles away, with only binoculars [Newsweek], yet the recon men could discern between Asians and Caucasians:
--The area of Operation Tailwind is heavily jungled, with visible line-of-sight measured in tens of yards;
--Ordinary binoculars lack the magnification and acuity to resolve human shapes two miles away, so the race of someone under surveillance cannot be discerned;
--The (likely fraud) Sgt Jim Cathey claimed the codeword for Americans was "longshadows," while the actual SOG codeword was "Strawhats."
[C-20]
CNN FALSELY CLAIMED AN ADVANCE RECON
MISSION HAD SURVEILLED THE "VILLAGE" IN LAOS
--Captain McCarley, the mission comrnander, knows no such advance recon took place;
--The two CNN/Time sources had nothing to do with this operation--they were not there and their alleged recon mission could not have happened:
--Maj. Plaster served in the recon company responsible for such missions in this area of Laos, personally knew the other 15 or so recon team leaders who would have had to have run such an operation, and knows that neither of these men served in his reconnaissance unit.
--One man, USAF Sgt. Jim Cathey, told the media such a fantastic story that he is almost certainly a fraud.
--The other man, Sgt. Jay Graves, a genuine Special Forces Vietnam veteran, never participated in cross-border operations into Laos. He served in SOG for only a few months in 1970, as an instructor, not a field operative. But his quotes in CNN and Time never quite claim he was on Tailwind.
[C-21]
COMMAND & CONTROL CENTRAL
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
Kontum, South Vetnam
Area of Responsibility: Southern Laos along Ho Chi Minh Trail corridor, and northern Cambodia, each to a depth of about 12 miles.
Duties: Conduct top secret, deniable unconventional reconnaissance and raiding missions behind enemy lines in Laos and Cambodia.
[Figure C-3]
[C-22]
CNN'S CLAIM THAT THE TARGET WAS A
"VILLAGE"
IS SUPPORTED ONL Y BY TWO MEN WHO WERE NOT THERE
--Not even Lt. Van Buskirk claimed it was a "village."
--USAF Sgt. Cathey (identified by Newsweek as a supply sergeant] was not on this operation, and his claims reek of fraud;
--U. S. Anny Sgt. Jay Graves could not have been there--he was not assigned to CCC, the unit responsible for such missions in this part of Laos.
[C-23]
OP/ED PIECE BY A USMC COBRA PILOT
[Extract from Monterey, Calif. Herald, 14 June 98]
Lt. Joe Driscoll:
"To listen to CNN you'd have thought that nerve gas uas dropped and the good guys ualked out over dead bodies. That wasn't the way it was.... They distorted, sensationalized and misrepresented it to fit their political spin and marketing hype.. . If it really is a fact that nerve gas was used, the real story would have been that it hadn't worked so well."
[C-24]
CONFIRMATION BY A USMC HH-53 PILOT
[Extract from 1997 book, Primer of the Helicopter War]
Captain Bill Beardall, HMH-463:
"We were briefed by a U.S. Army captain uho told us we were going to carry 200 Americans and Montagnards deep into Laos. We were to be a diversionary force for a large-scale attack on a major artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. "
And reference the extraction, four days later:
"It was going to be close and my gas mask was restricting my view. The area had been prepped with a vomiting agent to help Keep the bad guys' heads down."
[C-25]
CONFIRMATION BY USAF A-1 SKYRAIDER PILOTS
USAF A-1 Pilot, "Spad 03," Tom Stump:
[Extract from e-Mail Message]
"...I am trying to let everyone know this Sarin thing is bullshit but I must admit I do not remember this mission like it was yesterday."
[Extract from e-mail message to MG Perry Srruth, (ret.)]
"I can only tell the truth of what happened that day. There was never any Sarin gas on that battlefield. Had there been, those 16 Americans would now be memorialized on a Wall in Washington. . . "
[C-26]
CONFIRMATION BY USAF A-1 SKYRAIDER PILOTS
USAF A-1 Pilot, Art Bishop:
[Newsweek, 22 June 1998]
"Art Bishop, one of the two American pilots who bombed the enemy, wrote in his journal the next day that his payload was 'CBU-30'--tear gas. The allegation of sarin gas, he told Newsweek is a "lot of nonsense."
[C-27]
VAN BUSKIRK ALLEGED SOG ENCOURAGED
THE KILLING OF AMERICAN DEFECTORS
CNN Transcript [7 June]:
It was pretty well understood that if you came across a defector and could prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, do it, under any circumslance, kill them. It wasn't about bringing them back, it was to kill them.
FACT: As an intelligence-gathering organization, SOG's highest accolades went to men who brought back enemy prisoners--and an American defector would have been a bonanza on a par with a capturing a high-level enemy officer.
FACT: To emphasize the importance of capturing prisoners, SOG offered three special incentives to those who brought them back:
A. Bonus of $100 to each American.
B. Bonus of cash and a new Seiko wristwatch to each indigenous team member.
C. A "free" R&R to Taiwan or Bangkok for Americans.
FACT: Major Plaster and his teammates received these bonuses for capturing a prisoner five months before Tailwind in Laos, operating from the same base as Van Buskirk.
[C-28]
Although Time and CNN alleged the objective was a village harboring U.S. defectors, Lt. Van Buskirk contradicted both claims during a subsequent Q&A Session:
VAN BUSKIRK: .... Understand this camp was a military base camp. We had attacked it at first light. Our LZ as on the other side. We were almost beat before this. We were all wounded. Were just about out of ammunition. And we'd come into the camp quite by accident. My sergeant and I had seen two dogs, and we decided to follow the dogs, kill their owners, and then go to the LZ. The dogs took us to the camp.... "
[C-29]
LT. VAN BUSKIRK'S CHANGING STORY
Upon return, Capt. McCarley and Lt. Van Buskirk traveled to Saigon to brief Gen. Creighton Abrarns. Due to his head wounds, Capt. McCarley had Van Buskirk deliver the briefing while he and Chief SOG, Col. John Sadler, watched.
In his formal briefing notes, Lt. Van Buskirk:
--Admitted the mission was "to create a diversion in support of, and in consonance with, the CAS [CIA] launched Operation Gauntlet."
--Only once cited the use of gas--"CBU-19" (CS tear gas)--which was employed "to prep the area" and assist their unit extraction.
--His briefing does not mention American defectors, nerve gas or a "village."
[C-30]
CNN "VERIFICATION" OF NERVE GAS BY SP5 CRAIG SCHMIDT
Time article [15 June]:
"It doesn't surprise me in the slightest bit that it was nerve gas. It worked too well." [attnbuted to Craig Schmidt]
No such on-camera quote was offered in the 7 June CNN report.
Schmidt told Washington Times [17 June]:
"I still today don't know where they got my quote. I would never have said that." he said. "I don't know what it was. I believe my exact quote uas, I would be surprised if it was nerve gas. "'
On 14 June, Schrnidt told CNN the [unknown] gas was effective:
"It had a dramatic effect on the amount of resistance ue encountered, as soon as it was deployed from the A-1Es. It was almost instantaneous. It was very quick."
[C-31]
LT. VAN BUSKIRK'S CHANGING STORY
1983: Although his book, Tailwind, contains not one hint of defectors or nerve gas, his Author's Note says:
"this book is, to the best of my memory, a true account of what took place.
June 1998: Van Buskirk tells Newsweek:
...he had forgotten the nerve gas and defectors entirely for 24 years--until he suddenly recalled the events during a five-hour interview with CNN producer April Oliver this year.... he had repressed the memory on Easter Sunday 1971... [while] he was in a German prison on charges that he had sold weapons to a terrorist gang. (The charges were later dropped.)... he had a vision of Christ on that Easter Sunday morning, he had been drinking heavily and was haunted by nightmares."
[C-32]
IN SEPTEMBER 1970, LT. VAN BUSKIRK
SIGNED A STATEMENT THAT CS GAS WAS EMPLOYED
Shortly after the operation, Lt. Van Buskirk submitted SP5 Craig Schmidt for a Silver Star for Tailwind. In the suggested citation (signed by Van Buskirk) that accompanied his eyewitness statement, Van Buskirk wrote:
"When the company later moved to a landing zone for extraction they were subjected to tear gas that had been dropped by friendly aircraft but that had drifted to their position.... Although wounded and sick from the gas, SP5 Schmidt ran past his point man and began jumping up and down to flatten the tall elephant grass.... "
[C-33]
LT. VAN BUSKIRK SAYS "NERVE GAS"
ALLEGATIONS CAME NOT FROM HIM BUT FROM CNN
[Baltimore Sun, 15 June 1998]
"It was CNN, Van Buskirk says, that told him about the nerve gas after he told ~hem he had been choking and vomiting as he ran to the helicopters. He had always assumed it was tear gas."
" 'What they said was, ' "The symptoms you're describing are the symptoms of nerve gas, not tear gas." ' 'They said ' "What have you go to say about that?" ' "
[C-34]
CNN KNEW TAILWIND MEDIC DENIED
ANY USE OF NERVE GAS
[E-mail Message]
Sgt Gary Rose, the Tailwind medic, submitted for the Medal of Honor:
"...I was interviewed by telephone by Amy Karsada, (CNN), and could not say poison gas was used. So anyone who could place doubt about the use of nerve gas was not placed on camera."
"If they had dropped GB on us, I think a lot fewer of us (like possibly none) would be alive. Concentrated CS mixed in some type emolument would have stopped almost anyone in their tracks. I think the gas used was a concentrated CS."
[C-35]
SOG VETERAN WARNED CNN THE ALLEGATIONS
WERE WRONG
LTC Edward Wolcoff, USA (ret) was contacted several times by CNN producer April Oliver, each time explaining to her in detail why these allegations were either distruthful or illogical. Oliver insisted she had "interviewed approximately 200 people" and "authoritative figures" had confirrned the information.
"Despite my best efforts to focus Ms Oliver on a more reasoned line of inquiry, she apparently found it more profitable to formulate a bizarre premise and exploit it for sake of the drama and controversy--regardless of the facts."
[Faxed statement to Maj. Plaster, 21 June 1998]
[C-36]
THE ONLY TAILWIND PARTICIPANT ON-CAMERA TO VERIFY
VAN BUSKIRK'S CLAM OF NERVE GAS
Sgt. Mike Hagen, a Tailwind Participant:
[CNN Transcript] Nerve gas. The government don't want it called that. They want to call it incapcitating agent, or some other form. But it was nerve gas.
But prior to the broadcast, he phoned SOG veteran Ted Wicorek and said he had no idea what was causing his limb paralysis--Wicorek says in an e-mail message, [20 June 1998], "He asked me if I could confirrn the rumors that he has heard that nerve gas was used on Operation Tailwind."
[C-37]
CNN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE A SOG VETERAN
NERVE GAS HAD BEEN USED
BUT DID NOT MENTION HIS DENIAL
[E-mail Statement of Sgt. Ted Wicorek]
"April Oliver called three or four times before she reached me. In the beginning she was quite pleasant... the first thing she wanted to know about was the use of nerve gas. I told her that no nerve gas was used on Operation Tailwind. At this point she said she had high-ranking sources that confirmed that it was nerve gas.... I told her that there were absolutely no nerve gases used in Operation Tailwind. At this point the conversation deteriorated into a mental chess game.... She kept coming back to nerve gas and I noted that she was becoming irritated when I would not give in on this point. She indicated that she did not believe I was telling the truth.... ''
[C-38]
CNN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE MAJOR PLASTER
THAT POTENTIALL Y LETHAL GAS HAD BEEN USED
BUT DID NOT MENTION HIS DENIAL
[Statement of Major John Plaster, 21 June 1998]
"On two occasions during the fall of 1997, after the initial SOG piece had been aired on CNN, I uas phoned by April Oliver. Each call was at least an hour in length. Among various (false) allegations she presented to me, she claimed that a SOG force had wiped out a "village " in Laos, killing women and childen, and had employed an exotic gas--not CS--in some operations. I talked her through these assorted allegations, explaining to her in considerable detail why I thought these charges uere not credible. No matter how many people she could get to confirm such charges--and she insisted she had already erified these things--that it would not turn a falsehood into a truth. At the end of the second comersation, she uas very irritated uith me. Despite being the single greatest repository for SOG documents, and my direct contact with hundreds of SOG veterans, she never contacted me to verify any facts or allegations."
[C-39]
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE THAT NO
LETHAL NERVE AGENT WAS USED
When the Tailwind commandos retumed to the SOG helipad at Kontum --approximately 1.5 hours after the CS was used to extract them--Major Plaster, among other Green Berets, greeted them:
--The SOG commandos were wearing ordinary jungle fatigues, not chemical protective suits;
--Neither Arnericans nor Montagnards were suffering any visible symptoms of any kind of gas--even the CS effects had worn off;
--No one went through any kind of decontamination--they dropped gear in their team rooms, and while some went to a quick debrief, others gathered in the club to drink and share their war stories;
--Not one man that night cited any kind of poisonous gas, although it was commonly known that CS tear gas had been used to extract them
--Maj. Plaster heard not one man say anything about "Americans" or "defectors."
[C-40]
SOURCE: Major Plaster's Book
As ofthe surnrner of 1997, CNN and April Oliver had a copy of Major Plaster's book, which includes a six-page description of Operation Tailwind. Oliver told Maj. Plaster she'd read it from cover to cover.
Maj. Plaster does not cite a village, women and children, nerve gas or American defectors. His account was based upon
--Declassified SOG documents
--Interviews with Chief SOG, Col. John Sadler, Col. Bobby Pinkerton, Lt. Col. Michael Radke, Staf~Sergeant John Padgett and Spec. 5 Craig Schmidt
--A history of CIA operations in Laos
--And his own recollections.
[C-41]
Why Was There Minimal Enemy Resistance In the Camp?
NOTE: This enemy basecamp was not prepped with gas of any kind
1) Enemy forces were inexperienced, rear echelon supply and clerical troops
2) Attacking force was combat experienced SOG comrnandos, backed up by USAF fighters
3) North Vietnamese soldiers had fled into bomb shelters, NOT fighting bunkers. The shelters lacked firing ports, creating an ideal situation for employing hand grenades, which is exactly what the SOG cornmandos did. The NVA had never anticipated having to defend their camp from ground attack.
[C-42. This page duplicates page C-41]
Why Was There Minimal Enemy Resistance In the Camp?
NOTE: This enemy basecamp as not prepped wilh gas of any kind
1) Enemy forces were inexperienced, rear echelon supply and clerical troops
2) Attacking force was combat experienced SOG comrnandos, backed up by USAF fighters
3) North Vietnamese soldiers had fled into bomb shelters, NOT fighting bunkers. The shelters lacked firing ports, creating an ideal situation for employing hand grenades, which is exactly what the SOG commandos did. The NVA had never anticipated having to defend their camp from ground attack.
[C-43. Original shows about 3/4 of newspaper page; relevant article
excerpted.]
[Figure C-4]
[C-44]
[Figure C-5]
[C-45]
[Figure C-6]
[C-46]
TABLE 3. PROXIMATE DURATION OF HAZARD IN CONTAMINATED TERRAIN
WARNING: This table is intended as a guide only. Chemical agent detectors must be used to determine
the extent of actual contamination and vapor hazards.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
| | APPROX TIME AFTER CONTAMINATION THAT
| | PRESCRIBED TASKS MAY BE PERFORMED WITH
| | NEGLIGIBLE RISH1
TASK | TERRAIN | (Not wearing protective clothing)2
| | Blister Agent | Nerve Agent
| | (Mustard) | (V- or G-)
| | Temperature3 | Uniform4
| | Warm |Hot | |
| | (70o-85oF) |(85o-100oF)| Summer | Winter
| | WEARING MASKS
TRAVERSAL5 | Bare soil or low vegetation.6 | 36 hr | 36 hr | 5 hr | 2 hr
(Walking across area, | High vegetation, including jungle | 4 days | 2 days | 28 hr | 10 hr
2 hr or less) | and heavy woods. | | | |
| | NOT WEARING MASKS7
OCCUPATION | Bare soil or low vegetation.6 | 4 days | 3 days | 32 days | 13 days
(Without hitting ground,| High vegetation, including jungle | 4 days | 3 days | 32 days | 13 days
24 hr) | and heavy woods. | | | |
OCCUPATION | Bare soil or low vegetation.6 | 4 days | 3 days | 32 days | 13 days
(Involving advance | High vegetation, including jungle | 4 days | 4 days | 50 days | 18 days
under fire, 24 hr) | and heavy woods. | | | |
1. These times are safe-sided for troop safety.
2. Leather combat boots treated with protective dubbing or rubber combat boots are worn.
3. Effects of blister agent vary significantly with temperature. Mustard freezes in temperatures
below 60oF and can present a hazard when the temperature rises.
4. Protection from V-agent and thickened G-agent varies significatnly with layers of clothing worn.
5. For peronnel wlaking for 2 hours in an area contaminated by blister agents, the limiting factor is
the vapor hazard. If only a few minutes are required for traversal of the area, the task can be
initiated at earlier times than those given.
6. Times shown are not applicable to sand. which will hold chemical agents for longer periods of time
than those given.
7. The data refer to approximate times at which personnel could occupy contaminated areas without
having to wear protective masks for protection against vapor hazard.
[C-47]
[By hand] 'TAILWIND'
REFERENCE ITEM 16, USARV FORM 157-R
OTHERS RECOMMENDED FOR AN AWARD FOR THE SAME ACTION
1. CPT EUGENE C. McCAULEY, JR., 239-46-9834 - SS
2. SGT GARY M. ROSE, 549-70-0726 - DSC
3. 1LT ROBERT L. VAN BUSKIRK, 224-58-2102 - SS
4. SGT MANUEL J. OROZCO, 527-72-3764 - SS
5. SF5 CRAIG D. SCHMIDT, 543-50-1312 - SS [Lined by hand]
6. SP5 JAMES D. LUCAS, 244-68-2691 - SS
7. MSG MORRIS N. ADAIR, 451-44-6520 - BS "V"
8. SFC JAMES L. BREVELLE, 457-40-5001 - BS "V"
9. SSG WILIAM J. SCHERER, 054-36-1274 - BS "V"
10. 1LT PETER E. LANDON, 569-64-5545 - BS "V"
11. SFC DENVER G. MINTON, 270-30-3849 - BS "V"
12. SGT MICHAEL E. HAGEN, 545-86-8206 - BS "V"
13. SGT KEITH E. PLANCICH, 532-50-2990 - BX "V"
14. SFC BERHARD BRIGHT, 266-46-8766 - BS "V"
15. SGT DAVID L. YOUNG, 369-50-5139 - BS "V"
16. SGT DONALD J. BEAUDREAU, 018-42-7704 - BS "V"
[Figure C-7]
[C-49]
[Figure C-8]
[C-50]
[By hand] TAILWIND
TOP SECRET2. In September, an operation on Route 966 on the western edge of the PFAO yielded 34 documents. Some 400 pages of these were evaluated by the MACV Combined Document Exploitation Center as Category A, containing significant intelligence. They were described by MACV J2 as "appearing to be the most significant collateral intelligence on the 599th Transportation Group since the beginning of the war." 3. A POW captured in October provided further information on the 559th Transportation Group, which has the highest intelligence collection priority in Laos. He was a former member of the D2 Engineer Battalion, Binh Tram (Military Station) 34, 559th Transportation Group, and provided information on the unit's OB, its training and tactics, and on the effects of allied interdiction efforts. 4. In November, another operation in Base Area 609 found and destroyed an estimated 40 tons of rice. The cache was in an area which has been extensively used by enemy units during the periodic attacks against 5th SFGA units at Dak Seang and Ben Het, and it is believed that the rice had been stored for use by units in similar future attacks. (TS) During 1970, fewer IIR's on enemy activity and terain in the PFAO were prepared by the PF section due to revised criteria for the submission of terrain IIR's. Whereas such reports were previously written on each mission, they are now prepared only when held infor- mation is more than six months old, or when there is a discrepancy between current maps and the actual terrain. (TS) PF Intelligence Reports written and distributed during 1970 included: 1. 10 spot reports on enemy activity, provided to MACV J2 (CIIB). 2. 558 IIR's of enemy activity and terrain. (TS) Target selection and development included: 1. A total of 645 targets as compared to 864 targets in 1969. 2. Ten wiretap operations were conducted under the CIRCUS ACT program; seven were successful. (TS) A total of 436 missions were conducted during the year, as compared to 458 in 1969. 1. 540 trails were reported. 2. 39 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were reported. B-II-6 [By hand] 1970 SOG HISTTOP SECRET
[C-51]
TOP SECRETzone. The column was struck with 6 sorties of F-100's resulting in an estimated 100 enemy killed by air (KBA). (TS) On 25 April 1970, JCS authorized the expansion of tactical air strikes throughout Zone Alpha and on 29 April 1970 expanded the authority to use artillery and helicopter gunships in an offensive role. On 5 May 1970, JCS rescinded the requirement for close hold security on tactical airstrike reporting in Cambodia. Air strikes were then reported through normal SALEM HOUSE channels. (TS) On 27 May 1970, JCS authorized expansion of the tactical air strike authority to what is now known as the air interdiction zone (AIZ) through 30 June l970. This authority was later extended to 1 May 1971. Operation TAILWIND [By hand] Snip (TS) On 4 September 1970, CCC was alerted for the requirement to conduct a company sized operation in support of a [marked out] operation near Chavane, Laos. Project nickname was "Operation TAILWIND." Following LZ preparation by TAC AIR and the insertion of a pathfinder team, CCC, Company B, was inserted about 20 km SE of Chavane at 1232 hours 11 September 1970. Four CH-53's were used for airlift and four AH1G Cobra's for gunship support. Small arms fire was received from southwest of the insertion LZ. All CH-53's and AH1G's received hits, but all aircraft were able to return to base. (TS) The company moved northwest 500 meters where they encountered a series of hootches used for the storage of 140mm rockets, 32mm mortar ammunition, 23mm AAA ammunition, B-40 rockets, small arms ammunition, and approximately 40 dismantled bicycles. Charges with delay fuses were placed on the 140mm rockets, and the company moved northwest 1,500 meters. The company counted 30 secondary explosions immediately following detonation and 75-100 during the following five hours. (TS) Later the companyv made contact with approximately 40 enemy. The engagement lasted an hourr and tactical air strikes were employed. When the enemy broke contact, the company moved south where they began preparation of an LZ for the extraction of wounded. The LZ was com- pleted when the company again came under attack from 140-150 enemy. Nine US were wounded in this encounter, but extraction of wounded was not possible due to adverse weather. (TS) Enemy contact continued throughout the night and fire support contlnued to be provided by Spectre (C-130) gunships. When enemy action decreased, the company moved to secure an LZ at a different location. A CH-53 helicopter attempted to land for medevac of wounded but was struck by numerous small arms and B-40 rocket rounds causing it to lose power and crash. The crew was successfully extracted by ladder. The company was directed to another LZ but weather prevented extraction. B-VIII-7TOP SECRET
[C-52]
TOP SECRET(TS) Contact was again made with enemy units. This time they appeared to be defending. The company advanced on the enemy who withdrew beyond a battalion sized base camp containing 8,000 kilo- grasm of rice, as well as numerous hootches and latrines. There was evidence that the area had been used as a truck park and maintenance point as some vehicle parts were found. A 120mm mortar was found and destroyed. (TS) The company, still receiving small arms and B-40 rocket fire, then moved to an antraction HLZ. Thirty-six sets of TAC AIR were used during the extractio. The company was extracted using 3 CH-53's and returned to Dak To. Total casualties for the operation were 3 SCU KIA, 33 SCU WIA, 16 US WIA, 144 enemy KIA. 50 enemy WIA (estimated) and 288 enemy KBA (estimated). Parachute Insertions (TS) Parachute insertions were started in late summer with four static line and one High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) insertion being conducted as a means of altering the method of entry into the PFAO. 1. HALO. Chief, SOG approved the HALO insertion technique on 18 July 1870. A pilot raining program was conducted after equipment requirements were determined, personnel were selected, and coordin- ation was effected for 14 (7 US, 1 ARVN, and 6 SCU) personnel to receive training presented by the 1st Special Forces Group, (Airborne), 1st Special Forces on Okinawa. The training program was completged at Camp Long Thanh where final mission preparation took place. A six man (3 US and 3 SCU) team was inserted from a C-130 at 0200 hours on 28 November 1970 at 14,000 feet AGL. During descent the team members becaem separated because of poor visibility caused by clouds and drizzle. The team members remained separated and were extracted from four separate locations on 2 December 1970. As a method of entry this technique was considered proven as a means of entering the PFAO undetected since an active enemy search was not made to locate the team. 2. Static line. The four static line insertions were proven as successful methods of entering the PFAO but were marred by disper- sion of personnel and difficulty in assembly on the ground. Each of the missions terminated in an effort to locate and group team members. As an alternate method of insertion, parachute insertions have created a new threat that enemy LOC security forces must be preapred to counter. B-VIII-8TOP SECRET
[End Tab C]
[D-1]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
JUL 16 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
During the Viet Nam War the United States was not a party to any treaty prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.
- The United States was never a party to the Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases of 29 July 1899 (which is now considered obsolete).- President Nixon submitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (commonly known as the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol) to the Senate for ratification on 11 August 1970, but it did not come into force for the United States until 10 April 1975.
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention) was opened for signature in 1993 and was ratified by the United States in 1997.
Since World War II the United States has taken the position that the first use of lethal chemical weapons is contrary to customary international law. On this basis, from World War II until U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the United States adhered to a "no-first-use" policy under which the United States would not resort to the use of lethal chemical weapons unless they were first used by our enemies. (See the attached extract from AFP 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. Published in 1976, it accurately states the US understanding of its law of war obligations during the Viet Nam War.)
[Signature]David A. Koplo
Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs)
[D-2]
| DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters, US Air Force Washington DC 20330 |
AF PAMPHLET 110-31 19 November 1976 |
Judge Advocate General Activities
INTERNATIONAL LAW -- THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS
This pamphlet is for the information and guidance of
judge advocates and others particularly concerned with international law
requirements applicable during armed conflict. It furnishes references and
suggests solutions to a variety of legal problems but is not directive in
nature. As an Air Force pamphlet, it does not promulgate official US Government
policy although it does refer to US, DOD and Air Force policies.
Chapter l--The International Law of Armed Conflict
Scope of Publication
The Law of Armed Conflict: Its Context
Determinants of the Law
Views on the Law of Armed Conflict
Application of Law
Observance of the Law
Footnotes
Chapter 2--Status of Airspace and Aircraft
Airspace Defined
Control of Airspace
Control of Outer Space
Military Aircraft
Access by Military Aircraft to Airspace During Peacetime
Access to Airspace by Military Aircraft During Hostilities
Footnotes
Chapter 3--Combatants, Noncombatants, and Civilians
Introduction
Combatants
Unlawful Combatants
Noncombatants
Civilians
Footnotes
Chapter 4 Conflict in the Air and at Sea
Introduction
Military Aircraft
Civil Aircraft
Armed Conflict at Sea
Footnotes
Chapter 5--Aerial Bombardment
Introduction
__________
OPR: JACI
DISTRIBUTION: F
[D-3]
6-4
AFP 110-31 19 November 1976
between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.
(2) Convention On The Prohibition Of the Development, Production, And Stockpiling Of Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons And On Their Destruction, 1972.
Article I. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflictArticle II. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible, but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.
Article III. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.
Article IV. Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
b. Biological Weapons.9 International law prohibits biological weapons or methods of warfare whether they are directed against persons, animals or plants. The wholly indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature of biological weapons has resulted in the condemnation of biological weapons by the international community, and the practice of states in refraining from their use in warfare has confirmed this rule The Biological Weapons Convention prohibits also the development, preparation, stockpiling and supply to others of such weapons.
c. Chemical Weapons: Gas Warfare. The first use of lethal chemical weapons is now regarded as unlawful in armed conflicts. During World War II President Roosevelt in response to reports that the enemy was seriously contemplating the use of gas warfare. stated "Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. . . We shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.''11 This United States position has been reaffirmed on many occasions by the United States as well as confirmed by resolutions in various international forums. On 11 August 1970, when the 1925 Geneva Protocol was resubmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent prior to United States ratification, President Nixon stated that the United States would ratify the Protocol with an appropriate reservation that "would permit the retaliatory use by the United States of chemical weapons and agents." The 1925 Geneva Protocol came into force for the United States on 10 April 1975.
d. Anti-plant Agents.13 Anti-plant agents are chemicals which possess a high potential for destroying plants. Thus, they can limit the production of food or defoliate vegetation used either as a raw material (trees for pulp) or as a cover (trees for camouflage). These agents include herbicides that kill or inhibit the growth of plants; plant growth
[D-4]
6-5
AFP 110-31 19 November 1976
regulators that either regulate or inhibit plant growth, sometimes causing plant death; and those which dry up plant foliage. US policy on the use of herbicides in war is as follows:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within US bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters . . . The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of any . . . chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance (Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975, issued by Gerald R Ford. President of the United States).
The legal effect of this Executive Order is to reflect national policy It is not intended to interpret the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or change the interpretation of the US that the Protocol does not restrain the use of chemical herbicides as such.
e. Riot Control Agents.14 Riot control agents are chemicals. such as sprays and gases, which do not cause permanent injury and have no harmful effects other than temporarily disabling the person to whom they are applied. US policy on the use of riot control agents in war is as follows:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, . . . first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct US military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations. . .
The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents. . in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval. in advance. (Executive Order No. 11850. 8 April 1975, issued by Gerald R. Ford. President of the United States).
The legal effect of this Executive Order is to reflect national policy. It is not intended to interpret the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or change the interpretation of the US that the Protocol does not restrain the use of riot control agents as such.
f. Poison.15 Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations provides: ''It is especially forbidden . . . To employ poison or poisoned weapons.'' Poisons are biological or chemical substances causing death or disability with permanent effects when. in even small quantities. they are ingested. enter the lungs or bloodstream, or touch the skin. The longstanding customary prohibition against poison is based on their uncontrolled character and the inevitability of death or permanent disability as well as on a traditional belief that it is treacherous to use poison.
6-5. Nuclear Weapons.16 The use of explosive nuclear weapons. whether by air, sea or land forces, cannot be regarded as violative of existing international law in the absence of any international rule of law restricting their employment. Nuclear weapons can be directed against military objectives as can conventional weapons. However, decisions to employ nuclear weapons emanate from a nation' s highest level of government. The authority of United States forces to employ nuclear weapons resides solely with the President. Moreover, these weapons have
[End Tab D]
[E-1]
DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION OFFICE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-2400
15 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
SUBJECT: Allegations that U.S. Forces Used Lethal Gas to Kill Defectors
In support of your inquiry into Operation Tailwind, enclosed please find the following:
(1) Summary of the results of my search of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) publications, including titles and translations of selected extracts from three PAVN publications.
(2) Talking points about:
- the two known American defectors, and- three American servicemen who are frequent subjects of false stories about American defectors.
(3) Background note concerning the question of possible foreign advisors to PAVN troops in the Operation Tailwind area of operations.
I hope this information proves helpful. Please contact me if you have
questions.
[Signature]ROBERT J. DESTATTE
Senior Analyst, Southeast Asia Division
Research & Analysis Directorate
3 Enclosures
as stated
[E-2]
SEARCH OF PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM PUBLICATIONS
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
I reviewed the People's Army of Vietnam's (PAVN) official history of military operations on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the PAVN's official history of the 968th Volunteer Infantry Division, and the PAVN's official history of its Chemical Command (see below for titles and extracts).
KEY POINTS:
- These three official PAVN accounts make no mention of any possible use of lethal chemicals by American or allied forces during the war.- The official PAVN history of its operations on the Ho Chi Minh trail makes no mention of any possible use of any type of lethal chemical weapons by American or allied forces during the war.
- The history of 968th Volunteer Infantry Division, the unit responsible for the defense of the area in which Operation Tailwind took place, makes no specific mention of any engagement in September 1970, nor any mention of the use of chemical agents by US and allied forces.
- The history of PAVN Chemical Command mentions American use of only defoliants, incendiary, and CS type chemical weapons in Laos.
- The history of the PAVN Chemical Command mentions that the PAVN's seizure of American chemical weapons (specifically CS grenades) and equipment (e.g., gas masks) and related documents during Operation Lam Son 719 in early 1971 in Laos contributed significantly to Hanoi's "political and diplomatic struggle." From this statement we might infer that Hanoi would have exploited any American attempt to employ lethal chemicals.
- Primary missions of PAVN chemical troops (history of the PAVN Chemical Command):
- guidance to combat arms units on how to cope with chemicals the enemy employed- distribution of gas masks and other equipment for defense against chemicals
- generate smoke in support of deception and concealment operations
- flame thrower support to combat arms units
- collect and exploit enemy chemical munitions and countermeasures equipment
DISCUSSION AND EXTRACT TRANSLATIONS:
I reviewed the following three books to see whether PAVN's official histories mention any possible use of lethal chemicals by US forces in Laos during the Vietnam war. I found no mention of lethal chemicals. I translated a few relevant passages that you might find useful.
1. Van Tai Quan Su Chien Luoc Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh Trong Khang Chien Chong My [Strategic Military Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the War of Resistance Against
1
[E-3]
America], written by Senior Colonel Nguyen Viet Phuong, Directorate of Rear Services, People's Army of Vietnam, 1st reprinting with revisions and additions, Hanoi, 1988.
pp. 337-358, contains descriptions of various bombs American forces employed in Laos, and PAVN countermeasures, and statistical charts depicting total numbers of bombs by type, year, and general location. No mention of any type of chemical weapon.
2. Su Doan 968 [968th Division], published by the Culture and Information Office of the 968th Division, Quang Tri, 1990. The 968th Volunteer Infantry Division was responsible for defense of the Ho Chi Minh trail corridor in southern Laos, including the area in which Operation Tailwind took place.
pp. 60-90, contains descriptions of actions in the Saravane Province, Laos during 1970. The passage contains a relatively detailed account of actions during April-June 1970. The passage does not mention any engagement in September 1970. The only mention of American commando operations [i.e., MACVSOG] is a sentence on page 88 that notes during the 1970 rainy season we (the US) inserted 35 commando teams by helicopter in the regions bordering the Bolovens Plateau.
I found no mention of American or allied use of chemical agents in the PAVN history of the 968th Division.
3. Lich Su Bo Doi Hoa Hoc, Tap 1, 1958-1975, so thao [History of the Chemical Command, Volume 1,1958-1975, draft], written by Le Huong and Dang Xuan Khoi and revised by Nguyen Thanh Huu, published by the Headquarters of the Chemical Command, People's Army of Vietnam, Hanoi, 1988. Chapter 2, pp. 167-240, covers the activities of the PAVN Chemical Command in B4 Front (southern Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Province, South Vietnam), and B5 Front (demilitarized zone, northern Quang Tri Province, and the Highway 9 corridor), and southern Laos.
p. 198. The history of the PAVN Chemical Command devotes a total of two short paragraphs to events during 1970. Only one of these two paragraphs is devoted to events in Laos: "In May 1970, the 91st [Chemical] Company was attached to the 141st Regiment, 312th Infantry Division in Laos. The company was organized into three cells that accompanied the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and the 19th Company which fought a number of engagements at Phou Nha Thau and Phou Then [Plain of Jars area], but their effectiveness was low because the terrain did not permit the flame throwers to be used to their full potential."
p. 202 [Feb-Mar 1971]. "With regard to chemicals, the tactical operations plan of Major General Hoang Xuan Lam, the commander of the [RVNAF] operation, directed the use of various chemical weapons (CBU 19 bombs, BLU 52A and BLU 52B 70mm chemical rockets). One hundred percent of enemy forces were equipped with gas masks before the operation, each man was equipped with 1-2 CS smoke or powder grenades; the basic load for each M19 gun included 6-12 CS rounds; each company had 34 type E8 CS canister launchers; and, additionally, they still had the 40mm CS launch tubes."
p. 203 [Feb-Mar 1971]. "The enemy carried out 15 chemical attacks on our positions on high points 31 1, 351 , 402, 229, 863, and 684; four attacks on our artillery positions; 14 attacks on our troop bivouac areas, command posts, supply points, artillery observer posts, etc..., but the chemical troops deployed with our units dealt with chemical contingencies calmly and quickly, insuring our troops could fight continuously for a protracted period.
2
[E-4]
"Chemical contingencies were discovered through reconnaissance and the effects were overcome immediately, giving our troops confidence. In the various units, the seizure of enemy documents and chemical equipment was of great significance for technical research and training, and for the political and DIPLOMATIC struggle [emphasis added]. We seized 187 gas masks, three CS dispensers (E8), one 40mm CS launch tube, 11 XM25 grenades, 62 XM54 grenades, and two enemy documents that spoke about our chemical equipment."
3
[E-5]
TALKING POINTS ON DEFECTORS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
QUESTION: "How many U.S. military personnel defected to communist forces in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict, 1963-1975?"
ANSWER: Only two American military personnel were known to have defected to Communist forces during the war. (See below for names and details.)
QUESTION: "During the war there were reports of a so-called "salt-and-pepper" team operating with Communist forces. What is the basis for these reports?"
ANSWER: Some reports of Americans operating with Communist forces no doubt are based on sightings of USMC Private Robert R. Garwood, one of the two American military personnel who were known to have defected to communist forces. There is circumstantial evidence that Robert R. Garwood armed with an AK 47 assault rifle occasionally accompanied PAVN troops in the field. Robert R. Garwood and US Army Private McKinley are the only Americans who are known to have operated with Communist forces during the war.
QUESTION: Is it possible Russian advisors might have been working with People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations, and members of the MACVSOG force might have mistook the Russians for American defectors.
ANSWER: We have seen no evidence that could support a belief that Russians or other Western advisors (e.g., Cubans) served with PAVN forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations.
DEFECTOR MCKINLEY NOLAN (Case 9950)
Private Mckinley Nolan, U. S. Army, was dropped from the rolls as a deserter when he failed to return to his unit after he was released from the Long Binh Military Stockade on 8 November 1967. Taking along his common-law Vietnamese-Khmer wife and her two children, Nolan defected to the National Liberation Front (NLF). He and his wife resided with Vietnamese Communist forces at various locations along both sides of the border between Cambodia and northern Tay Ninh Province, South Vietnam, until approximately November 1973.
In approximately November 1973, Nolan and his family left the Vietnamese and joined Khmer Rouge forces. They lived with Khmer Rouge forces in the vicinity of Memot town until at least mid-1974. Several sources report that Khmer Rouge forces killed Nolan. Although separate sources report different dates, the Khmer Rouge killed Nolan apparently sometime between late 1974 and mid-1975.
DEFECTOR ROBERT R. GARWOOD (Case 0155)
Private Robert R. Garwood, USMC, disappeared from his unit near Danang City, South Vietnam, on 28 September 1965. Survivors of the Communist B.1 Front POW camp (also known as the Military Region 5 POW camp), located in northwestern Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam, reported that Garwood lived with the cadre in the camp--not with the POWs and had complete freedom of movement. Communist authorities offered Garwood release in May 1967; however, he declined to accept release stating that he wanted to stay with Communist forces and assist them in their cause for freedom. In the autumn of 1969, Garwood moved to North Vietnam, where he lived until he returned to the United States in March 1979.
1
[E-6]
Several hundred former officers of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces who were detained in Communist re-education camps in North Vietnam after the war and later immigrated to the United States, told American officials they encountered Garwood as a member of the staff of the re-education camps near Yen Bai Town, about 80 kilometers northwest of Hanoi, between mid-1976 and the autumn of 1978.
After he returned to the U.S., Garwood was tried by a military courts martial and found guilty of collaborating with the enemy and having assaulted an American POW.
SALT-AND-PEPPER TEAM:
The stories of a so-called "salt-and-pepper" team illustrates how persons who exploit the POW/MIA issue defame American servicemen who died in Vietnam, and defame the families of those servicemen.
- USMC Privates Robert L. Greer and Fred T. Schreckengost have been targets of this story- These two Marines disappeared on 7 Jun 1964
- Both are Caucasian
- They rented motorbikes to tour an area near Danang City during off-duty time
- Credible reports of capture and death received shortly after they disappeared
- Their motorbikes were found submerged in a canal not long after incident
- In 1990 specialists from PACOM's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting investigated
- Witnesses led JTF-FA team to burial site, remains recovered in Nov 1990
- Suggestions these two Marines were defectors unjustly defames them and their families
USMC PRIVATE EARL CLYDE WEATHERMAN
- USMC Private Earl Clyde Weatherman is a frequent target of false stories about defectors- Pvt Weatherman disappeared after he escaped from a brig near Danang City on 8 Nov 1967
- Sometime after he escaped from the brig Communist forces captured him
- He was confined with other Americans in mountains of northeast Quang Ngai Province
- Seizing an opportunity, he and another USMC prisoner assaulted a guard, took his weapon, and escaped.
- The two escaped men traveled about two kilometers before pursuers caught them. - The other escaped prisoner witnessed pursuers kill Private Weatherman.
- In 1994 Vietnamese witnesses led American investigators to the site where they buried Private Weatherman.
- Although Private Weatherman might have encountered disciplinary problems before he was captured, he acted heroically after becoming a prisoner. He resisted his captors and tried to escape when he saw an opportunity.
- Suggestions Private Weatherman was a defector unjustly defames him and his family.
2
[E-7]
BACKGROUND NOTE RE FOREIGN ADVISORS TO PAVN
One of the questions the CNN/TIME story about Operation Tailwind suggests is the question of whether Russian or other Soviet bloc advisors might have been working with People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations, and whether members of the MACVSOG force might have mistook those advisors for American defectors.
We have seen no evidence that could support a belief that Russians or other Soviet bloc advisors (e.g., Cubans) served with PAVN forces in the Operation Tailwind area of operations. In fact, available information about the PAVN's operations suggests strongly that Russian and other Soviet bloc advisors did not operate in the Operation Tailwind area of operations.
Several sources of knowledge give us insight into PAVN's wartime operations.
First, in the course of their in-country investigations and oral history interviews to search for information about the fate of American servicemen who remain unaccounted for from the war, the PACOM's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and its predecessor, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, have interviewed hundreds of PAVN veterans.Second, in recent years the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Affairs Office's (DPMO) Joint Commission Support Directorate has interviewed several Soviet veterans who served as military advisors in Vietnam.
Third, specialists in the JTF-FA and DPMO have reviewed hundreds of official histories that PAVN published about the war.
Fourth, wartime intelligence American and allied forces gathered from prisoners, ralliers, captured documents, signal intercepts, etc.
The preponderance of information gathered from these four sources reveals that Soviet military advisors seldom ventured south of the coastal town of Vinh, located in Nghe An Province in northern Vietnam, about midway between Hanoi and the old demilitarized zone. To the best of our knowledge, the few Soviet bloc military advisors that ventured south of Vinh were advisors to PAVN air defense units. With two possible exceptions, to the best of our knowledge, Soviet bloc military advisors did not venture outside of northern Vietnam.
The first possible exception would have occurred during the early 1 960s when the PAVN used fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to move personnel and supplies into a few sites in northeastern and central Laos. Soviet bloc pilots and aircrews might have participated in some of those flights.
The other possible exception would have occurred during PAVN's defensive campaign against Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos, in about February-April 1971. This was an American supported offensive by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces' (RVNAF) along the Highway 9 corridor between the Vietnamese border outpost at Khe Sanh and the Laotian town of Tchepone. One former Soviet advisor to a PAVN air defense regiment told American interviewers that he and other members of his small advisor team believed they might have ventured a short distance into an area of Laos located between the Ban Karai Pass and the town of Tchepone for a brief period in early 1971.
1
[E-8]
Toward the end of the war, Cuba sent a small group of construction engineers
to Vietnam to help with road building projects; however, this was long after
Operation Tailwind. During the war Cuba also posted a diplomatic representative
to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, which was located
in Cambodia. It is unlikely any Cubans ever ventured into Laos in support
of or as advisors to the PAVN.
2
[End Tab E]
[F-1]
OPERATION TAILWIND
SIR, I AM LT VAN BUSKIRK FROM MACSOG AT KONTUM. I WAS A PLATOON LEADER
DURING OPERATION TAILWIND WHICH ENTERED TARGET AREA TANGO 2 EIGHTEEN KILOMETERS
EAST OF CHAVANE ON 111245Z SEP 70. THE FORCE COMMITTED WAS 16 US AND 120 SCU.
OUR MISSION WAS TO CONDUCT A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE TO COLLECT INFORMATION
AND INTELLIGENCE AND TO CREATE A DIVERSION IN SUPPORT OF, AND IN CONSONANCE
WITH, THE CAS LAUNCHED OPERATION GAUNTLET.
TWENTY MINUTES AFTER A 12 MAN PATHFINDER TEAM WAS DELIVERED TO THE LZ BY 2 UH-1
HELICOPTERS, THE MAIN BODY WAS LANDED BY 3 CH-53 HELICOPTERS AT (POINT 1). THERE
WAS NO ENEMY FIRE RECEIVED BY THE PATHFINDER SHIPS, HOWEVER, THE FIRST CH-53
RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE APPROXIMATELY 5 MINUTES FROM THE LZ. TWO SCU AND THE
FIRST PLATOON SERGEANT REPORTED SEEING, FROM THE WINDOW OF THE AIRCRAFT JUST
PRIOR TO LANDING, E RUSSIAN MEDIUM TANKS AND TWO 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS MOVING NE
ON ROUTE 966. THE LZ AND SURROUNDING AREAS HAD BEEN PREPPED WITH "ROCK-EYE"
ARMOR-PIERCING, CLUSTER BOMB UNITS. ALL THE CH-53 AIRCRAFT RECEIVED MINOR
HITS FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE, BUT DUE POSSIBLE TO THE LZ PREP, ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT
WAS NOT OBSERVED FROM THESE POSITIONS KNOWN TO BE IN THE GENERAL AREA.
THE COMPANY MOVED APPROXIMATELY 600 METERS TO THE NW WHEN THE 1ST PLATOON POINT
SQUAD LOCATED AN ENEMY HUT AT POINT 2 WHICH CONTAINED OVER TWO HUNDRED 140 MM
ROCKETS (POINT 2). TWO SQUADS FROM THE 1ST PLATOON DEPLOYED AND SEARCHED THE
AREA, LOCATING A TOTAL OF 8 HUTS CONTAINING:
1. FIVE HUNDRED 140 MM ROCKETS * (START SLIDES) (SLIDE TWO)
2. THREE HUNDRED B-40 ROCKETS
[F-2]
3. 12,500 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMO.
4. APPROXIMATELY 40 BICYCLES.
5. THREE HUNDRED 83 MM MORTAR ROUNDS (SLIDE ONE)
6. TWO THOUSAND 23 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT SHELLS (SLIDE ONE)
DURING THIS PERIOD THE ENEMY COULD BE HEARD FIRING SIGNAL SHOTS THROUGHOUT
THE AREA AND AT ONE TIME A FIELD PHONE WAS HEARD RINGING. THE TWO SQUADS
BROUGHT SAMPLES FROM EACH STRUCTURE FOR PHOTOGRAPHING AND IDENTIFICATION.
THE DEMOLITION EXPERTS SET AN EXPLOSIVE CHARGE WITH A 13 1/3 MINUTE DELAY
FUZE IN EACH OF THE TWO LARGEST STRUCTURES CONTAINING THE 140 MM ROCKETS
AND PLACED A WHITE PHOSPHORUS GRENADE ON EACH CHARGE TO MARK THE LOCATION
FOR THE FAC. THE COMPANY MOVED NORTH AT 1500 HOURS AND 14 MINUTES LATER
TWO LARGE EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD FOR THE
NEXT FIVE HOURS. THE FAC REPORTED SEEING THE SMOKE FROM THE WHITE PHOSPHORUS
GRENADES AND MARKED THE LOCATION FOR A BOMB STRIKE.
THE COMPANY WAS ENGAGED BY ENEMY FORCES WHICH WERE BY PASSED AT (POINT 3) AND
CONTINUED NW TO A RON SITE AT (POINT 4). NO ENEMY CONTACT WAS MADE DURING THE
NIGHT. AS THE COMPANY WAS PREPARING TO MOVE TO THE ROAD THE MORNING OF D + 1
TWO TRACKED VEHICLES, POSSIBLE THE TANKS MENTIONED EARLIER, WERE HEAR MOVING
VERY SLOWLY FROM NORTH TO SOUTH ON ROUTE 966. THE COMPANY ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY
THE TRACKED VEHICLES WITH LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, HOWEVER, THE TERRAIN BETWEEN
THE COMPANY'S LOCATION AND THE ROAD WAS A SWAMP WHICH PRECLUDED DIRECT OBSERVATION.
AT POINT 5 AN ESTIMATED 40 ENEMY SOLDIERS INITIATED CONTACT WITH THE LEAD ELEMENT.
THE ENEMY FIRED AW WEAPONS, RIFLE GRENADES, B-40 ROCKETS AND A MORTAR. TWO SQUADS
DEPLOYED FROM 1ST PLATOON AND MANEUVERED AGAINST THE ENEMY. TAC AIR, ARMED
WITH CBU-25 WAS EXPENDED AGAINST THE ENEMY'S POSITION. THIS ENGAGEMENT LASTED
OVER ONE HOUR. THE COMPANY MOVED 500 METERS SE TO A LARGE BOMB CRATER TO PREPARE
2
[F-3]
AN LZ. THE ENEMY INITIATED TWO MORE CONTACTS WITH THE COMPANY USING AW FIRE,
B-40 ROCKETS AND THROWING GRENADES. CURING THESE CONTACTS, WHICH LASTED OVER
TWO HOURS, THE US COMPANY COMMANDER, 1ST PLATOON LEADER, 1ST SERGEANT, MEDIC,
AND 5 SQUAD LEADERS WERE WOUNDED. THE EXTRACTION WAS NOT COMPLETED DUE TO BAD
WEATHER IN THE AREA.
THE COMPANY WAS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY ALL NIGHT. A LARGE ENEMY
FORCE HAD SURROUNDED THE COMPANY AND ATTEMPTED TO BREAK INTO THE PERIMETER.
THE ENEMY FIRED MANY B-40 ROCKETS AND MORTAR ROUNDS, BUT THEIR MAIN ATTACK
WAS WITH HAND GRENADES. THE 1ST AND 3RD PLATOON EACH REPORTED RECEIVING
300 ENEMY GRENADES IN THEIR DEFENSIVE AREAS AND EACH PLATOON THREW APPROXIMATELY
200 HAND GRENADES BACK AT THE ENEMY. THE REST OF THE COMPANY REPORTED AN
ESTIMATED 100 EXPLOSIONS CAUSED BY MORTAR ROUNDS, B-40 ROCKETS, AND HADN GRENADES
THAT WERE THROWN OVER THE 1ST AND 3RD PLATOON POSITIONS. DURING THIS CONTACT,
THE COMPANY HAD ONLY ONE MAN WOUNDED, A US SQUAD LEADER, WHO HAD CRAWLED FROM HIS
FOXHOLE AND ATTEMPTED TO CAPTURE A POW. THE 1ST PLATOON REPORTED ONLY 1 ENEMY
CONFIRMED KILLED BUT ESTIMATED THAT 35 ENEMY WERE KILLED BY SPECTRE AIRCRAFT
WHICH PROVIDED SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. THIRD PLATOON REPORTED 30 ENEMY
KILLED BY AIR, IN THEIR SEGMENT OF THE PERIMETER, AND THE 2D PLATOON REPORTED
2 ENEMY KILLED BY AIR AND NO ENEMY KILLED BY GROUND ACTIONS. NEITHER FORCE
USED SMALL ARMS FIRE DURING THE NIGHT FOR FEAR OF EXPOSING THEIR POSITION.
THE ENEMY USED SIGNAL WHICH THE COMPANY SOON UNDERSTOOD AND WAS ABLE TO WARN
ALL UNITS BY USE OF THE RADIO.
ONE CLICK OR WHISTLE - MOVE.
TWO CLICKS OR WHISTLES - THROW GRENADES.
THREE CLICKS OR WHISTLES - WITHDRAW.
THE CLICKS WERE MADE BY HITTING TWO PIECES OF BAMBOO TOGETHER.
3
[F-4]
[Partial fax header:]
SHERRY MCCARLEY 001
THE SPECTRE AIRCRAFT WAS UNABLE TO READ THE SIGNALS FROM THE COMPANIES
TRANSPONDERS OR MINI-PONDERS. THE PILOT STATE HIS EQUIPMENT WAS OLD,
AND HE ADJUSTED HIS A/C FIRE CONTINUOUSLY FROM THE FLASHES OF B-40
ROCKETS, EXPLODING HAND GRENADES AND TRIP FLARES THAT THE COMPANY REPORTED
TO HIM. THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT OF D + 1, 1ST AND 3RD PLATOON MEMBERS COULD
HEAR MANY HEAVY OBJECTS BEING DRAGGED AWAY WITHIN 5 METERS OF THEIR
POSITIONS. AFTER THE A/C WOULD FIRE, THEY COULD HEAR THE ENEMY RUN AND BANG
INTO TREES AS THEY FLED IN PANIC; THEY COULD HEAR SOME CRY OUT AS THEY DIED.
SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THEY COULD HEAR THE SOUND OF HEAVY OBJECTS AGAIN BEING
DRAGGED AWAY FROM THEIR POSITIONS, THEN MORE ENEMY SIGNALS AND INCOMING
GRENADES. THE COMPANY ESTIMATE THE AIRCRAFT AS HAVING KILLED A MINIMUM OF
67 ENEMY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. ON D + 2, 13 SEP, THE COMPANY WAS DIRECTED
TO MOVE TO A NEW LZ FOR EXTRACTION OF THE TWO SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PERSONNEL.
DURING THIS MOVEMENT AN ENEMY SQUAD WAS OBSERVED MOVING TO OCCUPY THE 3RD
PLATOON'S FOXHOLES FROM THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. 1ST PLATOON INITIATED CONTACT
AND HELD THE ENEMY SO THE COMPANY COULD BY-PASS THEM WITH THE WOUNDED. ANOTHER
ENEMY SQUAD REINFORCED THE FIRST, AND 3 US PERSONNEL AND ONE SUC, MAINTAINED
CONTACT UNTIL THEY COULD BRING TAC AIR TO DESTROY THE ENEMY SQUADS. THE TAC
AIR WAS SUCCESSFUL ON THE 1ST ENEMY SQUAD AND KILLED APPROXIMATELY HALF OF THE
OTHER SQUAD. THE 4 MEN REJOINED THE COMPANY ON THE WAY TO THE LZ. JUST AFTER
ARRIVING AT POINT 8 AN ENEMY SQUAD AGAIN INITIATED CONTACT. CBU-25 WAS USED
AGAINST THE ENEMY BY TAC AIR. * THE COMPANY SECURED THE LZ AT POINT 9 AND
CLEARED TREES AND STUMPS WITH CLAYMORE MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVES. AT 1255 A
CH-53 ARRIVED TO REMOVE THE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, HOWEVER, THE AIRCRAFT COULD NOT
LAND DUE TO A TAIL ROTOR BLADE STRIKING A TREE (SHOW BLANK SLIDE).
4
[F-5]
THIS SHIP LATER CRASHED 3 KILOMETERS TO THE NE AT POINT 10 AFTER IT WAS HIT BY
A B-40 ROCKET. ALL PERSONNEL WERE RESCUED BY A CHASE SHIP. DURING THIS RESCUE
ACTION EIGHT ENEMY WERE KILLED BY AIR. THE COMPANY WAS DIRECTED TO ANOTHER
LZ FOR EVACUATION OF WOUNDED. THE COMPANY HAD TRAVELED APPROXIMATELY 350
METERS WHEN MORE THAN TWO ENEMY SQUADS INITIATED CONTACT AT POINT 11. THE FIRST
PLATOON ENGAGED THE ENEMY WITH TWO SQUADS AND DIRECTED A SUCCESSFUL TAC AIR STRIKE
WITH CBU-25 ON THE ENEMY POSITION. THE COMPANY ARRIVED AT THE LZ LOCATION AT
1400 HOURS (POINT 12). THE FIRST PLATOON LINKED BACK UP WITH THE COMPANY AND
DEPLOYED INTO A REAR AMBUSH FORMATION. TAC AIR WAS DIRECTED THROUGHOUT THE
AREAS WHERE EARLIER CONTACT HAD OCCURRED. THE ENEMY DID NOT MAKE CONTACT WITH
THE COMPANY AGAIN UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY. WHEN BAD WEATHER PREVENTED EVACUATION
OF WOUNDED, THE COMPANY SET UP A DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AT POINT 13. THE COMPANY
BEGAN MOVEMENT TO ANOTHER LZ AT DAYBREAK. THE COMPANY WAS OUT OF WATER, HAD USED
MORE THAN HALF THEIR BASIC LOAD OF AMMUNITION, MOST OF THE US WERE WOUNDED, SOME
TWICE, AND MANY SCU WERE WOUNDED, HOWEVER, ONLY 4 SERIOUSLY. THE MORALE OF THE
COMPANY WAS EXTREMELY HIGH DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY
THUS FAR.
APPROXIMATELY 600 METERS FROM THE RON SITE, THE UNIT RECEIVED FIRE FROM A B-40
ROCKET AT POINT 14, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND HAND GRENADES. THE ENEMY WAS ONLY
20 METERS AWAY.
TWO SQUADS DEPLOYED ON LINE FACING THE ENEMY AND RETURNED WHAT SOON BECAME SPORADIC
FIRE. THE PLATOON LEADER COULD HEAR THE ENEMY TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES, BUT NEITHER
ONE OF HIS INTERPRETERS COULD TRANSLATE WHAT THEY THINK TO BE A LOATIAN DIALECT.
THE PLATOON LEADER CALLED OUT TO THE ENEMY IN ENGLISH TO "CHOI HAU" AND HIS
INTERPRETER CALLED OUT IN VIETNAMESE, BUT EACH TIME THEY CALLED OUT THEIR POSITION
WOULD COME UNDER MORE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE.
% 5
[F-6]
[Fax header:]
06/16/98 TUE 13:26 FAX 9106860074 SHERRY MCCARLEY 001
THE COMPANY COULD HAVE BY-PASSED THE ENEMY, HOWEVER, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME
THE ENEMY HAD INITIATED DIRECT FRONTAL ATTACK. BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION
WE BELIEVED THE ENEMY WAS TRYING TO PROTECT A VALUABLE LOCATION. WE REQUESTED
PERMISSION FROM THE COMPANY COMMANDER TO ASSAULT THE POSITION. THE COMPANY
COMMANDER APPROVED AND TWO SQUADS, YELLING, SCREAMING, AND FIRING THEIR WEAPONS
ASSAULTED THE ENEMY POSITION.
SOME OF THE ENEMY RETURNED THE FIRE AND OTHERS BROKE AND RAN. THE TWO SQUADS
KILLED THOSE REMAINING AND DROVE MANY INTO A BN SIZE BASE CAMP (POINT 15). THE
ASSAULT CONTINUED AND THE ENEMY BROKE INTO THREE DIRECTIONS. THE RESERVE SQUAD
ENGAGED THOSE THAT WERE FLEEING IN THEIR DIRECTION. DUE TO THE CANOPY THINNING
OUT, THE BASE CAMP WAS MARKED WITH A WHITE PHOSPHORUS GRENADE AND TACK AIR WAS
BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY SOLDIERS FLEEING TO THE FRONT AND THE RIGHT FLANK.
THE ENEMY WHO REMAINED IN THE CENTER OF THE BASE CAMP TOOK UP POSITIONS IN HUTS
WHICH WERE ASSAULTED AND DESTROYED. THE FIRST PLATOON KILLED A CONFIRMED 54
ENEMY IN HUTS, BUNKERS AND SPIDER HOLES, AND THE 2ND PLATOON KILLED 17 ENEMY
ON THE LEFT FLANK. TACK AIR KILLED AN ESTIMATED 25 FLEEING ENEMY SOLDIERS. AFTER
THE BASE CAMP WAS SECURED, PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN AND MANY VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENTS WERE GATHERED AND ALL LIVESTOCK WERE KILLED. THREE ENEMY REFUSED TO
SURRENDER AND ONE BROKE AND RAN WHEN AN ENEMY AUTOMATIC WEAPON FIRED ON THE
SQUAD'S POSITION. ALL WERE KILLED. SQUAD LEADERS ATTEMPTED TO DRAG SOME BODIES
OUTSIDE THE HUTS FOR FURTHER IDENTIFICATION, HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNABLE TO DO SO
BECAUSE THE BODIES WERE SPREAD ALL OVER THE FLOORS AND WALLS. INTELLIGENCE
MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM SLEEPING HOOCHES, PASSED TO THE COMPANY COMMANDER
AND THE ASSAULT CONTINUED. THE FIRST PLATOON TOOK NO CASUALTIES DURING THIS
ASSAULT, AND THE SECOND PLATOON HAD ONLY ONE SCU WOUNDED. AT THIS POINT, B
COMPANY CONSIDERED THEIR SITUATION CRITICAL AND REQUESTED EXTRACTION. AS THE
FIRST HELICOPTER ARRIVED AT POINT 16, IT RECEIVED GROUND FIRE FROM A LONG HILL
6
[F-7]
[Fax header:] 06/16/98 TUE 13:27 FAX 9106860074 SHERRY MCCARLEY 001 TO THE NW AND SW. THE COMPANY SUPPRESSED THE GROUND FIRE WITH ORGANIC WEAPONS AND REMAINING AMMUNITION. THE FIRST TWO CH-53'S WERE ABLE TO LIFT OFF THE LZ WITH ONLY MINOR DAMAGE POSSIBLY DUE TO CBU-19 BEING USED TO PREP THE AREA. THE THIRD SHIP APPARENTLY SUSTAINED DAMAGE WHICH CAUSED IT TO CRASH 15 KILOMETERS EAST OF THE LZ. FIVE ENEMY SOLDIERS WHO HAD CRAWLED BACK UP THE HILL AND WERE ON THE LZ WERE KILLED BY PERSONNEL AS THEY BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT. ONE SCU WAS FATALLY WOUNDED AS HE ENTERED THE AIRCRAFT AND ANOTHER SCU WAS KILLED WHEN THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED. A CHASE SHIP SUCCESSFULLY RESCUED THE PASSENGERS AND PROCEEDED TO KONTUM ON 14500 SEP 70. THE INFORMATION I HAVE JUST PRESENTED WAS OBTAINED BY A COMPLETE INTERROGATION OF EVERY US AND SCU MEMBER OF THE COMPANY IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN TO CCC. AS A PLATOON LEADER OF THIS OPERATION, I AM MOST PROUD OF MY OWN US AND SCU PERSONNEL AND OF THE ENTIRE COMPANY. WE FEEL WE DID A GOOD JOB. THE PERSONNEL WERE AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE. WE CANNOT SAY TOO MANY GOOD THINGS ABOUT THE AIR SUPPORT WE RECEIVED. THEY WERE MAGNIFICENT. WITHOUT THEM OUR JOB WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. SIR, COLONEL SADLER WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT A FINAL WRAP UP ON OPERATION TAILWIND.
7
[End Tab F]
[G-1]
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF ROBERT L VAN BUSKIRK
JULY 14 1998
Mr. Van Buskirk was contacted by Henry J. Schweiter, OASD/RA, by phone on the afternoon of July 14, 1998. He indicated no one from the government had contacted him before and that while he would be happy to talk to anyone about Tailwind, he would only answer questions about the use of Sarin gas and the sighting of possible defectors if those questions were submitted in advance in writing.
In describing Operation Tailwind, Mr Van Buskirk stated that he believed the operation had been compromised before it began and was a trap. "How could we put two, six-man pathfinder teams on the LZ for 18 minutes with 'all clear', and yet I had 10 percent wounded before we hit the ground? The enemy knew when and where we were coming, and we were completely surrounded." All the helicopters were hit on the way in. He stated that they only got off the LZ because of firepower from the sky. As confirmation, Mr Van Buskirk referred to the first CNN report, which quoted Major General Jack Singlaub as saying that the SOCJ forces were "bait".
Mr Van Buskirk stated that all fourteen living American participants from Operation Tailwind have been located. He said that Sergeant William Scherer and Sergeant Keith Plancich were dead. He mentioned that Gary Matsumoto, a military expert and reporter from Fox News, had succeeded in locating most of the participants.
Mr Van Buskirk said that the account of Operation Tailwind in the book on SOG forces by retired Army Major John L Plaster was highly inaccurate. He said that Plaster was "out to lunch" and that "he was handing out beer as we came out of the helos after the operation was over." He said that the SOG forces on Tailwind did not march 15 miles cross-country, as Plaster claims in his book. "We didn't go 10 football fields from the LZ", Mr Van Buskirk said. "They stomped us for four days. It ain't the way Plaster wrote it."
The amazing thing about Tailwind was that Mr Van Buskirk got all 55 men under his command out alive. He said that from his perspective, his job was to "blow stuff up and keep my men alive." He said that for four days he fired his weapon so often that it took the skin off his trigger finger.
Mr. Van Buskirk specifically addressed the case of Sergeant Michael Hagen, one of his men on Operation Tailwind who is living in poverty with his parents in Los Angeles, California and is paralyzed from the knees down. According to Mr Van Buskirk, he's 100 percent disabled, but he can't get any medicine from the VA because he can't prove he was in country. Mr. Van Buskirk said that Hagen's physician, Dr Baumsweiger (sp?), a neurologist and psychiatrist, can attest to the legitimacy of his disability. He said Hagen could stick a needle through his tongue and not feel anything.
Mr. Van Buskirk volunteered that he had seen Hagen and others "convulsing" when gas was dropped on the SOG forces during Tailwind. He said "I don't think it was CS." He added, "Whatever it was, it worked. Whatever was on the LZ got us out alive." When asked whether
[G-2]
he was familiar with change in CS tear agents used in theater from CBU-19 during the late 1960s to CBU-30, which was deployed in 1970, Mr Van Buskirk replied that he was not. He opined that Sergeant's Plancich's death may have been caused by exposure to the gas--"his heart exploded before he reached age 40."
When asked about possible defectors, Mr. Van Buskirk referred to the script for his briefing to General Creighton Abrams after Operation Tailwind. He said the script referred to three enemy soldiers who refused to surrender, and one broke and ran away. All were killed. Mr. Van Buskirk would only say that the one who ran and the two who were in the "spider hole" were the ones he was talking about.
Mr Van Buskirk stated he disagreed with April Oliver, the CNN reporter, that the camp the SOG forces discovered was gassed before they went in. "CNN got it wrong", he said. He also said he talked to Peter Arnett personally.
Mr. Van Buskirk strongly urged that more interviews be conducted, in particular of former Sergeant Hagen. He expressed a willing [sic] to discuss his experiences with anyone, subject to the restriction that questions about the use of sarin gas and defectors be submitted in writing. He mentioned that when he wrote his book, I knew there was going to be sensitive stuff, so he didn't talk about those things.
[G-3]
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500
RESERVE AFFAIRS
July 16, 1998
Robert L. Van Buskirk
433 Treasure Way
Rutherfordton, NC 28139
Dear Mr. Van Buskirk:
Thank you for talking with me over the phone the other day about your recollections of OPERATION TAILWIND. I appreciate your candor and willingness to discuss the operation.
During our conversation, you indicated that you would only be willing to answer questions concerning the use of Sarin nerve gas and about sighting Caucasians if those questions were posed in writing I have three questions:
1. Is there anything you want to tell us about the use of Sarin nerve gas during OPERATION TAILWIND?2. Is there anything you want to tell us concerning the targeting or sighting of U.S defectors or other Caucasians during Operation Tailwind?
3. Are there any other comments about OPERATION TAILWIND you would like the Department of Defense to consider in its review of the operation?
I would be grateful if you would fax your written responses to these questions to me by the close of business Friday, July 17, 1998. My fax number is 703-695-3659.
Thank you for your cooperation, and I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,[Signature]
Henry J. Schweiter
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Manpower and Personnel)
[G-4]
[Fax header:] JUL-16-98 THU 01:36 PM Bt CAROLINA LAND CORP. 704 286 1774 P.01
[Transcription of hand-printed letter:]
July 16th, 1998
To: Henry J. Schweiter, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301-1500
Via: Fax 703-695-3659
Reference: Operation Tailwind
From: Robert L. Van Buskirk, 433 Treasure Way, Rftn, NC 28139
Dear Mr. Schweiter,
Thank you for your letter - Fax - containing the three
questions you'd like me to answer as part of your investigation
into allegations raised in a recent report by CNN and Time
magazine. After much thought and reflection, as well as rev-
iewing my own notes from several CNN interviews, both on
and off camera; I stand by the record of those inter-
views.
There are well over a hundred pages of printed
notes and transcripts available to your investigation; I'm
sure through CNN's Tom Johnson and Rick Kaplan, both of
whom expressed a desire that CNN & the Pentagon do a
joint investigation of the charges raised by the CNN story.
I further suggest you request the transcripts and notes
concerning Capt. McCarley. And that McCarley might also
release a copy to you of my seven page briefing to General
Abrams and his staff. I was not allowed to keep a copy or
any notes from that briefing, so I was surprised to learn Cpt.
McCarley had provided the press with my briefing.
Finally, I would like to know if your investigation is
in depth enough to learn: who told the enemy, when and
where we were arriving for Tailwind? It was a trap
which almost succeeded. Finally, I hope Sgt. Hagen and
others who suffer from some type of 'toxic exposure' would
have a 'waiver' or disability to be recognized by the V.A.
I would hope part of your investigation is to help our wounded.
Sincerely,
[Signed] Robert Van Buskirk
[Fax footer:]
JUL-16-1998 13:58 704 286 1774 P.001
[End Tab G]
[H-1]
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON
JUL 7 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind"
The attached report reflects the review conducted by the Air Force in response to your June 9, 1998 directive.
I am confident that the report accurately supports the conclusion that no nerve gas was used by the Air Force during this Operation.
[Signature]F. WHITTEN PETERS
Acting Secretary of the Air Force
Attachment:
Report
[H-2]
AIR FORCE HISTORY REPORT
ON
OPERATION TAILWIND
Air Force History Support Office
16 July 1998
[H-3]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page/Appendix
I. Introduction
A. Events Which Prompted DoD Review ...............Page 1
B. SECDEF Directed Review .........................Page 1
C. Conclusions ....................................Page 2
II. Conduct of the Review .............................Page 2
III. Discussion
A. Unclassified Account of TAILWIND ...............Page 6
B. Related Topics
1. Considerations: Nerve Agent Weapons .........Page 21
2. Clay/Killpack Letter ........................Page 22
3. Explanation of Research in SEADAB
and CACTA .................................Page 24
[Note: Appendices not in report]
IV. Appendices
A. Illustration of A-1 Skyraider with
CBU-30 Munitions Load ........................Appendix A
B. Messages from the Airborne Command
and Control Center ...........................Appendix B
C. Authorizations to Use CS "Riot Control"
Tear Gas .....................................Appendix C
D. Public Information About Nerve Agent Munition:
New York Times Articles, 1969-1971............Appendix D
E. Clay/Killpack Letter and Related
Correspondence ...............................Appendix E
F. List of Persons Interviewed and Interview Text Appendix F
G. Information on the Southeast Asian Data Base
(SEADAB)......................................Appendix G
H. Secretary Cohen's Directive ....................Appendix H
I. Combat Air Activities (CACTA) Print-out.........Appendix I
J. JRCC Search and Rescue Log .....................Appendix J
K. 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron Messages.....Appendix K
L. 1st Marine Air Wing Messages ...................Appendix L
M. Tear Gas Rockets ...............................Appendix M
[H-4]
AIR FORCE HISTORY REPORT
OPERATION TAILWIND
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Events Which Prompted DoD Review
At 10:00 p.m. EDT on Sunday, 7 June 1998, Cable News Network
(CNN) telecast the first edition of a new show, "NewsStand: CNN &
Time," in coordination with Time magazine. The lead story on the 7
June telecast, called "Valley of Death," alleged that a U.S. Special
Forces unit was inserted into Laos in September 1970 to kill U.S.
military defectors. The story claimed that during the operation, code
named TAILWIND, the Special Forces unit assaulted an enemy base camp
"village" and killed enemy troops, women, children, and U.S.
defectors. The telecast alleged that Air Force A-1 Skyraider
aircraft dropped Sarin nerve gas CBU-15 munitions on the enemy base
camp prior to the attack by the Special Forces unit. The CNN telecast
also claimed that during their extraction, the Special Forces
personnel called in Air Force A-1s, which again dropped Sarin nerve
gas weapons on enemy soldiers.
The next day, Time magazine, dated 15 June 1998, included a
similar story on Operation TAILWIND, written by CNN staff.
B. Review SECDEF Directed
On Monday, 8 June, the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen,
announced a formal investigation of these charges. A 9 June
memorandum to the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) directed a 30-day investigation of the two charges that the
TAILWIND operation was directed against U.S. military defectors and
that Sarin nerve gas was used. (See Appendix H)
1
[H-5]
C. Conclusions
This Air Force report will only address the allegation that Air
Force A-1s dropped Sarin nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND, 11-14
September 1970. The other allegation, that Operation TAILWIND was
directed against U.S. military defectors, will be addressed by the
U.S. Army and the JCS.
Based on all of the information historians gathered in their
investigation, Sarin nerve gas was not used by Air Force aircraft
during Operation TAILWIND. The historians could find no evidence that
the CBU-15 nerve agent munition was an operational weapon or deployed
to Southeast Asia at the time.
On 13 and 14 September 1970, A-1s from the 56th Special
Operations Wing dropped CBU-30 CS tear gas munitions to assist in the
extraction of the Special Forces unit The 13 September attempt was
aborted, and the 14 September attempt succeeded.
Authorization to use CS tear gas in Search and Rescue operations
in Laos derives from a 20 January 1968 Secretary of Defense
Memorandum. (See Appendix C)
II. CONDUCT OF REVIEW
On 3 June 1997, the Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO), Dr. Richard
P. Hallion, was informed of the upcoming 7 June CNN story about nerve
gas in Laos, 1970. On 4 June, Air Force personnel began a thorough
search to identify materials on TAILWIND and the use of gas of any
kind in Southeast Asia. Dr. Hallion spoke to several knowledgeable
sources: (1) Colonel Rod Paschall (retired Green Beret); (2) General
Michael Dugan (retired Air Force Chief of Staff, A-1 pilot); (3)
Colonel Eugene Deatrick (retired A-l pilot); (4) Terry Bolstad
(retired A-1 Search and Rescue (SAR) pilot); (5) Lt Col William
2
[H-6]
Flanagan (retired F-4 weapon systems operator); and Herbert Mason
(historian for the Air Force Special Operations Command)
After the telecast, the Secretary of Defense ordered an
investigation of the allegations that TAILWIND was directed against US
military defectors, and that Sarin nerve gas was used in the
operation. The Air Force Historian then ordered a program-wide search
for relevant materials concentrating on the Air Force History Support
Office (AFHSO), the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), and
the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).
Additional Interviews:
1. Wayne Thompson (AFHSO) conducted interviews with Tom Stump,
Don Feld, and Art Bishop, all of whom had been in the 56th Special
Operations Wing (SOW) as A-1 pilots. Feld and Bishop flew the CBU-30
tear gas sorties on 14 September 1970. Thompson also interviewed
Covey Forward Air Controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support
Squadron: Gary Green, George Boehmer, and Warner McGraw.
2. Diane Putney (AFHSO) interviewed Donald Knight and Wilfred
Turcotte, officers who had commanded the 56 SOW's 456th Munitions
Maintenance Squadron (MMS) in September 1970.
3. Yvonne Kinkaid (AFHSO) interviewed Lloyd O'Daniels, Covey FAC
"Rider"; Lt Col Paul Spencer, Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 456
MMS; Lt Col Wilfred Turcotte, commander, 456 MMS; Col Donald Knight,
commander, 456 MMS; SMSgt James McCoy, Munitions Services
Superintendent, 456 MMS; and CMSgt Donald Guy, Munitions Services
Superintendent, 456 MMS.
4. Sheldon Goldberg (AFHSO) also interviewed Lt Col Spencer,
Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 456 MMS.
3
[H-7]
Major Publications Examined:
FM 3-10/AFM 355-4, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents,
31 March 1966.
Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret
War in Laos, Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995.
Cosmas, Graham & Lt Col T. P. Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam:
Vietnamization and Redeployment: 1970-1971, Washington, DC, USMC,
1986.
Hammond, William M., Public Affairs: The Military and the Media,
1962-1968, Washington, DC, Center of Military History, 1988.
Plaster, John L., SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
Vietnam, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1997.
Van Buskirk, Robert and Fred Baver, Tailwind, Waco, TX, Word
Books, 1983.
The New York Times, 1969-1971.
Project CORONA HARVEST Report, HQ PACAF (DOV), In-Country and
Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, l Jan 65 - 31 Dec 69,
vol. 2, Hardware: Munitions, 2 November 1970, AFHSO.
Burch, Maj R. M., Project Contemporary Historical Evaluation of
Combat Operations (CHECO) SEA Report, "The ABCCC in SEA," 7 AF/DOAC,
15 January 1969.
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Command History 1970,
Annex B, Studies and Observations Group," 8 April 1971.
USAF Management Summary, Reference Data, Non-Nuclear Ordnance
Characteristics, HQ USAF, 1967-1970.
Guide to Air Force Armament Laboratory Non-Nuclear Munitions and
Equipment, Part 1 & 2, AFATL, 1 September 1968.
Hay, Lt Gen J. H., Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material
Innovations, Washington, DC, DePt of Army, 1974.
Schlight, Lt Col John, Project CHECO SEA Report, "Rescue at Ban
Phanop, 5-7 December 1969," 7 AF/DOAC, 15 February 1970.
JCS Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB), 1970-1972, in Center for
Electronic Records, NARA.
JCS Combat Air Activities (CACTA) File, 11-14 September 1970, in
Center for Electronic Records, NARA.
Seventh Air Force CHECO Microfilm, 1966-1970.
4
[H-8]
USAF Field Histories Consulted:
Pacific Air Force, 1970
Seventh Air Force, 1968-1971
Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA), 1964-1968
OOAMA Southeast Asia Support, 1964-1968
Air Force Armament Laboratory, 1964-1971
Air Proving Ground Center, 1964-1971
USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center, 1964-1971
8th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1970
12th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1970
35th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-September 1970
56th Special Operations Wing, 1969-1971
366th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1960
388th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-September 1970
400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), 1964-1971
432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, July-September 1970
504th Tactical Air Support Group, July-September 1970
41st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing, July-September 1970
3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, July-September 1970
Participants in Air Force History Research:
Richard Hallion, The Air Force Historian
Wayne Thompson, Air Force History Support Office
Diane Putney, Air Force History Support Office
Sheldon Goldberg, Air Force History Support Office
Yvonne Kinkaid, Air Force History Support Office
Capt Roy Stanley, Air Force History Support Office
James Howard, Air Force Historical Research Agency
TSgt David Byrd, Air Force Historical Research Agency
Herbert Carlin, Air Force Materiel Command
William Elliot, Air Force Materiel Command
Vickie Johes, Air Force Materiel Command
Dennis Casey, Air Intelligence Agency
Lt Col Dale Wise, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification
Team
SMSgt Jean Hardin, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification
Team
MSgt Ray Bailey, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification Team
5
[H-9]
Richard Boylan, National Archives II-Textual Records
Charles Shaughnessy, National Archives II-Textual Records
Margret Adams, National Archives II-Center For Electronic Records
Lee Gladwin, National Archives II-Center for Electronic Records
Fred Graboske, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums
William Siebert, National Personnel Records Center
III. DISCUSSION
A. Unclassified Account of TAILWIND
On 11 September 1970, Marine CH-53 helicopters and AH-1G Cobra
gunships carried into Laos, near Chavane, a team of 16 Americans and a
Special Commando Unit (SCU), consisting of Montagnard troops. The
Americans were in Company B, Command and Control Central, Military
Advisory Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG). Their
mission, Operation TAILWIND, would last until 14 September 1970, and
their objectives were reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and a
diversion for a larger operation to the north.
From landing zone preparation on 11 September to extraction on 14
September, the team was provided continuous tactical air support by
Air Force, Army, and Marine assets. The enemy almost continuously
attacked the team during the four days they were in Laos. Air Force
units under the operational control of the Seventh Air Force flew 76
sorties for TAILWIND and provided Forward Air Control (FAC) and
Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft and crews
Pilots used the code words "Prairie Fire" to refer to the infiltration
and exfiltration of the MACSOG team. Similarly, MACSOG used the
"Prairie Fire" code words to identify cross-border operations into its
Laotian area of operations.
The A-1 Skyraider aircraft which flew TAILWIND missions belonged
to the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW), stationed at Nakhon Phanom
6
[H-10]
(NKP) Air Base, Thailand. The Thirteenth Air Force provided the wing
with command, administration, facilities, and personnel, and the
Seventh Air Force exercised operational control over the wing~s
aircraft. Three units flew the A-1s assigned to the 56 SOW:
1st Special Operations Squadron at NKP
602nd Special Operations Squadron at NKP
Operating Location AA (OL-AA) at Da Nang Air Base,
South Vietnam
In September 1970, the wing's 21st Special Operations Squadron (SOS)
flew eleven CH-3E helicopters and one, new CH-53 helicopter which
arrived at NKP on 8 August. The squadron referred to the large CH-53
as "BUFF," for "big, ugly, fat fellow," and this designation should
not be confused with a similar BUFF nickname given to B-52 bombers.
The helicopters of the 21 SOS did not participate in TAILWIND because
they flew other combat missions in a "big operation," according to the
squadron history, to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in the Bolovens area of
Laos.
The A-1 pilots assigned to the 56 SOW flew four types of combat
missions: escort, strike, armed reconnaissance, and search and rescue
(SAR). During SAR missions to rescue downed pilots, the wing operated
with the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, which flew the HH-3
"Jolly Green Giant" helicopters. The aircraft carried weapons
appropriate for the type of mission flown. For a "strike" operation,
for example, the munitions maintenance crews would load high explosive
and fragmentation bombs and napalm. In "SAR support," at least one A-
1 aircraft on the mission would carry M-47 smoke bombs and weapons
with "CS" "riot control" tear gas, for use if warranted. An Air Force
history, written by Earl H. Tilford, Jr., and first published in 1980,
explained that tear gas was employed on SAR missions:
7
[H-11]
As the war continued, the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong,
and Pathet Lao used increasingly sophisticated weapons and
tactics to frustrate rescue efforts. Rescue forces reacted
to these challenges by developing new weapons and changing
tactics Tear gas bombs and riot control chemicals were
some of the most controversial weapons used to support
rescue operations. These weapons included Cluster Bomb Unit
(CBU)-19A/B and CBU-30A antipersonnel area denial bombs,
which were essentially tear gas bombs.
The 56 SOW history for April-June 1969 identified the situations
when the use of tear gas would be appropriate during SAR operations.
The downed pilot himself would be deliberately gassed in some cases:
CBU-19 could be used on enemy gun or troop
concentrations when the enemy was not equipped with masks or
other protective equipment. In these areas it was more
efficient to disable the enemy temporarily than to employ
normal weapons. It was most effective in areas of
widespread small arms which were normally difficult to
locate and silence.
CBU-19 could be used directly on the survivor if the
survivor was surrounded, had been captured, or was injured
and unable to help himself and was in [imminent danger from
advancing enemy forces.
The report, "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast
Asia, 1 Jan 65-31 Dec 69," provided the five primary situations when
CBU-19 and CBU-30 were employed in South Vietnam:
To deny the enemy his use of base camps, bunkers, tunnels, and
caves
In prestrike operations in support of defoliation missions
In SAR operations to prevent the capture of downed aircrews
In offensive combat operations, such as assaults and suppression
of small arms fire around helicopter landing zones
In defensive combat operations such as perimeter defense
The 56 SOW history for July-September 1970 referred to "gas birds" and
defined them as aircraft carrying CBU-19/CBU-30. Thus, the A-1s of
the 56 SOW sometimes carried and delivered CS tear gas munitions.
The word "incapacitating" was used to describe the CS weapons.
The 56 SOW history in July described a SAR mission and mentioned
8
[H-12]
"incapacitating ordnance." Another report, "USAF Search & Rescue in
Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70," provided a definition for "CS" in
its glossary: "personnel incapacitating agent."
The CBU-19 gas bomb had been originally designed for helicopters,
but within the Air Force, mostly A-1s expended them, and they were
little used after 1969. During 1970-1972 the Air Force principally
used the CBU-30 tear gas cluster bomb. Both propeller aircraft, A-1s,
and jet aircraft, especially F-4s and F-100s, employed the CBU-30,
which contained 66 pounds of CS tear gas, while the CBU-19 contained
only 14 pounds. The "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations"
report described the CBU gas munitions:
The CBU-19 chemical cluster was a 130-lb. modified
U.S. Army dispenser intended for use on helicopters and
consisted of two subclusters fitted to a strongback. Each
cluster contained 528 agent-filled canisters; each canister
contained an incapacitating chemical, called CS, and a
pyrotechnic fuze. Upon ejection from the aircraft, the fuze
ignited the CS, disseminating the CS for four to six
seconds. This required delivery below 600 feet AGL [above
ground level] to insure that the chemical reached the
ground. Also, as the cluster had originally been designed
for use on helicopters, delivery was restricted to use on
the A-1 and A-37 because the cluster could not withstand the
airloads encountered on faster aircraft. The CBU-30
consisted of the S W -13 downward ejection dispenser and
1,280 BLU-39/B23 submunitions, each filled with CS. Upon
ejection, a pyrotechnic fuze in each submunition ignited,
disseminating the agent into the air. Delivery was
restricted to below 600 feet AGL to insure ground coverage.
Upon contact with the ground, the submunitions skittered
about, disseminating the CS even further. The CBU-30 was
compatible with both low and high speed aircraft.
In the Air Force, CS had replaced the older, less potent CN tear gas.
A MACV directive, 28 March 1970, defined CN as a "standard tear agent
employed by law enforcement agencies" and CS as "an improved agent
developed for military use." The BLU-52 consisted of CS-1, CS in a
persistent powdered form, in a 750-lb. fire bomb casing. Because CS-l
tended to cake when wet, an oil-like substance was added to improve
its flow qualities, and the improved fill was called CS-2 and the
9
[H-13]
munition was designated BLU-52A. BLU-52s functioned as anti-personnel
area denial and interdiction munitions. They only recently were sent
to the 56 SOW in September 1970 and caused problems. The Munitions
Maintenance Squadron reported: "BLU-52's have arrived and are causing
a difficult storage situation because of lack of proper
decontaminants. These bombs will be restricted from use."
The Tilford history provided an account of the use of tear gas
which highlights its potency and shows that those who breathed the
agent could experience very strong physical reactions. It stated that
on 15 February 1969, A-1 Skyraiders flew a SAR mission near the Laos-
South Vietnam border and dropped CBU-19s. It continued:
Braving the constant hail of antiaircraft fire, the
Skyraiders made the required mile-long run at 300 feet and
220 knots to hit all their targets--enemy antiaircraft gun
positions. While the gunners choked, coughed, cried, and
retched uncontrollably, a Jolly Green [helicopter] with its
crew wearing gas masks swooped in and saved the pilot.
An Air Force historical CHECO report also included an account of the
effects of tear gas. It included a statement from a downed Air Force
pilot describing the use of riot control agents (CBU-19, CBU-30, and
BLU-52) during his rescue near Ban Phanop in Laos, lasting three-days
in December 1969:
They laid it all along the top of the ridge . . .[some
of] it hit me . . . I might as well tell you what it feels
like when that stuff goes off. I ran into a tree and was
wrapped around the tree urinating, defecating, and retching
all at the same instant. . .It also made me want to sneeze.
It was a beauty to have 500 pounders and everything go off
because it would give me a chance to sneeze. . .It goes into
effect instantaneously. Physically and mentally you can't
control yourself. . .After that every time I'd come up on the
air and ask for Vodka (A-1s carrying CBU-19), as soon as I'd
tell them where, how far and the heading, I'd tell them
'Don't get it close to me.'
The "USAF Search & Rescue Report, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70,~ which
covered the time of the TAILWIND Operation, contained illustrations of
the A-1 Skyraider carrying its various weapons loads, and for the SAR
10
[H-14]
support configuration it indicated that the A-1 carried two CBU-30
weapons, and they were hung on the right and left "stubs" of the
aircraft, which placed them under the right and left wing, immediately
next to the fuselage. (See Appendix A) A set of notes dated January
1970, which a 56 SOW A-1 pilot consulted before flying missions,
provided a warning: "To dispense CBU-30 consecutively, do not set
train position. Instead, set the stub selector switches to SALVO one
at a time."
The employment of tear gas "riot control" weapons in Southeast
Asia by the Air Force and Army generated controversy, and appropriate
officials in the chain of command authorized each use of the CS air
weapon. The Seventh Air Force required regular reports on the exact
number of munitions expended during specified time periods. Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara issued a key authorization for use of CS
in Laos on 20 January 1968 when he sent a memorandum to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating, "With reference to JCSM 480-67
of 26 August 1967, I approve at this time only so much of the JCSM
recommendation as pertains to the use of riot control agent CS in
combat aircrew recovery operations in Laos." The MACSOG history which
discussed TAILWIND noted, The authority to use CS/CN gas within the
PF [Prairie Fire] AO [area of operations] was held by the US
Ambassador to Laos. Its use was considered on a case by case basis
and was last utilized to assist in an extraction of an exploitation
force on 14 September. This date, 14 September 1970, matches last
day of the TAILWIND operation when the team was extracted and the
operation ended. A MACV directive 25 December 1971 stated that the
use of riot control agents commonly covered "extraction by helicopter
of troops, medical evacuees, and downed aircrews."
11
[H-15]
The CBU-14 and CBU-25 weapons in the inventory of the 56 SOW
deserve special consideration because the wing was discontinuing the
use of CBU-14s and receiving CBU-25s in September 1970. Both cluster
bomb units used the suspension unit, universal (SUU)-14 dispenser,
filled with submunitions. Neither was a chemical munition. The CBU-
14 was designed for use against light materiel targets, such as
trucks. The CBU-25 was an anti-personnel weapon. The CBU-14s had a
high percentage of duds. The 56 SOW history in September 1970
reported:
Other problems included the unforeseen change in
ordnance types. When the shipment of CBU-25 arrived, the
CBU Storage Area was filled to capacity with CBU-14 leaving
no room for storage. The change was due to the
characteristics of CBU-14 which sometimes hangs undetonated
in trees, providing the enemy with a source of effective
antipersonnel munitions for use against friendly troops in
the form of booby traps. . . . Due to the late arrival of
CBU-25 ordnance (September) follow up action was not
available for this report. However, action was expected
during October to request removal of CBU-14 from NKP.
In September the A-1s of the 56 SOW expended both CBU-14 and CBU-25
munitions.
Also during September 1970, the three units of the 56 SOW which
flew the A-1 Skyraiders participated in TAILWIND, and pilots from the
wing dropped the CS weapons used during the operation. The call sign
of the A-1 pilots from the 1st Special Operations Squadron of the 56
SOW was "Hobo." Their squadron history for September stated:
The [T]ailwind exfil on 13 and 14 September was
heavily opposed, but with the help of numerous accurate low-
level attacks by A-1s, from both NKP and Danang, the ground
team was successfully extracted on the second day. Many
Hob[o] pilots were involved in this effort
The squadron history for July 1970 referred to CBU-19/CBU-30 "gas
birds," but the September history does not specifically state that the
unit's aircraft dropped gas during TAILWIND.
12
[H-16]
The history of the 602nd Special Operations Squadron did not
mention TAILWIND, but interviews confirmed that squadron pilots flew
in support of the operation. Among the weapons the squadron used in
September were CBU-30s, CBU-14s, and CBU-25s. No CBU-19s were used
The tear gas expenditures for the month consisted of eight CBU-30 tear
gas munitions.
The 56 SOW's Operating Location AA, stationed at Da Nang,
provided a description of its TAILWIND involvement in its September
history. The A-1 pilots' call sign was "Spad":
On 11 September the Spads assisted in the infil of a
unique long range reconnaissance team. Also on that date,
units of the Royal Laotian Government were fighting to
interdict Rt 23 in the Laotian panhandle. The
reconnaissance team, code name "Tailwind," was three times
their normal size and was intent on more than
reconnaissance. Scheduled to be a diversion for the Laotian
unit, Tailwind on 12 September made contact with the enemy.
In response to this contact, the Spads launched 10 sorties
to support the tactical emergency which had developed. On
these sorties Spad pilots made numerous low altitude passes
to .50 calibre and intense small arms and automatic weapons.
Strikes were also directed against known mortar positions.
By the 13th of September the enemy had definite knowledge he
was fighting more than a standard reconnaissance team. An
aggressive effort was made to overrun the special forces.
The Spads again responded to what had now become a Prairie
Fire Emergency by providing twelve sorties. Again low
passes and precision delivery repelled hostile forces in
their attempt to destroy the friendly team. This lasted
throughout the day, and efforts were made to prepare for a
first light launch.
On the 14th of September eight sorties were launched
on this day to assist in the recovery of this team. The
team was safely extracted at 1400 hours on the 14th of
September. All total, the Spads provided thirty sorties in
support of the "Tailwind." The team reported over 400 KBA
[killed by air] and suffered only three lost during its
heroic activities.
Among the munitions the OL-AA expended during the month were CBU-25s.
In September 1970 the operating location expended no tear gas weapons.
Information in the 56 SOW history indicates that the A-l
Skyraiders which dropped tear gas during TAILWIND, expended CBU-30,
not CBU-19, tear gas munitions. Two other sources point to CBU-30 as
13
[H-17]
the gas weapon the A-1s dropped. The computerized Southeast Asia Data
Base (SEADAB) reveals that A-1s from NKP expended 6 CBU-30s on 13
September and 6 CBU-30s on 14 September, in the area where the
TAILWIND team was located. The 12 CBU-30s used over the two-day
period include the 8 CBU-30s specifically listed in the 602 SOS
September history. Art Bishop, one of the pilots who dropped the tear
gas on the last day of the operation, 14 September, stated that he
used CBU-30, and he is certain of the type because he consulted a
diary in which he had written CBU-30. The second pilot who dropped
the gas bombs, Don Feld, clearly remembered it as tear gas, but could
not recall the type of CBU.
Other USAF tactical air (TACAIR) units and aircraft
operating in the part of Laos where the TAILWIND team operated
on 11-14 September 1970 were: F-4s and AC-130s from the 8th
Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon Air Base, Thailand; F-4s from
the 388 TFW, Korat Air Base, Thailand; F-100s, probably from the
35 TFW, Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam; F-100s from the 355
TFW, Takhli Air Base, Thailand; AC-119s from the 18 SOS at Da
Nang Air Base; and OV-10s from the 504th Tactical Air Support
Group at NKP. Most of the unit histories did not mention
TAILWIND. One did preserve the letter of congratulations from
General Lucius Clay, Jr., Seventh Air Force commander, to the
crews of the 8 TFW, for their participation in the operation.
Clay singled out for special recognition the pilot and crew of
an AC-130 Spectre gunship, call sign Moody 2, from the 16 SOS.
SEADAB computerized data did not show any aircraft other than
the A-1s from NKP as dropping gas munitions during TAILWIND.
Among the responsibilities of the 456th Munitions Maintenance
Squadron (MMS) of the 56 SOW were those to supply the wing with all
14
[H-18]
required munitions and associated components for combat missions and
to support all loading, downloading, arming, and disarming of all wing
aircraft requiring munitions. During an interview, the commander of
the 456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt. Col Wilfred N. Turcotte,
USAF, retired, stated that the wing had in its inventory tear gas
munitions, but no Sarin. The idea of nerve agent munitions at NRP was
a "startling concept" to him. The men in his squadron who loaded the
weapons on the aircraft did so with no protective gear and often
worked in the hot climate "stripped to the waist," wearing shorts or
long pants. As commander, he was often on the flight line as
munitions were prepared and loaded. He certainly would have known if
there was poison Sarin gas in the weapons his men handled. There was
none. He would have been notified if Sarin gas was going to be used
on a mission. He was never so informed.
During an interview, the Assistant Maintenance Supervisor of the
456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF,
retired, explained that he had received formal training in identifying
and handling munitions of all types, including nerve gas. He said
there was no Sarin at NKP. Had there been he certainly would have
been aware of it, and he knew how to recognize it. He stated that had
he seen any he would have immediately reported it to the Inspector
General. At no time while he was in the 56 SOW did he see special
protective clothing, masks, rubber aprons, etc. necessary when storing
and moving nerve agent munitions. He was familiar with every storage
and work area and went through them all He checked munitions loads
daily. The gas munitions at NKP were there for search and rescue
(SAR) missions. These weapons were preloaded on trailers so they
could quickly be uploaded to the SAR aircraft.
15
[H-19]
The officer who assumed command of the 456 MMS on 23 September
1970, nine days after TAILWIND, Col. Donald L Knight, USAF, retired,
stated that the 56 SOW used tear gas on missions, but that he had
received no information at all about nerve agent munitions ever being
in the 56 SOW inventory of weapons. He never heard anything about
Sarin at NKP, and none was in the wing when he commanded the 456 MMS.
He described how weapons were preloaded on trailers in the munitions
area and driven over to the aircraft where 456 MMS members loaded them
onto the aircraft. The only protective equipment he remembered his
munitions loaders wearing on the flight line were ear plugs.
After the TAILWIND operation, General Clay, as commander of the
Seventh Air Force, attended a briefing on the mission 11-14 September,
given by one of the members of the ground element. The briefer
described in detail the combat action the group engaged in while in
Laos, and the tactical air power his team relied upon Clay wrote,
"Describing the air support as 'magnificent,' the briefer further
stated the mission could not have seen accomplished without the
coordinated, accurate air support his forces received."
Air Force units supported TAILWIND with effective and continuous
air power, but at no time during the operation did any Air Force
aircraft deliver Sarin nerve gas. The A-1 Skyraiders did expend CBU-
30 tear gas, which contributed to the successful extraction of the
TAILWIND team.
16
[H-20]
TAILWIND from the ABCCC EC-130 Perspective Matched to SEADAB Data
Two Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) EC-130 aircraft
flew during TAILWIND and reported daily on the mission, starting on
its second day, September 12, when a Prairie Fire Emergency was
declared. The ABCCC messages, matched to data in the computerized
Southeast Asia Data Base, provide additional information about the
operation.
The calls signs for the two ABCCC aircraft were Moonbeam and
Hillsboro.
On 11 Sep 70 sorties by 8 TFW F-4s from Ubon dropped MK-82 bombs
at a landing zone in southern Laos at YC 4370 0470.
For the night of 12/13 Sep Moonbeam reported coverage by FLIP
(1115), an AC-119 gunship from the 18 SOS (Danang), and Moody 1 and 2
(1103 & 1119) AC-130 Spectre gunships from the 8 TFW at Ubon at
coordinates YC 4362 0498. The supporting aircraft could see mortar
rounds, grenades, and rockets falling on Company B. Firefly 44, an A-
1 out of NKP (56 SOW), expended a load of CBU-25s in support of
Tailwind that night, as did 18 Spad 01, an A-1 from 56 SOW OL-AA at
Danang. Both were guided by an Alma FAC.
The Prairie Fire Emergency continued during 13 Sep 70. ABCCC
Hillsboro reported Company B moving from landing zone to landing zone,
trying to exfiltrate the area. They were not successful, and one
Marine CH-53 (Gnat One) was destroyed but the crew was saved.
Hillsboro reported 22 A-1 sorties and 8 quick-reaction force (QRF)
sorties (F-4s) supporting Tailwind on 13 Sep These sorties included
Wolfpack 11 and 12 F-4s from 8 TFW (Ubon) dropping MK-82 bombs and
CBU-24s at YC 4480 0570; Hobo 20 and 44 A-1s from 56 SOW (NKP)
dropping CBU-25s; Spad 01 and 03 A-1s from 56 SOW OL-AA (Danang)
dropping CBU-25s and BLU-32B fire bombs.
17
[H-21]
During the 13 Sep exfiltration attempts. CBU-30 tear gas bombs
were dropped at YC 4450 0380 by Firefly 24 and Hobo 46, which were 56
SOW A-1s from NKP.
Later in the day, additional support was provided by Firefly 34
and 35 (56 SOW A-1s from NKP) dropping CBU-25s at YC 4350 0450.
During the night of 13/14 Sep Moonbeam ABCCC reported that
Company B had 3 critical casualties, and 8 others wounded. Gunships
Greg 1 and 2, Will and Check, provided cover. Additional support was
provided by Hobo 30 and 31; Firefly 42 and 43; and Spad 03 and 04
Company B was extracted successfully at 1500L on 14 Sep 70.
Another Marine CH-53 was lost in this effort. Hillsboro reported that
at least 10 A-1 and 8 QRF (F-4) sorties were flown in support of
Tailwind on 14 Sep and guided by Gazor FACs. Wolfpack 11, 21, 41, and
51 F-4s (8 TFW from Ubon) dropped CBU-24s and MX 82 bombs at YC 4220
0570. Some of the A-1 sorties were Hobo 31 and 32 and Spad 01, 02, 03
and 04 (56 SOW OL-AA from Danang) dropping CBU-25s.
In support of the exfiltration on 14 Sep, CBU-30 tear gas was
dropped by Firefly 44 and Hobo 20 (56 SOW A-1s from NKP) at YC 4450
0380.
SOURCES:
1. 7AF ABCCC Msg & Narrative Rpts, 12-14 Sep 70.
2 JCS SEADAB, 11-14 Sep 70.
18
[H-22]
Sources Cited in the Unclassified Account of TAILWIND
All material cited is unclassified
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1970
Annex B, Studies and Observations Group, 8 April 1971, Air Force
History Support Office (AFHSO), Bolling AFB, DC.
History, 56th Special Operations Wing, July - September 1970,
vols 1 and 2, microfilm, AFHSO.
These volumes contain the monthly histories of 1st Special
Operations Squadron (SOS), 21 SOS, 602 SOS, Operating Location AA, and
456th Munitions Maintenance Squadron.
Earl H. Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980).
History, 56th Special Operations Wing, April - June 1969, vol 1,
microfilm, AFHSO.
Project CORONA HARVEST Report, HQ PACAF (DOV), In-Country and
Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 65 - 31 Dec 69,
vol 2, Hardware: Munitions. 2 Nov 1970. AFHSO.
Report, USAF Search & Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec
70," microfilm, AFHSO.
MACV Directive 525-11, 28 March 1970, "Employment of Riot Control
Agents an Defense Against Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Attack,~
copy from National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), AFHSO
Lt Col John Schlight, Project CHECO SEA Report, "Rescue at Ban
Phanop, 5-7 Dec 1969," 7 AF/DOAC, 15 February 1970. AFHSO.
Photocopies of 456th Munitions Maintenance cards, faxed from Col
Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, to Diane T. Putney, AFHSO. 26 June
1998. AFHSO.
Memo, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Subject: "Use of
Riot Control Agent (CS) in Combat Aircrew Recovery Operations in Laos
and NVN," 20 January 1968, copy from NARA in AFHSO.
MACV Directive 525-11, 25 December 1971, "Employment of Riot
Control Agents and Defense Against Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear
Attack," copy from NARA, AFHSO.
Interview, Art Bishop (Major Arthur N. Bishop, USAF, in 1970), by
Wayne Thompson, AFHSO, 16 June 1998.
Interview, Don Feld (2Lt Donald H. Feld, USAF, in 1970), by Wayne
Thompson, AFHSO, 17 June 1998.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) in
Center for Electronic Records, NARA.
Letter, Lucius D. Clay, Jr., 7AF/CC, to Colonel Larry M.
19
[H-23]
Killpack, 8TFW/CC, 8 October 1970, in History (S), "8th Tactical
Fighter Wing," vol 2, microfilm, AFHSO.
Interviews, Lt Col Wilfred N. Turcotte, USAF, retired, by Diane
T. Putney, AFHSO, 26 June 1998, and Yvonne A. Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3 July
1998.
Interviews, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF, retired, by Yvonne A.
Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3 July 1998, and Sheldon A. Goldberg, AFHSO, 3 July
1998.
Interviews, Col Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, by Diane T.
Putney, AFHSO, 26 and 29 June 1998, and Yvonne A. Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3
July 1998.
Messages and Narrative Reports, 7AF Airborne Command and Control
Center (ABCCC), 12-14 September 1970, microfilm, AFHSO.
John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
Manuscript, Bernard C. Nalty, Interdiction in Southern Laos,
1968-1972. AFHSO.
20
[H-24]
B. Related Topics
1. Considerations: Nerve Agent Weapons
The following describes an exercise with MC-1, a Sarin nerve
agent munition, which shows the precautions necessary when handling
lethal nerve gas. In January 1969, the 313th Air Division informed the
400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) and other interested USAF
units on Okinawa of a USAF operational test and evaluation program for
the 750 lb. MC-1 Sarin nerve gas bomb to be conducted at Dugway
Proving Grounds, Utah, in March 1969.
Leakproof containers were shipped in from Ogden Air Materiel Area
(OOAMA), and Disaster Control Forces at Kadena were extensively
trained. Army and Air Force Technical Escort teams inspected the 25
weapons carefully and supervised the loading into the containers which
were then mounted on 9 pallets.
On 27 March 1969, the convoy of bombs left the Chibana Army
Ammunition Depot in tractor trailers for an hour and a half drive to
Kadena. They were escorted by Security Police, Disaster Control, and
medical teams. Loading into the C-141 took an hour.
The C-141 flew to Dugway via Barber's Point, Hawaii. The
Technical Escort team and the aircrew had masks and Atropine. The
team worked in shifts to monitor the cargo by checking the pallet tie
downs and the containers. There was no way to check for leaks within
the containers. Since the gas was tasteless, odorless, and invisible,
the method used to detect leaks indoors was to place several rabbits
in cages around the area and see if they were affected. This
procedure was done on the flight. The rabbits survived. The trip was
uneventful.
SOURCES: Trip Report, DTC 69-14, Tech Escort Support, 27-28 Mar 69,
1Lt P.C. Spencer, 313 AD/DMW, 30 Apr 69, in History 400 MMS, Jan-JUn
1969, and Interview with Lt Col P. C. Spencer, USAF, Ret., 3 Jul 1998.
21
[H-25]
2. Clay/Killpack Letter (7 AF/CC Letter to 8 TFW/CC)
At some point after 7 June 1998, CNN provided a copy of an Air
Force letter from the Seventh Air Force (7 AF) Commander to the 8th
Tactical Fighter Wing (8 TFW) Commander, congratulating the latter on
his wing's performance in Operation TAILWIND. The letter had a one-
page attachment with excerpts from a TAILWIND after-action report. At
issue is an unreadable digit in the last paragraph of the excerpts
page, referring to a cluster bomb unit (CBU) weapon, possibly CBU-15
or CBU-25.
The historians found a copy of the 7 AF letter in the history of
the 8 TFW, July-September 1970. It did not include the attachment.
They also found correspondence forwarding the 7 AF letter to the Wing
Director of Operations and the 16th Special Operations Squadron (16
SOS) because the 7 AF letter singled out one AC-130 crew for special
praise.
On 30 June 1998, the historians received a copy of the TAILWIND
after-action report delivered to General Abrams by Lt Van Buskirk in
1970. From the fax markings, the report seems to have come from the
McCarley family. Most of the quoted items in the excerpts page match
the Van Buskirk report. The use of CBU-25s is mentioned three times
in the Van Buskirk account. Van Buskirk's report identified the gas
munition used on 14 September 1970 as CBU-19 tear gas Actually, the
historians have determined that it was CBU-30 tear gas.
The historians were not able to find coverage of TAILWIND or the
7 AF Commander's letter in the history of 7 AF, July-December 1970
They could not find any similar congratulatory letters to any of the
other 7 AF Wings participating in TAILWIND.
22
[H-26]
Attached to the copy of the 7 AF Commander's letter provided by
CNN was a Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) listing for a
September 1967 Air Proving Ground Command Report of an engineering
evaluation of the CBU-15/A.
The report covers test of the CBU-15/A with F-100, F-105, and F-
4C aircraft from August 1964 through July 1967. The Phase I bomb
operated properly, but did not provide enough area coverage to meet
the operational requirement. It was also estimated that a larger
Phase II bomb would not meet the operational requirement
It was recommended that if six SUU-13/A dispensers were fitted to
an F-4D, it might produce an area coverage to meet the operational
requirement.
The report shows that this munition was being tested on fast-
moving jet aircraft. There is no indication of compatibility testing
with "slow moving" A-1 Skyraider aircraft.
23
[H-27]
3. Explanation of Research in SEADAB and CACTA
The Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) is in the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). It describes fixed-wing
combat air missions of the U.S. military services, from 1970 to 1975,
and includes such data as mission dates, aircraft flown, weapons
loads, and bomb damage assessments. In 1977 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) gave the SEADAB computer tapes and SEADAB computer coding
instructions dated 1975 to NARA.
Early in 1993, an AF Reserve IMA officer assigned to the Air
Force History Support Office (AFHSO) began work on decoding the SEADAB
tapes in NARA. The Office of the Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO)
provided funding to a contractor which employed some personnel who
worked with SEADAB in the early 1970s. Additional funding was
provided in 1996 by Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC),
which needed the data for de-mining projects in SEA, in the effort to
locate and detonate unexploded ordnance dropped during the conflict in
SEA. A full and accurate decoding of the more than 170 data fields
for all of 1970-1975 requires significant additional research.
WhiLe doing their TAILWIND research, Air Force historians
requested that the Reserve officer generate a computer print-out from
SEADAB showing any CBU-15 munitions dropped by A-1 aircraft,
1970-1972. The print-out showed that the A-1s dropped "CBU-15
AntiMaterial" weapons more than 2,000 times. The historians knew an
error occurred because the CBU-15 is not an anti-materiel munition and
the weight of the weapon was incorrect. They doubted that the CBU-15
nerve agent bomb could have been used secretly over 2,000 times. They
asked the USAF Reserve officer who had generated the print-out to see
if the coding instructions could explain how the error occurred.
24
[H-28]
The officer consulted a second set of SEADAB computer card
coding instructions which he had acquired from the Pacific Air Forces
(PACAF) history office. Both the PACAF coding instructions and the
1975 JCS coding instructions referred to the same SEADAB data base,
but the instructions were printed at different times.
The PACAF coding instructions are in a binder titled "Old
SEADAB Tables" and consist of two sets of print-outs showing the
current status of the computer card coding instructions from August
1970 to November 1974. One set with data printed in a narrow, compact
format identifies Code 415 in the munitions table (Table 8) as CBU-14
Anti-Material, 250 lbs. from 1970 to 1974. The other set, with a
spread out full text format, shows Code 415 in Table 8 as CBU-14
Anti-Material, 250 lbs. from August 1970 to September 1972 The 30
October 1972 edition shows Code 41S as CBU-15, but still describes it
as Anti-Material, 250 lbs. This change continues through 1974.
The bottom line was that in 1970, there was no code for CBU-15.
Code 415 meant CBU-14 in the card coding instructions for 1970. When
the tape was run for 1970 using the 1970 card coding instructions, it
showed CBU-14, 24, and 25 as anti-material and anti-personnel bomblets
and CBU-30 tear gas.
As a double check to the SEADAB data base, the historians
studied a second computerized data base in NARA, the Combat Air
Activities (CACTA) file. CACTA contains data from combat air missions
in Southeast Asia, October 1965-December 1970. It was the official
record for 1970 while SEADAB was still being tested. SEADAB became the
official record for operational aircraft sorties on 1 January 1971
NARA provided the historians with a CACTA computer data tape
which contained information on all missions flown in September 1970.
25
[H-29]
The historians sent the tape to the contractors who had been working
on SEADAB for the de-mining project. The contractors worked over the
4th of July weekend 1998 to extract data from the CACTA tape They
succeeded in producing a print-out of missions flown during the time
of TAILWIND, 11-14 September 1970.
The CACTA data on all missions flown during the TAILWIND
Operation showed no CBU-15 sarin gas munitions expended. No nerve
agent weapons of any type showed up in the CACTA data.
The SEADAB data had shown 4 sorties carrying CBU-30 on 13
September 1970 and 4 sorties carrying CBU-30 on 14 September.
Although the CACTA computer print-out was incomplete, it did show a
"Hobo" mission, number 623, carrying CBU-30 to target coordinates
YC44500380 on 14 September. One of the sorties shown in SEADAB for 14
September and expending CBU-30 also had the call sign "Hobo," mission
number 623, and target coordinates YC44500380. CACTA confirmed data
in SEADAB that CBU-30 was expended on 14 September by an aircraft with
the call sign "Hobo." "Hobo" was the call sign of the 1st Special
Operations Squadron of the 56th Special Operations Wing, which flew the
A-1 Skyraider missions on 14 September for Operation TAILWIND.
See Appendices G and I.
[Note: No appendices were provided]
26
[End Tab H]
[I-1]
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: The Secretary of the Army, 7/20/98
Prepared by COL Woolfolk, ECC, 695-7552
SUBJECT: Report Summary--Operation TAILWIND--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
PURPOSE: To Provide the Results of a Review of Allegations Regarding Operation TAILWIND
DISCUSSION: The Department of the Army conducted research to determine whether the Army used Sarin nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND as directed (Enclosure 1). The Army's report is at Enclosure 2.
Completed research revealed no evidence of use of Sarin chemicals by U.S. forces in Vietnam. No evidence has been found indicating that Sarin nerve gas was stored by the Army within Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. The Army did have Sarin in weapon storage facilities in Okinawa, Japan, during this time period.
These conclusions are based upon a two-part search for Army documents; the first within the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and the second within all Army organizations that could be expected to be aware of such use of Sarin nerve gas. Interviews were conducted with participants who had personal knowledge of and/or participated in the operation. Finally, specific research regarding the Army's storage and use of Sarin was conducted to provide the exact location of munitions storage.
The Army's costs for researching these allegations are approximately $38,643.00, which includes the 1,795 work hours used to conduct this research and expenditures such as telephone calls. The report will be updated if new evidence is found. The Army's points of contact for compiling this report are Colonel Robert Buckstad, who can be reached telephonically at 703-695-6432 or by email at bucksrd@hqda.army.mil; and Mr. Ed Arnold. at 703-614-0559 or arnolew@hqda.army.mil.
Enclosures
[I-2]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Front Matter
SECDEF Tasking Memo, dated 9 June 98
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army forwarding Memo, dated
10 July 1998
Report Summary- Operation TAILWIND, dated 9 July 1998
TAB A - Document Search Methodology and Results
Archives Search Divider
Army Personnel Command search methodology and resultsArmy Search Divider
Technology Management Office search methodology and resultsNumbered Tab Section
1 - Army Chief of Staff Message DTG 181 700ZJUN98)2 - FORSCOM
3- INSCOM
4 - TRADOC
5 - CNGB
6 - DCSLOG
7 - DCSINT
8- DCSOPS
9 - USASOC
10 - USARPAC
1 1 - AMC
12 - DCSPER
13 - DUSA-IA
14- DAIG
15 - CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY
16 - OTJAG
17 - MTMC
18 - SURGEON GENERAL
19 - USACIC
20 - CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE (AR-PERSCOM)
21 - SAILE-ZX
22 - SAMR
23 - JDIM-MC
24 - SAGC
[I-3]
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Army Search Tasker DividerDCSPER Tasking Message
Army Chief of Staff Tasking Message (DTG 181700ZJUN98)
TAB B - Methodology and Results of Personal Interviews of Individuals
Interview DividerInterview Taskers Divider
TAB C - Methodology and Results of Questions Sent to Army Command and Agencies
Specific QuestionsQuestions Tasker
TAB D - Cost table of Research Effort in support of Operation TAILWIND Document Search
TAB E - DCSLOG Information paper, dated 14 July 1998, on the documents related to an undated/unauthenticated summary of an alleged January 1970 shipment of 2.75" rockets.
TAB F - ODCSPER consolidated response to Army Chief of Staff questions on who had Executive Agent responsibility over Sarin during Operation TAILWIND timeframe, and who had Command and Control of lethal Agents stored in Okinawa during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND.
TAB G - Statements provided by individuals to Special Forces Association regarding Operation TAILWIND.
[I-4]
Secretary of Defense Cohen's memorandum of June 9, 1998 on TAILWIND allegations omitted; see Tab B.
[I-5]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
105 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0105
10 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
SUBJECT: Report Summary--Operation TAILWIND
The Department of the Army conducted research to determine whether the Army used Sarin Nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND as requested. See enclosure 1. This memorandum provides the report. See enclosure 2.
Completed research revealed no evidence of any such use of Sarin. There is no evidence that Sarin Nerve gas was stored by the Army within Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. The Army's costs researching these allegations are approximately $33,708.00 for the 1,710.5 workhours used to conduct this research and expenditures such as telephone calls. The report will be updated if new evidence is found.
These conclusions are based upon (1) a two part document search for Army documents (a) within the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and (b) within all Army organizations that reasonably could be expected to be aware of such use of Sarin Nerve gas, (2) interviews conducted with specific participants in the operation, and (3) specific research regarding the Army's storage and use of Sarin.
The Army points of contact for compiling this report are Colonel Buckstad, who can be reached telephonically at 703-695-6432 and by email at bucksrd@hqda.army.mil; and Mr. Arnold, at 703-614-0559 or amolew@hqda.army.mil.
[Signature]JOEL B. HUDSON
Enclosures
[I-6]
Department of the Army
Report Summary
Operation TAILWIND
Report, 20 July 1998
Contains Information Protected by the Privacy Act
DOI: 20 July 1998
[I-7]
Department of the Army
Report Summary
for
Operation TAILWIND
DOI: 20 July 1998
1. Purpose. This report provides the results of the Department of the Army's review into allegations that Sarin Nerve gas was used during Operation TAILWIND.
2. Conclusion. Research reveals no evidence of any use of Sarin, nor was it a goal of Operation TAILWIND to target U.S. Army defectors. Additionally, there is no evidence that Sarin nerve gas was stored by the Army in Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand.
3. Approach. The Department of the Army's review into the alleged use of Sarin Nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND focused on three specific research efforts.
a. First, we conducted a search for targeted documents which relate to the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. We searched in the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and within the Army organizations which could be expected to have been involved in any such use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. These searches revealed that there are no existing documents which indicate that the Department of the Army participated in the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND.
(1) The Army Declassification Agency did a search of their database using eighteen specific keywords (listed on page 2 of their report, see tab entitled Archives Search). The search identified 132 folders which required additional review. Of these, 130 were at the National Archive's Washington National Record Center (WNRC) (located in Suitland MD) and 2 rolls of microfilm which are at the Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks (Carlisle, PA). All folders and microfilm were reviewed. This in-depth review of the contents of each folder and microfilm was NEGATIVE for Operation TAILWIND information.
(2) The Technology Management Office within the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army released a message to all Army organizations which could be expected to have documentary evidence of any use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. Each organization was tasked to review their current files area and records holding areas, for all classified and unclassified documents that reference Sarin or TAILWIND during the period 1 Jan '70 and 31 Dec '75. This search resulted in four organizations reporting information pertaining to Sarin - none of which was related to Operation TAILWIND.
[I-8]
DOI: 20 July 1998
(a) The following Army organizations conducted document searches:
U.S. Army Forces Command
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
U.S. Army Pacific Command
U.S. Army Materiel Command
Military Traffic Management Command
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
National Guard Bureau
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Center for Military History
The Army Judge Advocate General
The Army Inspector General
The Army Surgeon General
Office of the Secretary of the Army
Program Manager, Chemical Demilitarization Office
(b) TAB A contains the results of document searches directed by the Technology Management Office and the Army Declassification Activity.
b. Second, the Center for Military History telephonically interviewed six of seven individuals identified as possibly having firsthand knowledge of Operation TAILWIND and, thus, any use of Sarin Nerve gas. SGT Jay Graves declined to be interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association. None of the interviewees had personal knowledge of the use of Sarin or any lethal chemical agent during Operation TAILWIND. All stated that the purpose of the mission was to attack installations on the Ho Chi Minh trail and create a diversion for another operation. Adair [one of the individuals interviewed] also stated that there was no mention before or after the mission about defectors or Caucasians in the area of operations. Adair himself saw no Caucasians during the operation except his fellow soldiers. Young [one of the individuals interviewed] saw the gas being sprayed, did not use his damaged mask when the [tear] gas drifted over him, and reported that those who breathed the gas "coughed, choked, but otherwise were not slowed down." Hagen [one of the individuals interviewed] also saw the mist [tear gas] drifting over their position. His mask had a bullet through the filter and when he breathed the gas, "I started throwing up, (and) fell to the ground in convulsions. In discussions with others after the mission, others said that once the effects wear off, you're fine." Schmidt [one of the individuals
[I-9]
DOI: 20 July 1998
interviewed] noted "it was typical to carry masks...it was a normal part of SOG kit." He felt the gas used was stronger than normal tear gas, but "did not hear any rumors to the effect that nerve gas was used on TAILWIND, or that it was ever used on SOG missions." Thus, the interviews conducted reveal that none of the individuals interviewed have any knowledge of the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND.(1) Each interview attempted to gain answers to the following:
(a) Document any information regarding the use of lethal chemical munitions in Vietnam.(b) Identify the exact storage location (base and country) of any lethal chemical munitions known by the interviewee.
(c) Identify the authority empowered to authorize the tactical use of lethal chemical munitions in support of Special Operations Group (SOG) missions.
(d) Identify the name and role of any soldier who might have additional information regarding Operation TAILWIND.
(2) The following lists the individuals who were interviewed:
(a) Individuals interviewed:Name -- Identified as a result ofSGT Minton, FNU -- Provided FAC audio tape from SOCOM archives
MSG Adair, Morris N. -- From USARV list of awarded individuals
SGT Young, David L. -- From USARV list of awarded individuals
WO1 Watson, William D. -- Referral
SGT Schmidt, Craig -- Early Bird Article
SGT Hagen, Michael E. -- From USARV list of awarded individuals
SGT Graves, Jay -- Early Bird Article (Declined to be interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association.)
(b) At TAB B are the interviewer's recapitulation of these interviews and the Army documents which tasked that the interviews be conducted.
[I-10]
DOI: 20 July 1998
c. Third, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics tasked the Army Materiel Command to provide answers to specific questions raised during internal DoD/Army discussions. We know that during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND, the Army had weapons containing lethal chemical agents stored within the continental United States and in Okinawa. There is no evidence that any lethal chemical agents were released for employment during the time of Operation TAILWIND. Following are the specific research questions:(1 ) What was the quantity of Sarin the US Army controlled then and now?(2) Where were lethal chemical munitions stored during the time of the operation?
(3) In what form was the lethal chemical agent stored (i.e., large drums, or weapons)?
(4) Who managed the custody of the lethal chemical agents? Who had authority to issue lethal chemical agents from the storage sites? Was any ever issued?
TAB C contains the results of the research and the Army documents tasking the research.
d. The Army researched additional issues which arose while developing this report.(1) The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, DA, analyzed two shipping documents related to an undated summary of an alleged January 1970 shipment of 2.75" rockets. The research revealed that the shipping labels do not conform with marking requirements in place at the time of Operation TAILWIND, for ammunition containing lethal chemical agents. Thus, the presence of the shipping label does not indicate a presence of Sarin. TAB E contains the analysis of these documents.(2) The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DA, orchestrated research to determine (a) which DoD agency was the executive agent for lethal chemical agents, and (b) who had command and control of the lethal agents stored in Okinawa during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND.
(a) The Center for Military History interviewed MG (Ret) John Hayes, the former Commander, 2nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, where Sarin was stored during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND. According to MG Hayes, the Army was the overall executive agent for the U.S. chemical stockpile at that time. MG Hayes had command and control of the Sarin stockpile in Okinawa during TAILWIND. During his
[I-11]
DOI: 20 July 1998
command, MG Haves never released or approved the release of any lethal chemical agents for use by any U.S. Forces serving in Southeast Asia.(b) TAB F contains the interview notes of MG(Ret) Hayes and other related documents.
4. Costs. It cost the Department of the Army approximately $38,418 and 1,795 workhours to conduct this research. Detailed costs are identified at TAB D.
[I-12]
[Note: None of the tabs listed were provided]
Department of the Army
Report Summary
for
Operation TAILWIND
Annotated Index
DOI: 20 July 1998
Results of searches for Army documents within the................ TAB A
National Archives' Washington National Record Center
and the Army reveal that there are no existing documents
which indicate that the Department of the Army participated
in the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND
Results of interviews of individuals who participated ........... TAB B
in or had personal knowledge of Operation TAILWIND
reveal that none of the individuals interviewed have any
knowledge of the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND
Results of specific research conducted regarding the ............ TAB C
types of munitions and chemicals available for use during
the time period of Operation TAILWIND reveals that while
lethal agents were stored as weapons, available Army
documents indicate that no lethal chemicals were stored in
Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand during the timeframe of Operation
TAILWIND (1970).
Detailed costs .................................................. TAB D
Analysis of shipping label and packing document allegedly........ TAB E
related to a 1970 shipment of unusual weapons to Okinawa,
provided by DoD for Army evaluation.
Interviews of MG (Ret) John Hayes, former Commander, ............ TAB F
2nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, during the TAILWIND period,
confirming command and control of lethal chemical munitions and
disposition of these munitions under his command.
[End Tab I]
[J-1]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000
10 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Secretary of the Navy [Signature John H. Dalton]
Prepared by: Eugene P. Angrist, Acting General Counsel,
614-1994
SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding Operation TAILWIND - INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM
PURPOSE: To provide the Secretary of Defense with the Results
of the Department of the Navy's Record Review
Regarding
Operation TAILWIND.
DISCUSSION: On June 9, 1998, the Secretary of Defense directed
the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a review of any
pertinent
sources to determine if the allegations of the use of Sarin gas
on U.S. defectors in Operation TAILWIND were
valid. This review
was the result of a CNN/Time report which aired on June 7, 1998,
and alleged that the U.S. military
used Sarin gas to kill
American defectors during Operation TAILWIND. This review took
thirty days and the results are
contained in the attachment.
There is no evidence, classified or unclassified, that Sarin gas
was used on American
defectors or in any way during Operation
TAILWIND.
Attachment:
1. Department of the Navy Report on Operation TAILWIND, with
attachments.
[J-2]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY REPORT ON
OPERATION TAILWIND
Introduction
On June 9, Secretary Cohen directed the Secretary of the
Navy to conduct a review of military records, historical
writings, other appropriate sources and interview individuals
with personal knowledge of Operation TAILWIND. This order
followed allegations by CNN and Time that Sarin nerve gas was
used to kill U.S. military defectors during this operation. The
Secretary of the Navy directed the General Counsel to conduct
this document search. On June 11, 1998, Acting General Counsel
of the Navy, Eugene P. Angrist, requested the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Director
of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Counsel to
the Commandant, Judge Advocate General of the Navy (JAG) and the
Staff Judge Advocate of the Marine Corps to document any
information to substantiate these allegations (attachment 1).
Overview of Review Process
This review process took 30 days to complete.
Approximately 224 total man-hours were spent searching various
archives for information related to Operation TAILWIND. The
following lists the areas searched:
CNO - Archives of Office of Naval Intelligence (N2), Deputy
CNO (Plans, Policy & Operations)(N3/N5), Deputy CNO
(Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments)(N8),
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Special Warfare
Command (SPECWARCOM), and the Naval Historical Center;
Marine Corps - Command Chronologies, Oral Histories, and
Archived Documents;
NCIS - Defense Clearance and Investigations Index,
automated index of NCIS investigative and adjudicative
files, the Counterintelligence Directorate's Case
Management System, and records in the NCIS Records Center;
JAG - Archives.
LtCol Arthur Picone Jr., USMC, (Ret.), a Marine veteran of
the operation (CH-53D Helicopter Aircraft Commander and Assigned
[J-3]
Alternate Flight Leader During Operation TAILWIND), was located,
questioned and voluntarily submitted a statement in which he
categorically denies the allegation of Sarin use (enclosure 5 of
attachment 2). Also, included is former Marine Corps pilot
Joseph L. Driscoll's statement to Congressman Sam Farr
(attachment 3) denying the use of Sarin gas during the
operation. Mr. Driscoll was a 1st Lieutenant, flying with HML-
367, a squadron of Cobra gunships, which supported Marine H-53
helicopters participating in Operation TAILWIND.
Summary
The Marine Corps produced all the information that the DON
can provide pertinent to this review (attachment 2). All of the
Navy components submitted negative reports (attachment 4). This
is not surprising in light of the fact that this operation
involved Army, Air Force and Marine Corps units only. The
documents provided include: Marine Aircraft Group 16 Command
Chronology for 1-30 September 1970 (EXCERPT); Marine Heavy
Helicopter Squadron 463 Command Chronology for 1-30 September
1970 (EXCERPT); selected message traffic IRT Operation TAILWIND;
Flightcrew Assignment/Debrief Sheets, Operation TAILWIND; in
addition to LtCol Picone's voluntary statement. None of the
information uncovered gives any indication that Sarin gas was
used during these missions.
Discussion
The following is an excerpt from U.S. Marines in Vietnam
1970-1971, pages 295 & 296:
Each month, from May through November, Marine
helicopters took part in SOG lifts, described in HMH-
463 reports as "a tri-Service mission in a denied
access area." These activities reached their climax
in Operation TAILWIND. During this operation, between
7 and 14 September, HMH-463 daily committed five or
six CH-53Ds, eventually supported by four Marine AH-
1Gs, five Army AH1G's or UH-1Es, two Marine and one
Air Force OV-10As, and numerous flights of jets. In
the face of heavy antiaircraft fire, the Marine-led
flights inserted a company-sized SOG force near a
North Vietnamese regiment and then, after the SOG
troops had accomplished their mission, extracted them.
The operation cost HMH-463 two CH-53s shot down and
six crewman wounded, all of whom were rescued.
[J-4]
Although Operation TAILWIND resulted in an
estimated 430 NVA casualties and in the capture of
documents of great intelligence value, it evoked sharp
protests to MACV from Generals McCutcheon and
Armstrong.
The documents discovered by the Marine Corps support this
narrative. "The purpose of the mission," according to Mr.
Driscoll, "was to create a disruption along the North Vietnamese
supply route. The unusually large size of the insertion was to
reacquire the enemy to re-deploy their forces in response."
This is echoed in the MAG-16 Command Chronology excerpt
(enclosure 1 of attachment 2). There is no mention of U.S.
defectors or the use of Sarin gas.
Conclusion
There is no evidence in the Navy and Marine Corps
classified or unclassified official records that would support
the allegation that Sarin gas was employed against U.S.
defectors, or that U.S. defectors were targeted in any way
during Operation TAILWIND. Two Marine Corps pilots who
participated in the operation support this view.
Attachments:
1. Acting General Counsel of the Navy memorandum, dated
June 11, 1998, subj: Allegations Regarding Operation
TAILWIND.
2. HD Comment on SECDEF Memo of 9JUN98, w/enclosures.
3. Letter to Congressman Farr from Joseph L. Driscoll, dated
June 22, 1998.
4. Other Navy Responses.
[End Tab J]
[K-1]
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC
Reply ZIP Code:
203 18-0300
DJSM 775-98
17 July 1 998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
Subject: Report of Operation TAILWIND
Attached is an unclassified version of the memorandum reporting the results of the review directed by the Secretary of Defense
Approved & Secured with Approval
by: DENNIS C. BLAIR, 17 July 1998DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff
Enclosure
[K-2]
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC
Reply ZIP Code:
20318-6000
17 July 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
Subject: Report of Operation TAILWIND Review
1. This memorandum reports the results of the review conducted in response to the SecDef memorandum, 9 June 1998, "Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind" (Tab A).
2. Conduct of the review:
a. Contact was made with US Pacific Command (USPACOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), all Joint Staff directorates, the Information Management Division (IMD), and the Chairman's Legal and Public Affairs offices. Agencies were tasked to conduct a review IAW with the directive in Secretary Cohen's memorandum. Official files including relevant historical files and retired records were searched. Participating agencies used an estimated 350 man-hours in the conduct of the review.
b. Reviews conducted by the following agencies found no evidence of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND: J1, J3, J4, J5, J6, J7, J8, and the Legal and Public Affairs offices.
c. The review conducted by USPACOM found no evidence of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. The review located one document; Annex B, Studies and Observation Group, to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1970, annual history. Since this document is available here, it was not forwarded by USPACOM.
d. The review conducted by USSOCOM found no evidence to support allegations of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. The following historical materials (Tab B) relating to TAILWIND accompanied the USSOCOM review report:
[K-3]
(l) Unclassified extract of 1970 MACV-SOG history discussing TAILWIND; it contains no mention of sarin gas or US defectors.
(2) Unclassified extracts from oral history interviews conducted by Dr. Richard Shultz with LTC Lawrence Trapp, LTC Jack Isler, LTC Ernest Hayes, and COL John F. Sadler, retired former members of MACV-SOG, which include discussion of TAILWIND or the use of CS gas.
(3) Tape cassette containing a copy of an alleged recording of Forward Air Controller radio communications during TAILWIND; it was given by SFC Denver Minton, a retired soldier who was on TAILWIND, to the USSOCOM Command Historian, Dr. John Partin. The tape has been furnished to Mr. William A. Davidson, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, for enhancement and review (tape not included at Tab B).
e. The review conducted by DJA found no evidence of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. Since DIA files for the period have been retired to the Washington National Records Center (WNRC), DIA personnel performed a search of electronic databases for raw intelligence reports and finished intelligence retired to the WNRC. Records of six documents apparently originated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were located using the search term "Chavane." These reports were not retained in DIA historical files; report numbers are at Tab C. Agency historian's files and the relevant files of Director's correspondence at the WNRC were searched manually. Mr. Benny Meyer and Mr. Chris Guenther, who served as DIA Southeast Asia analysts in 1970, could not recall any reports regarding defectors or the use of sarin gas.
f. The review conducted by personnel of IMD found no evidence to support allegations of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. Joint Staff corporate records under the control of the IMD and the Chairman's files (Wheeler files), Record Group 218 (Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) were searched.
g. The review conducted by personnel of the Joint History Office found no evidence to support allegations of the use of sarin gas or of the presence of US defectors during TAILWIND. Phone interviews of former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret) on 17 June1998 and former Director, Joint Staff, Gen John W. Vogt, USAF (Ret) on 18 June 1998 by Dr. Walter Poole revealed no new information
2
[K-4]
(MFR AT Tab D). Admiral Moorer said that he could not remember anything about TAILWIND; he also stated that he had no knowledge of the use of sarin gas or of the targeting of US defectors on TAILWIND. General Vogt had no memory of the use of sarin gas or of the killing of US defectors on TAILWIND. Vogt found the CNN story ~absolutely unbelievable," and he categorically denied having received or issued instructions for the use of sarin gas or for the killing of US defectors.
3. Description of Operation TAILWIND:
a. It is useful to begin with a review of how policies on the use of non-lethal chemical agents were developed between 1965 and 1970. Senior civilian and military officials were constantly attentive to public opinion, carefully defined the conditions for using riot control agents (RCA), and always specified the types of gas authorized for use.
b. In January 1965, without publicity, RCA were used in operations by South Vietnamese personnel who operated dispensers aboard US helicopters. General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) had secured the US Ambassador's political clearance to carry the aerial dispensers. On 20-21 March, Associated Press photographer Horst Faas accompanied South Vietnamese troops in the field and saw them with gas masks and chemical grenades. Faas told AP reporter Peter Arnett who published a story mentioning South Vietnamese "experiments with gas" and non-lethal gas warfare. A public furor followed in the US, which the CJCS characterized as having "literally engulfed the entire government" for two days. The US Ambassador opposed further use of RCA. Westmoreland persuaded the commander of South Vietnamese forces to issue instructions prohibiting the use of RCA on the battlefield.
c. In April 1965, as the first US combat troops entered South Vietnam, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) authorized GEN Westmoreland to employ RCA in accordance with authority granted by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. In July, during a background press briefing, the Secretary of Defense said that RCAs would not be used. On 9 September GEN Westmoreland--supported by the Ambassador--requested authority to use RCA for the specific purpose of clearing tunnels, caves, and underground, shelters encountered in tactical operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on 10 September, recommended use of RCA in combat situations, subject only to the judgment of the tactical commander on the scene. On 26 October, the CJCS authorized Westmoreland to
3
[K-5]
employ CN and CS tear gas during a search and clear operation in one village. On 2 November, upon receiving presidential approval, the Chairman granted Westmoreland authority to use CS and CN tear gas at his discretion during military operations in South Vietnam. In practice, delegation of authority usually went to battalion level. Use of nausea producing agents DM and CN-DM was not authorized. The next expansion of authority occurred on 20 January 1968, when the Secretary of Defense approved using CS in Laos during combat air crew recovery operations.
d. During April and May 1969, there were two incidents in which US Marines encountered use of unknown chemical agents by the North Vietnamese; two Marines died. On 25 November 1969, through National Security Decision Memorandum 35, President Richard Nixon reaffirmed US renunciation of first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. He added, however, that this renunciation did not apply to RCA and herbicides.
e. The incursion into Cambodia by US and South Vietnamese forces took place during May and June 1970. To offset the damage inflicted upon supply routes and bases running through Cambodia the enemy sought to expand their control in southern Laos. They undertook to improve passage of supplies down the Ho Chi Minh l~ail by attacking around the Bolovens Plateau to gain control of good dry weather roads and, during the rainy season, a river route into South Vietnam. About 5,000 indigenous personnel were available to disrupt enemy activities in Laos. Authority to use RCA in Cambodia and Laos was requested; it was subsequently granted by the National Command Authorities.
f. Ground operations in Laos had to be covert, so as not to openly violate the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos which forbade the signatories which included the US and North Vietnam from introducing foreign troops or other military personnel in Laos. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (SOG) was permitted to conduct certain types of operations in Laos as authorized by higher authorities in Washington, subject to the concurrence of the US Ambassador in Laos. The chain of command for SOG ran through COMUSMACV in Saigon to CINCPAC in Hawaii and then to the National Command Authorities in Washington.
g. Operation TAILWIND was undertaken for two reasons: to conduct a reconnaissance in force - an offensive operation to contact the enemy, and as a diversion in support of Operation GAUNTLET. TAILWIND was scheduled to begin on 3
4
[K-6]
September, but bad weather delayed it until 11 September. Helicopters inserted three platoons, with 120 indigenous and 16 US personnel, into the Chavane area of southern Laos.
h. The TAILWIND force, inserted under fire on 11 September, was almost constantly in contact with the enemy over the next 72 hours. Later on the 11th, the force discovered and destroyed an ammunition supply dump. On 12 September, the force engaged a platoon and then a company-size element. Tactical air support helped drive the enemy off. The force was heavily engaged throughout 13 September. On 14 September, while moving to the extraction landing zone, the force made contact with the enemy and overran a base camp. The extraction then took place under heavy small arms fire.
i. The script of the post-Tailwind briefing given by 1LT Robert Van Buskirk to GEN Creighton Abrams (COMUSMACV) at Kontum, a copy of which was received from Mr. Rudi Gresham (Tab E), states that (1) on 11 September tactical aircraft used "Rock-Eye" CBU in landing zone preparation and (2) that on 12 and 13 September tactical aircraft used CBU-25 against the enemy and (3) that on 14 September CBU- 19 was used to prepare the area around the extraction landing zone. The briefing script refers to only enemy soldiers being killed during the seizure of a battalion-size camp on 14 September. (Only two US servicemen, Robert Garwood, USMC, and McKinley Nolan, USA, are known to have defected and joined enemy forces during the Vietnam War).
j. At every US military echelon, TAILWIND was rated a success. Friendly losses were three killed (all indigenous) and 49 wounded (including all US ground personnel on TAILWIND); one UH-1G and two CH-53 helicopters crashed. Enemy killed were estimated at 432 ( 288 by air and 144 by ground action). The primary gain from TAILWIND was the capture of documents that constituted the most significant intelligence yet found about the activities of the 559~ Transportation Group. Another benefit was the diversion of enemy forces operating on the Bolovens Plateau. Despite the success of TAILWIND, the effort to reduce the US role in operations and to give indigenous forces an even larger role meant that there was no repetition of TAILWIND.
5
[K-7]
4. Conclusions: Extensive search and review of available records and interviews with ADM Moorer and Gen Vogt have failed to find any material to support the allegations that a military operation in Laos called "Operation TAILWIND" was directed toward US military defectors or that sarin nerve gas was used during the operation.
[Initials V. R., signature]DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Brigadier General, USA (Ret)
Director Joint History Office
[End Tab K]
[L-1]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
15 July 1998
The Honorable William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Pursuant to the direction of the CIA's Executive
Director, we have completed an exhaustive search for any
information regarding the recent media allegations
concerning Operation TAILWIND.
I have been authorized to provide the attached detailed
statement regarding our efforts and results. As stated
therein, the CIA found no information to support the
allegations that the military activity identified as
Operation TAILWIND was intended to take, or in-fact took,
any action against American deserters, or was intended to
employ, or in fact employed, sarin nerve gas. This
unclassified statement may be included in any public report
on this matter which your Department may issue.
You may also wish to note that we have also completed
action on all document referrals made pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) on this subject and have
returned same to your designated FOIA focal point office.
Sincerely,
[Signature]
Lee S. Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Attachment:
as stated
[L-2]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Unclassified Statement
of the
Central Intelligence Agency
regarding "Operation TAILWIND"
The Central Intelligence Agency has now completed an
exhaustive search for any information to support the media
allegations that the United States had used Sarin nerve gas
28 years ago in Laos in a "behind the lines" military action
known as "Operation TAILWIND" and/or that the purpose of
Operation TAILWIND was, at least in part, to locate and kill
American deserters.
The CIA's efforts included thorough searches in the
operational and analytical directorates of the CIA as well
as the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and
our history staff. In addition, knowledgeable civilian and
military personnel, including the senior CIA representatives
in Vientiane (Laos) at that time, were contacted for their
personal recollections.
Although we identified several documents which
contained references to Operation TAILWIND, we found no
information whatsoever to support either of the media
allegations. In addition, none of the individuals contacted
had any knowledge of the use of poison gas either in support
of allied or US military forces or against US deserters.
In conclusion, all records available to the CIA
establish that Operation TAILWIND was exclusively a military
operation which included reconnaissance (e.g., area recon),
monitoring (e.g., roadwatch), and exploitation (e.g.,
document capture or destruction of supplies) activities in
Communist-held areas of Laos. Certainly, a major if not key
objective was to identify and interdict Communist supplies
moving from North Vietnam while a subsidiary objective was
to provide diversionary relief to Laotian irregulars. The
CIA found no information to support the allegations that
Operation TAILWIND was intended to take, or in fact took,
any action against American deserters, or was intended to
employ, or in fact employed, sarin nerve gas.
13 July 1998
[End Tab L]
[M-1]
SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE MELVIN LAIRD
FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
On July 14, 1998, Colonel Thomas G. Bowman, USMCR, spoke with Secretary Laird to discuss Operation Tailwind. Secretary Laird indicated that he had a brief (approximately four minute) conversation with a journalist regarding Operation Tailwind and the use of Sarin gas.
Secretary Laird informed the journalist that he never authorized or was asked to authorize the use of Sarin gas while he was Secretary of Defense (1969-1973). Secretary Laird was aware of the fact that Sarin gas was located on Okinawa. He had no knowledge of Sarin gas being used at any time associated with operations "in theater." "In theater" meant any of the bases and installations in the Pacific area (Guam, Okinawa, etc.) area that were being used to support the Vietnam War. To the best of his knowledge none of the Sarin gas located on Okinawa was ever transported to Vietnam or any other location in Southeast Asia.
During the conversation the journalist read him portions of a transcript of a taped conversation between the journalist and ADM Thomas Moorer, USN, (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding the alleged use of Sarin gas during the Operation Tailwind. As read to him the comments seemed to indicate that ADM Moorer confirmed that Sarin gas was used. When asked for his comment regarding the information from the transcript, Secretary Laird indicated that he thought the allegation regarding the use of Sarin was "...was ridiculous. I met with ADM Moorer every afternoon at about 4:30 to discuss the operations in Vietnam. I have no recollection of him ever speaking to me about authorizing the use of Sarin. I would have had to approve such action."
Secretary Laird closed the conversation indicating that he thought very highly of the Special Forces and was proud of their accomplishments in Vietnam.
[End Tab M]
[O-1]
INTERVIEW OF DR. FREDERICK R. SIDELL
FORMER CHEF, CASUALTY CARE OFFICE
US ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL DEFENSE
JULY 15, 20,1998
Dr. Sidell explained that he is the former Chief of the Casualty Care Office, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He is now a consultant. He has an MD degree from New York University, with a specialty in internal medicine. He has published articles and co-authored books on chemical warfare agents. His primary job has been to work on chemical agents and antidotes thereto for the last 30 years. He was on a special team that went to Tokyo after the release of Sarin gas in the subway there in 1995.
Sarin was developed in 1938 by a German named Schrader, who was developing insecticides. It is a clear, colorless liquid that evaporates at about the same rate as water and not as fast as gasoline. Sarin belongs to a class of nerve agents called organophosphates. These compounds and their symbols include Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), and VX. They are similar in chemical structure to insecticides. Sarin is more volatile than other nerve agents are-- it evaporates at a higher rate, particularly compared to Tabun and VX. For this reason, it is considered a nonpersistent agent.
Nerve agents like Sarin are extremely toxic to humans. They can be absorbed through the skin, but the effects are most immediate and pronounced when the substance is inhaled. Sarin works by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme released by the nervous system. In the human body, organs are controlled by the nervous system. The nervous system releases a chemical or neurotransmitter that stimulates the organs, glands and muscles. That neurotransmitter enzyme is acetylcholine. In order to avoid continuous stimulation, neurotransmitter acetylcholine is broken down by another enzyme, acetylcholinesterase. Nerve agents work by blocking the activity of acetylcholinesterase so that this chemical break down does not occur, acetylcholine builds up, and the muscle or gland keeps contracting or secreting. As a result, hyperactivity in the organs and muscles, including the muscles in the airways and in the gastrointestinal tract, occurs upon exposure to nerve agents.
If Sarin vapor comes into contact with a person's face, it causes miosis--constriction of the pupils in the eyes and redness. When the eyes are affected, nausea and vomiting occur as a reflex action. Salivation would occur in the mouth, and a runny nose or rhinorrhea would also result. Upon inhalation, the airways would constrict, and shortness of breath would ensue.
Human skin is a good protectant against Sarin and resists vapor. If you put on a gas mask and stood naked while exposed to Sarin vapor, you could withstand 5 to 10 times the amount of exposure that you could withstand if you inhaled it.
[O-2]
The best protection against inhalation of Sarin is a gas mask. If the concern is exposure to the liquid on the skin, the best precaution is a rubber suit or "mop suit," and they are available commercially.
In terms of ability to cause human fatalities, 100 milligrams of Sarin per cubic meter would kill 50 percent of people who inhaled that concentration for one minute. If liquid was placed directly on the skin, 1.5-1.7 milliliters would be fatal. This amount equates roughly to one third of a teaspoonful. If vapor is inhaled, effects occur in seconds to minutes. If liquid exposure occurs, effects occur in minutes to hours. If exposed to high enough concentrations, unconsciousness may result in seconds, convulsions in minutes and death in as few as 10 minutes. Sarin may be employed an effective lethal weapon. In weapons, Sarin is in liquid form, and detonation tends to cause the vaporization and dispersion of the liquid.
The best antidote for Sarin consists of a combination of two substances--atropine and pralidoxime. The Swedes have developed an autoinjector that is very effective, although the US has a system that is superior. Each soldier is supposed to carry three sets of autoinjectors. The antidote essentially works by blocking the acetylcholine from reaching the organs.
The compounds CS and CN are classified as riot control agents. Although similar in effect, they are different compounds. It takes less CS to cause reactions in humans than it would take if exposed to CN.
The effects of Sarin exposure on humans are different than those of CS or CN. Riot control agents cause burning eyes, red eyes, tearing, and may cause the eyes to close. Nerve agents do not cause burning, although they may cause tearing. Sarin would cause miosis or contraction of the pupil, which would last for days or even weeks. Riot control agents cause the nose to burn and a runny nose (rhinorrhea). Sarin does not cause a burning sensation in the nose, although it would cause a runny nose. Riot control agents also cause a burning in the mouth area and salivation. Coughing may occur. Sarin exposure causes excessive salivation but not a burning sensation. Sarin exposure also causes secretions from the airways and extreme shortness of breath. If Sarin is inhaled directly, unconsciousness may result in seconds. Riot control agents do not cause loss of consciousness. Riot control agents cause a burning sensation on exposed skin; Sarin does not. If a sufficient concentration of Sarin is inhaled, the person becomes unconscious, then goes into convulsions and twitching, and then becomes flaccid. With riot control agent, convulsions are not generally experienced, although retching from inhalation of the tear gas is not uncommon.
Medically, there are no lingering effects commonly associated with exposure to nerve agents. In this country, at least one thousand people have been exposed to non-fatal doses of nerve agents, either deliberately or accidentally, and no long-term adverse effects have been noted. However, exposure to organophosphate insecticides has been known to cause nerve deficits within days or weeks of exposure, and those symptoms are known to continue over time.
If Sarin gas had been dropped on the forces of Operation Tailwind, the precise effect on the people on the ground would depend on a variety of factors, including the size of the weapon, whether the Sarin would be in liquid or vapor form, weather conditions (such as direction of the
[O-3]
wind), and whether people had protection such as gas masks. If those on the ground were unprotected and inhaled Sarin in sufficient quantity, it is unlikely that all would survive.
To his knowledge, we had no nerve agents in theater at the time of Operation Tailwind, nor did we have it weaponized in ordnance small enough to be used on a small engagement like that operation--it was all in large bombs.
[O-4]
Frederick R. Sidell, M.D.
14 Brooks Road
Bel Air, MD 21014
410-838-7253
Education
1960-1964- Internship and Residency (Internal Medicine), Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital, Cleveland, OH
1960 - MD, New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY
1956 - BS (Chemistry), Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio
Civilian Positions
1995 October - Retired from US government; chemical casualty consultant
1993-September 1995 - Chief, Chemical Casualty Care Office, USAMRICD
Late 1970s - September 1995 - Director, Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Course
1985-1991 - Director, Chemical Accident Rescue Team (Team was dissolved)
1989-1993 - Chemical Casualty Care Office, USAMRICD, APG, MD
1988-1989 - Chemical Casualty Task Area Branch, USAMRICD, APG, MD
1985-1988 - Plans, Operations, and Training Branch, USAMRICD, APG, MD
1979-1985 - CW Casualty Management Office, USAMRICD, APG, MD
1976-1979 - Chief, Clinical Resources Branch, Experimental Medicine Division, Biomedical Laboratory, APG, MD
1975-1976 - Chief, Medical Volunteer Office, Biomedical Laboratory, APG, MD
1974-1975 - Acting Chief, Clinical Research Department, Medical Research Laboratory, APG, MD
1968-1974 - Chief, Clinical Investigation Branch, Medical Research Lab, Edgewood Area, APG, MD
1966-1968 - Acting Chief, Clinical Research Department, Medical Research Laboratory, APG,MD
Military Positions
1964-1966 Captain, MC, USAR
1964-1966 Chief, Clinical Investigation Section, Clinical Research Department, Medical Research Division, CRDC, Edgewood Arsenal, MD. CPT, MC, U.S. Army
Boards and Committees
1987 Member AR 15-6 Environmental Hazard Board, APG
1965-1979 Member, Human Use Committee, USABML/MRL (dates approximate)
[O-5]
1970-1972 CRDL Equal Employment Opportunity Committee (first committee)
1979 Member, The Surgeon General's Investigative Team to Southeast Asia to investigate use of chemical agents against the H'Mong
1995 Member, U.S. medical team to Tokyo by Department of State by invitation of Japanese government after Tokyo subway nerve agent incident
Publications
1. Sidell, F.R., Harper, D.G. and Bottiglieri, N.G. Effects on Humans of Low Concentrations of GB Vapor, CRDL TM 2-15, April 1965, Classified report
2. Sidell, F.R., Groff, W.A. and Vocci, F. Effects of EA 3148 Administered Intravenously to Humans. TM 2-31, November 1965, Classified report
3. Bottiglieri, N.G., Sidell, F.R. and Sim, V.M. Human Effects from Atmospheric Contamination with Low concentrations of GB. TM 2-27, August 1965, Classified report
4. Sidell, F.R. and Groff, W.A. Oral Toxicity of VX to Humans. EATR 4009, May 1966
5. Fleisher, J.H., Clark, J.H. and Sidell, F.R. Dose-Response Effects and "Aging" of Human Red-Blood-Cell Cholinesterase After Poisoning with EA 3148 June 1966. Classified report
6. Sidell, F.R. Human Responses to Intravenous VX. EATR 4082, April 1967
7. Sidell, F.R., McShane, W.P. and Hayes, A.H. The failure of Methylphenidate to Influence the Therapy of VX Poisoned Rats. EATR 4125, August 1967.
8. Sidell, F.R. and Groff, W.A. Reactivation of VX-Induced Cholinesterase by 2-PAMCl in Humans. EATM 114-11, September 1967
9. Sidell, F.R. and Kysor, K.P. A Review of the Time Course of the Central Effects of Incapacitating compounds in Humans. EATM 114-19, October 1968,
10. Sidell, F.R., Mershon, M.M., Savola, R.H., Schwartz, H.N., Wiles, J.H. and McShane, W.P. Treatment of Percutaneous VX Intoxication in Rabbits under Conditions Simulating Self-Therapy in the Field. EATM 114-22, September 1968
11. Sidell, F.R. A Summary of the Evaluation of CAR 302,196 in Humans, EATR 4213, January 1969
12. Sidell, F.R., Groff, W.A. and Ellin, R.I. Blood Levels of Oxime, Excretion Rates, and Side Effects Produced by single Oral Doses of N-Methylpyridinium-2-Aldoxime Methanesulfonate (P2S) in Humans. EATR 4265, January 1969
[O-6]
13. Sidell, F.R. and McShane, W.P. A Comparison of Separate Versus Mixed Solutions of Atropine and 2-PAMC1 in the Therapy of VX Poisoned Rats. EATM 114-23, April 1969
14. Craig, F.N., McMichael, P.D., Robinson, P.R. and Sidell, F.R. Effects of BZ on Temperature Regulation in Man. EATM 112-11, October 1969
15. Sidell, F.R., Karger, S., Simons, C.J. and Weimer, J.T. CAR 302,688: Aerosol Administration to Man. EATR 4395, May 1970.
16. Oberst, F.W., Ellin R.I., Farrand, R.I., Billups, N.B., Koon, W.S., Musselman, N.P., Crouse, C.L. and Sidell, F.R. Development of Methods for Detecting and Measuring Volatile Effluents. A Status Report. EATR 4415, August 1970
17. Sidell, F.R. Drug Absorption: Some Mathematical Considerations. EATR 4619, May 1972
18. Sidell, F.R. and Ketchum, J.S. Per Capital, Per Kilo, Per Liter, or Per Meter: An Analysis of Dose Expression in Clinical Pharmacology. EATR 4599, December 1971
19. Sidell, F.R. and Braun, B.G. EA 3834A: Effects in Man After a Single Oral Dose. EATR 4597, March 1972
20. Sidell, F.R., Ketchum, J.S., Markis, J.E. and Kysor, K.P. Compound 302,196: Intramuscular Administration to Man. EATR 4634, April 1972.
21. Sidell, F.R., Groff, W.A. and Kaminskis, A. Ethyl Alcohol: Is Elimination Rate Dose Dependent? EATR 4645, April 1972
22. Ketchum, J.S., Shiner, P., Kysor, K.P., Houff, C., Sidell, F.R., and Sim, V.M. Relationships Among Dose, Time, and Various Measures of Laboratory and Military Performance in Volunteers Receiving a Centrally Active Cholinergic Blocking Agent (EA3580). EATR 4678.
23. Sidell, F.R. The use of Physostigmine by the Intravenous, Intramuscular and Oral Routes in the Therapy of Anticholinergic Drug Intoxication: EB-TR-76012, May 1976
24. Josselson, J. and Sidell, F.R. Dose-Response Effects of Intravenous Thiamine Hydrochloride on Pralidoxime Pharmacokinetics in Man. EB-TR-76117, March 1977
25. Josselson, J. and Sidell, F.R. Thiamine Hydrochloride as an Adjunct to Pralidoxime in a Simulated Therapeutic Setting, EB-TR-76118, March 1977
26. Sidell, F.R., Groff, W.A. and Ellin, R.I. Blood Levels of Oxime and Symptoms in Humans After Single and Multiple Doses of 2-PAMCl. J. Pharm. Sci. 58:1093-1098 (1969).
27. Sidell, F.R., Magness, J.S. and Bollen, T.E. Modification of the Effects of Atropine on
[O-7]
Human Heart Rate Modification by 2-PAMC1. J. Pharm. Sci.11:68-76, (1970).
28. Sidell, F.R. and Groff, W.A. Toxogonin: Blood Levels and Side Effects after Intramuscular Administration in Man. J. Pharm. Sci.59(6):793-797 (1970).
29. Sidell, F.R. and Pless, J.E. Ethyl Alcohol: Blood Levels and Performance Decrements After Oral Administration to man. Psychopharmacological9:246-261. (1971)
30. Sidell, F.R. and Groff, W.A. Intramuscular and Intravenous Administration of Small Doses of 2-Pyridinium Aldoxime to Man. J.Pharm.Sci.60:1224-1228(1971)
31. Sidell, F.R. and Groff, W.A. Toxogonin: Oral Administration to Man. J. Pharm. Sci. 60:860-863 (1971).
32. Sidell, F.R., Groff, W.A. and Kaminskis, A. Pralidoxime Methane Sulfonate: Plasma Levels and Pharmokinetics After Oral Administration of a New Preparation to Man. J. Pharm. Sci. 61:1136-1140 (1972).
33. Hayes, A.H., Jr., McShane, W.P. and Sidell, F.R. The Effects of Acetyl Strophanthidin on the Hearts of Normal Dogs. British Journal of Pharmacology 38, (3), P. 616-619, March 1970.
34. Klapper, J.A., McColloch, M.A. and Sidell, F.R. The Effects on Personality of Reactivity to 1,2-Dimethyl-heptyl Tetrahydrocannabinol. Arch Gen Psychiat 26: 483-485, (May 1972).
35. Sidell, F.R., Groff, W.A. and Kaminskis, A. Toxogonin and Pralidoxime: Kinetic Comparison After Intravenous Administration to Man. J. Pharm. Sci. 61:1765-1769 (1972).
36. Ketchum, J.S., Sidell, F.R., Crowell, E.B., Aghajanian, G.K., and Hayes, A.H. Atropine, Scopolamine, and Ditran: Comparative Pharmacology and Antagonists in Man. Psychopharmacologia 28:121-145 (1973)
37. Swartz, R.D. and Sidell, F.R. The Effects of Changes in Renal Blood Flow on the Renal Excretion of Pralidoxime Chloride. Abs: Fed Proc 312518 1972 also: Effects of Heat and Exercise on the Elimination of Pralidoxime in Man. Clin. Pharm Therap. 14:83-89 (1973).
38. Sidell, F.R., Aghajanian, G.K. and Groff, W.A. The Reversal of Anticholinergic Intoxication in Man with the Cholinesterase Inhibitor VX. Proc. Soc. Exp. Biol. Med. 144:725730 (1973)
39. Sidell, F.R., Pless, J.E., Neitlich, H., Sussman, P., Copelan, H.W. and Sim, V.M. Dimethylheptyl-delta-6a-10a-tetrahydrocannabinol: Effects After Parenteral Administration to Man. Proc. Soc. Exp. Biol. Med. 142:867-873 (1973).
40. Ellin, R.I., Groff, W.A., and Sidell, F.R. Penetration of Pyridinium Oximes Into Human Red Blood Cells, Biochem. Pharmacol. 23:2663-2670 (1974).
[O-8]
41. Swartz, R.D., Sidell, F.R. and Cucinell, S.A. Effects of Physical Stress on the Disposition of Drugs Eliminated by the Liver in Man J. Pharm. Exp. Therap. 188:1-7 (1974).
42. Sidell, F.R. and Groff, W.A. The Reactivability of Cholinesterase Inhibited by VX and Sarin in Man. Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol. 27:241-252 (1974).
43. Sidell, F.R. Sarin and Soman: Clinical Manifestations and Treatment of Accidental Poisoning. Clin. Toxicol. 7:1-17 (1974).
44. Ellin, R.I., Farrand, R.L., Oberst, F.N., Crouse, C.L., Billups, N.B., Koon, W.S., Musselman, N.P. and Sidell, F.R. An Apparatus for the Detection and Quantitation of Volatile Human Effluents. J. Chrom. 100:135-152 (1974).
45. Sidell, F.R., Culver, D.L. and Kaminskis, A. Serum Creatine Phosphokinase Activity After Intramuscular Injection. JAMA 229:1894-1897 (1974).
46. Sidell, F.R. Modification by Diluents of Effect of Intramuscular Atropine on Heart Rate in Man. Clin. Pharmac. Therap. 16:711-715 (1974).
47. Sidell, F.R., Markis, J.E., Groff, W., and Kaminskis, A. Enhancement of Drug Absorption After Administration by an Automatic Injector. J. Pharmacokin Biopharm. 2:197-210 (1974).
48. Sidell, F.R. and Kaminskis, A. Influence of Age, Sex, and Oral Contraceptives on Human Blood Cholinesterase Activity Clin. Chem. 21:1393-1395 (1975).
49. Sidell, F.R. and Kaminskis, A. Temporal Intrapersonal Variability of Cholinesterase Activity in Human Plasma and Erythrocytes. Clin. Chem. 21:1961-1963 (1974)
50. Sidell, F.R. Clinical Aspects of Intoxication by Cholinesterase Inhibitors. Chapter in Medical Protection Against Chemical Agents. Published by SIPRI, Stockholm, Sweden, (1976).
51. Josselson, J. and Sidell, F.R. Effect of Intravenous Thiamine on Pradidoxime Kinetics. Clin. Phar. and Ther. 24:95-100 (1978). (Also: EB-TR-76115, Dec. 1976)
52. Lewis, C.W., Sidell, F.R., Tigertt, W.D., Lane, C.D., and Kelly, B.L. Final Report of DASG Investigative Team: Use of Chemical Agents Against the H'Mong in Laos. DASG, Washington, D.C. 20310 (1979)
53. Sidell, F.R. Studies of Nerve Agent Poisoning in Man. Chapter in: The Use of Animal Models in Development of Pretreatment and Therapy for Nerve Agent Poisoning. A Review of the Literature. L.W. Harris, coordinator, pages 19-53. USAMRICD SP-23-83 Dec 1982. Classified Document
54. Sidell, F.R. Atropine. Chapter in: The Use of Animal Models in Development of
[O-9]
Pretreatment and Therapy for Nerve Agent Poisoning. A Review of the Literature. L.W. Harris, coordinator, pages 55-71. USAMRICD - SP 23-83 Dec 1982. Classified Document
55. Sidell, F.R. Oximes. Chapter in: The Use of Animal Models in Development of Pretreatment and Therapy for Nerve Agent Poisoning. A Review of the Literature. L.W. Harris, coordinator, pages 73-96. USAMRICD - SP-23-83 Dec 1982. Classified Document
56. Sidell, Frederick R.: Medical Aspects of Nerve Agent Exposure, Medical Bulletin of the U.S. Army Medical Department. PB 8-88-8:3-8. 1988
57. Durm, M.A. and Sidell, F.R.: Progress in Medical Defense Against Nerve Agents. JAMA 262(5):649-652(1989).
58. Sidell, F.R. What to do in Case of an Unthinkable Chemical Warfare Attack or Accident. Postgrad. Med. 88:70-84 (1990)
59. Lukey, B.J., Parrish, J.H., Marlow, D.D., Clark, C.R. and Sidell, F.R. Pharmacokinetics of Physostigmine Intramuscularly Administered to Guinea Pigs. J. Pharm. Sc. 79:796-798 (1990)
60. D'Mello, G.D. and Sidell, F.R. A Model for Carbamate and Organophosphate-induced Emesis in Humans. Neurosci. and Biobehav. Rev. 15:179-184 (1991)
61. Author, unacknowledged. Nerve Agents. The Medical Letter, November (1990).
62. Gunderson, C. H., Lehmann, C. R., Sidell, F. R., Jabbari, B. Nerve Agents: A Review. Neurology. 42:946-950 (1992)
63. Borak, J., Sidell, F. R. Agents of Chemical Warfare: Sulfur Mustard. Ann. Emergency Med. 21:303-308 (1992)
64. Sidell, F. R. Civil Emergencies Involving Chemical Warfare Agents: Medical Considerations. In Chemical Warfare Agents. S. Somani, Ed. Pg. 341-356. Academic Press, Inc. San Diego, Calif 1992
65. Sidell, F. R., Hurst, C. G. Clinical Considerations in Mustard Poisoning. Pg. 52-66. In Chemical Warfare Agents. S. Somani, Ed. Academic Press, Inc. San Diego, Calif. 1992
66. Sidell,F.R. Clinical Considerations in Nerve Agent Intoxication. Pg. 156-194. In Chemical Warfare Agents. S. Somani, Ed. Academic Press, Inc. San Diego, Calif. 1992
67. Sidell, F. R., Borak, J. Chemical Warfare Agents: II. Nerve Agents. Ann. Emergency. Med. 21:865-871(1992)
68. Urbanetti, J. S., Sidell, F. R. Chemical Exposure. Pg. 48-53. In Principles and practice of
[O-10]
medical intensive care. R. W. Carlson and M. A. Geheb, Ed. W. B. Saunders. Philadelphia, PA. 1993
69. Sidell, F. R. The Medical Management of Chemical Casualty Course in CONUS and Europe during Desert Shield. J. U.S. Army Med. Dept. PB8-92-3/4:10-12. (1992)
70. Sidell, F. R. Clinical Effects of Organophosphorus Cholinesterase Inhibitors. J. Appl. Toxicol.1994.14:111-113
71. Smith, K.J., Hurst, C.G., Moeller, R.B., Skelton, H.G., and Sidell, F.R. Sulfur mustard: Its continuing threat as a chemical warfare agent, the cutaneous lesions induced, progress in understanding its mechanism of action, its long-term health effects, and new developments for protection and therapy. J.Am.Acad.Dermatol. 1995. 32:765-776
72. Ruhl, C.M., Park, S. J., Danisa, O., Morgan, R. F., Papirmeister, B., Sidell, F. R., Edlich, R. F., Anthony, L. S., Himel, H.N. A serious skin sulfur mustard burn from an artillery shell. J. Emergency Med. 1994. 12:159-166.
73. Sidell, F.R., Smith, W. J., Petrali, J. P., Hurst, C. G. Sulfur Mustard: A Chemical Vesicant Model. Chapter 9 in Dermatotoxicity. Pg 119-130. Ed: Marzulli, F. N. and Maibach, H. I. Fifth Edition.Taylor and Francis. Washington, D.C. 1996.
74. Marrs, T. C., Maynard, R. L., and Sidell, F. R. Chemical Warfare Agents. John Wiley and Sons. Chichester, England. 1996.
75. Sidell,F.R. Chemical Terrorism. (Editorial). Annals of Emergency Medicine. August 1996.
76. Sidell, F. R., Franz, D. R. Overview: Defense against the effects of chemical and biological warfare agents. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997:1-7.
77. Sidell, F. R. Nerve agents. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Fr~n7 DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997:129-179.
78. Sidell, F. R., Urbanetti, J.S., Smith, W.J., Hurst, C.G. Vesicants. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997: 197-228.
[O-11]
79. Sidell, F. R. Riot Control Agents. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General and Borden Institute: 1997: 307-324.
80. Sidell, F. R. Triage of chemical casualties. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997: 337-349.
81. Sidell, F. R. and Hurst, C. G. Long term health effects of nerve agents and mustard. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz, DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997: 229-246.
82. Ketchum, J.S. and Sidell, F. R. Incapacitating agents. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997: 287-305.
83. Dunn, M.A., Hackley, B.E.,Jr., and Sidell, F. R. Pretreatment for nerve agent exposure. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz, DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997: 181-196.
84. Sidell, F.R., Bresell, R. R., Mosebar, R. H., McNeill, K.M., and Takafuji, E.T. Field management of chemical casualties. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji, ET, Franz DR, eds. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. In: Zajtchuk, R, Bellamy RF, eds. Textbook of Military Medicine. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, Office of The Surgeon General, and Borden Institute; 1997: 325-336.
85. Sidell, F. R. Management of Chemical Warfare Agent Casualties. A Handbook for Emergency Medical Services. HB Publishing. Bel Air, MD. 1995
86. Sidell, F.R., Patrick, W. C., Dashiell, T. R. Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook. Jane's Information Group. Alexandria, VA. 1998
Presentations
Scientific presentations at ASPET meetings.
[O-12]
Panelist and presenter: Symposium on Stress and Drug Disposition, FASEB Montreal, Canada; Symposium on Triage, Columbus, Ohio, 1985
Invited speaker at seminar at Amer. Lung Assoc./Amer. Thoracic Soc. meeting, May 1991
Presentations at international scientific meetings held in Hercenova, Yugoslavia; Stockholm, Sweden; and Cambridge, U.K.
Presentations to the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, and to U.S. Senate Subcommittee
Hundreds of presentations on management of chemical casualties, including many sessions open to community health care providers, e.g., Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Richmond, Kentucky
Invited speaker at opening plenary session of annual meeting, American Association Medical Toxicologists, Toronto, Canada, October 1991.
Speaker, DIA, Treaty Verification Courses
Other
Reviewer, Journal American Medical Association
Reviewer, Scientific American Medicine
Reviewer, Annals of Emergency Medicine
Professional Organizations
American Society of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics
American College of Clinical Pharmacology
Awards
Several USAMRL/USAMRICD Achievement Awards
Consortium of Federal Laboratories Award for Information Exchange
Meritorious Service Award, U. S. Army National Guard. 1990
Department of the Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service - November
1989
Department of the Army Achievement Medal--January 1990
USAMRICD Commander's Medal February 1993
[End Tab O]
[P-1]
[Fax header:] JUL-01 10:57 P.01
SPECIAL FORCES ASSOCIATION
Post Office Box 41436
Fayetteville, North Carolina 28309-1436
|Telephone: 910-485-5433
Fax: 910-485-1041
E-mail: sfahq@aol.com
26 June 1998
STATEMENT
I, James Graves, discussed with CNN several operations I participated in while serving in Vietnam with Special Forces.
I did not participate in Operation "Tailwind" as an advanced Recon or in any other way during September 1970 in Laos. SIGNED WITNESS [James Graves] [James Dean]
[End Tab P]
[Q-1]
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307
8 OCT 1970
Colonel Larry M. Killpack Commander 8th Tactical Fighter Wing Dear Colonel Killpack Recently I attended a briefing given General Abrams, COMUSMACV, on "Tailwind", an operation conducted between 11 and 14 September by a force under MACV direction. In support of this action, elements under the operational control of this command flew 76 tactical sorties and, in addition, provided forward air control. Unfortunately, class- ification prohibits further description of the operation. The briefer had been a member of the element on the ground. He presented, in well documented terms, how his unit repeatedly engaged enemy forces, and how critical tactical air support was to the success of the action. In all, 173 enemy killed by tactical air were claimed, a figure which may be on the conservative side. Describing the air sup- port as "magnificent", the briefer further stated the mission could not have been accomplished without the coordinated, accurate air support his forces received. I am attaching a copy of some excerpts from his presentation. At the close of the briefing, General Abrams stated he "was convinced a valuable operation executed with great skill and a demonstra- tion of tremendous courage." The professionalism demonstrated by your crews in support of this important action was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Air Force. I have been informed that a special "well done" and thank you" is due Major Edward B. Flora and the crew of MOODY 2.
[Q-2]
I commend you and all the men of the 8th TFW who contributed to the
achievements of "Tailwind".
Sincerely,
[Signature]
L. D. CLAY, JR., General, USAF 1 Atch
Commander Excerpts from
Briefing
[Q-3]
EXCERPTS FROM BRIEFING
"The friendly lives saved cannot be reckoned, however, the inference
is clear. Of the 136 men participating, three were killed, 50 wounded.
Only five of the wounded required hospitalization. "
"The 1st Platoon reported only 1 enemy confirmed killed, but estimated
that 35 enemy were killed by Spectre aircraft which provided support
throughout the night. Third section reported 30 enemy killed by air,
in their segment of the perimeter, and the 2nd section reported 2 enemy
killed by air, and no enemy killed by ground actions. The Spectre
aircraft was unable to read the signals from the companies trans-
ponders or mini-ponders. The pilot stated his equipment was old,
and he adjusted his A/C fire continuously from the flashes of B-40
rockets, exploding hand grenades, and trip flares that the company
reported to him. Throughout the night of D+1, 1st and 3rd platoon
members could hear the enemy cry out, groan, moan, and other
sounds of pain. They could hear many objects being dragged away
within 5 meters of their positions. After the A/C would fire, they
could hear the enemy run and bang into trees as they fled in panic;
they could hear some cry out as they died. Shortly thereafter, they
could hear the sound of heavy objects again being dragged away from
their positions, then more enemy signals and incoming grenades.
The company estimated the aircraft as having killed a minimum of
67 enemy throughout the night."
"The TAC Air was successful on the 1st enemy squad and killed
approximately half of the other squad."
"TAC Air was directed throughout the areas where earlier contact
had occurred. The.enemy did not make contact with the element again
until the following day."
"Due to the canopy thinning out, the base camp was marked with a
white phosphorous grenade and TAC Air was brought to bear on the
enemy soldiers fleeing to the front and the right flank. The enemy
who had remained in the center of the base camp took up positions in
huts which were assaulted and destroyed. The first section killed a
confirmed 54 enemy in huts, bunkers and spider holes. Two of these
were NVA Sr. Master Sergeants. The 2nd section killed 17 enemy on
the left flank. TAC Air killed an estimated 25 fleeing enemy soldiers.
"We cannot say enough good things about the air support we received.
They were magnificent. Without their 76 sorties our job would not
have been possible."
Although not set forth in the formal presentation, comments from men
on the ground attest to accurate and effective delivery of CBU-[maybe 15; illegible]
"everytime it was brought in."
[End Tab Q]
[T-1]
INTERVIEWEES
During DoD's investigation of CNN/Time's allegations about Operation Tailwind, the following people were interviewed.
Civilian Personnel
The Honorable Melvin Laird, former Secretary of DefenseDr. Frederick R. Sidell, former Chief, Casualty Care Office, USA
Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense
Joint Chiefs Of Staff
ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.), former Chairman, JCSGEN John W. Vogt, USAF (Ret.), former Director, Joint Staff
United States Air Force
Munitions Maintenance Personnel of the 56th Special Operations WingCMSgt Donald P. Guy, USAF (Ret )Col Donald L. Knight, USAF (Ret.)
SMSgt James L. McCoy, USAF (Ret.)
Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF (Ret.)
Lt Col Wilfred N. Turcotte, USAF (Ret )
A-1 Skyraider Pilots of the 56th Special Operations Wing
Maj Arthur N. Bishop, USAF (Ret.)Col Donald H. Feld, USAF (Ret.)
2d Lt Thomas K. Stump
Army Special Forces Rider with USAF Covey Forward Air Controllers
MSgt Lloyd O'Daniels, USA (Ret )Covey Forward Air Controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron
Col George E. Boehmer, USAF (Ret.)Maj Gary E Green, USAF (Ret.)
Lt Col Warner McGraw, USAF (Ret )
[T-2]
United States Army
Studies and Observations GroupMSG Morris N. AdairSGT Michael E. Hagen
LTC Ernest Hayes, USA (Ret )
LTC Jack Isler, USA (Ret.)
LTC Eugene McCarley, USA (Ret )
SFC Denver G. Minton
COL Robert Pinkerton, USA (Ret )
CPT Michael Rose, USA (Ret )
COL John Sadler, USA (Ret )
SGT Craig Schmidt
MG John Singlaub, USA (Ret )
LTC Lawrence Trapp, USA (Ret )
1LT Robert Van Buskirk
170th Assault Helicopter Company
WO 1 William D Watson
United States Navy
HML-3671st Lt Joseph P. DriscollHMH-463
LtCol Arthur J. Picone, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
[End Tab T]
[End Report]
Transcription and HTML by JYA/Urban Deadline